This dissertation will compare the concept of nature as it appears in the philosophies of the American pragmatist John Dewey and the Chinese daoist Zhuangzi (Chuang Tzu) and will defend two central claims. The first of these is that Dewey and Zhuangzi share a view of nature that is non-reductive, philosophically liberal, and more comprehensive than the accounts recurrent in much of the Western tradition. This alternate conception of nature is non-reductive in the way that it avoids the physically mechanistic outlook underwriting much of contemporary Anglo-American thought. It is philosophically liberal in that it accepts a more generous and progressive position than predominant Western orthodoxies. And, it is more comprehensive in scope insofar as it draws as much from the social sciences as it does from the natural sciences. The second claim defended will be that the synoptic vision gained from such a comparison offers a new heuristic program for research into the philosophical position known as naturalism, a program that can, at once, avoid the scientistic tendencies of the current, mainstream treatment of nature and reconnect with earlier, more inclusive models. Where Dewey's and Zhuangzi's ideas converge, one finds similarities in the prescriptions each made for human action, and where they differ, one finds mutually complementary insights. Finally, this heuristic will be used to refute various interpretations of Dewey and Zhuangzi that tend to understate or ignore the importance of nature within their schemes.

Unfortunately, for the most part, teachers do not teach the Nature of Science (NOS). Even when teachers have adequate NOS knowledge, their knowledge still does not make its way into practice. While there are various reasons for this happening, this study has isolated other, more typical, constraints to teaching in order to look more closely at the influence of personal epistemological beliefs, understandings of NOS, and their effects on practice. In an effort to minimize typical constraints of time for the teaching of NOS, a sixth grade physical science course was chosen as a way to minimize this constraint. Within this course there was a School District- mandated schedule for the teaching of NOS. This curriculum map included details of what NOS topics to teach and when to teach them. In Phase One of the study, correlational relationships between these understandings of NOS and personal epistemological beliefs were investigated. A Pearson Correlation Coefficient of 0.62 was calculated based on 28 sixth grade science teachers. In Phase Two of the research, eleven participants were chosen for a more in-depth analysis. Through the use of triangulation of interview data, classroom observations, artifact collection and survey scores to ascertain the constraints for each individual, even though few constraints could be verified that would affect instruction, only three of eleven participants taught NOS. Personal epistemological beliefs play a role in the way instruction is approached in either a constructivist or non-constructivist manner.

The purpose of this study is to assess issues that arise in the context of epistemological claims in narrative educational research by means of narrative analysis and epistemological evaluation. The research questions which guided the study were: 1) To what extent is epistemology considered by narrative educational researchers?; 2) What issues do narrative educational researchers perceive when capturing participant testimony?; 3) What procedures do narrative educational researchers carry out which assure of methodological rigor?; and 4) What additional procedures, either before, during or after a study, can narrative educational researchers carry forth to assure that the research is the most meaningful for the researcher, the participant and anyone else who reads the research study? I applied multiple methods to address these questions, narrative thematic analysis and epistemological evaluation. Research participants included four narrative educational researchers. First, based on interviews, and after two rounds of open coding, narrative thematic analysis provided several themes which emerged based on the testimony provided by the research participants. Following the creation of themes, I completed the narrative thematic analysis by discussing how participant responses fit within the themes. Second, I epistemologically evaluated the quality of narrative educational research by relying on epistemological theory and concepts found in philosophical literature. The theoretical foundation for this work arose from developments that largely build and extend from classical reductionist and nonreductionist positions on the epistemology and social epistemology of testimony. Results from the evaluation provided a mix of strengths and weaknesses epistemologically, and therefore methodologically, in narrative educational research. Positively, I found strength in the methodological approach of building a close relationship between researcher and participant, and strength is found in a level of triangulation to address validity concerns. For weaknesses, I found that too much trust is offered by the researcher to the participant, both in themselves as well as in their testimony. Relatedly, accuracy in recall from memory and the dearth of concern about truth also presented issues. I recommended that in working to assure that trust is offered and justified by both the speaker and hearer, with greater concern to accuracy and truth, testimonial beliefs are more likely to be warranted. Future studies can focus on the inclusion of teachers, students and principals to provide additional insight, and a combining of a rich conceptual framework with a rigorous analytic approach to maintain the strengths of narrative research in education while addressing the weaknesses.

This paper will focus on two elements, viz. experience and inquiry, which are central to John Deweys philosophy and their relation to the movement known as pragmatism. Although each of these concepts has received extensive treatment by other schools of thought, the pragmatists, and particularly Dewey, did much to redefine each in hopes of alleviating the tension between conflicting philosophical viewpoints. An explication of Deweys view on experience is the first step in understanding his application of the pragmatic method towards reconstructing philosophical thinking. Therefore, this paper will explore the meaning that Dewey gave to each and how that meaning is helpful to the overall pragmatist project of reuniting philosophical speculation with practical consequences.

According to the classical consistency presupposition, contradictions have an explosive character: Whenever they are present in a theory, anything goes, and no sensible reasoning can thus take place. A logic is paraconsistent if it disallows such presupposition, and allows instead for some inconsistent yet non-trivial theories to make perfect sense. The Logics of Formal Inconsistency, LFIs, form a particularly expressive class of paraconsistent logics in which the metatheoretical notion of consistency can be internalized at the object-language level. As a consequence, the LFIs are able to recapture consistent reasoning by the addition of appropriate consistency assumptions. The present monograph introduces the LFIs and provides several illustrations of them and of their properties, showing that such logics constitute in fact the majority of interesting paraconsistent systems in the literature. Several ways of performing the recapture of consistent reasoning inside such inconsistent systems are also illustrated. In each case, interpretations in terms of many-valued, possible-translations, or modal semantics are provided, and the problems related to providing algebraic counterparts to such logics are surveyed. A formal abstract approach is proposed to all related definitions and an extended investigation is made into the logical principles and the positive and negative properties of negation.

It is difficult for organizations to effectively manage personal knowledge so it can be mobilized, shared, and rewarded to benefit the organization. These difficulties occur particularly in large geographically dispersed, hierarchical organizations. The management of developing, identifying successful practices, building up and maintaining tacit knowledge, requires an understanding of how these ideas have emerged within the organization through a Tacit Knowledge Exchange (TKE) process. Identification and understanding of TKE characteristics is difficult as they are invisible (tacit). The TKE process in action requires the adoption of multiple methods and approaches employed simultaneously. A series of cases study instances were used as a basis for the methodology, each contributing specific aspects of the methodology. The initial three case study instances, each yielded specific characteristics regarding tacit knowledge exchange and networking. The findings from the initial three case study instances were tested in a large hierarchical, complex engineering organization. This final case study instance, prototyped a methodology to graphically codify, index and build up in-house tacit knowledge abilities through mapping staff knowledge. The final case study instance allowed for investigations into what these TKE characteristics of a complex organization would utilize To date, specific TKE characteristics have not been well understood. This research contributed to specific understanding of the identification TKE characteristics and network structures. The outcome of the research provided a graphical structure identifying who would be likely to possess the kind of knowledge they need to find. The interview process was an important facilitator to precondition the knowledge bearers for sharing, thus locating key

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2007. / Title proper from title frame. Also available in printed format.

<p>This study deals with the thesis that conceivability implies possibility. Confronted with alleged counterexamples to this thesis, some philosophers have turned to what may be called “idealized” or “more demanding” notions of conceivability. I argue that in turning to such notions, they have made the thesis useless to limited beings like us for attaining modal knowledge. However, in refusing to identify conceivability with demanding or idealized notions, we cannot maintain that conceivability always implies possibility. Essentially, there are two ways to proceed: to view conceivability as a mere guide to possibility, or to argue that the conceivability thesis is a local truth, i.e., a truth with respect to a certain class of statements. I defend the latter alternative. This class of statements employs concepts with respect to which doubt concerning the conceivability thesis is to be regarded as general skepticism, not as skepticism relating to the conceivability thesis itself.</p><p>I proceed by outlining an interpretation of strict possibility—i.e., the kind of possibility that I take the conceivability thesis to be about—according to which modal truths depend essentially on conceptual relations, as opposed to obtaining purely in virtue of properties of things themselves. Given this account, on which both ideal conceivability and strict possibility have a conceptual ground, I argue that these notions are not only coextensional but relate to one and the same property of statements. I further argue that the impossible is unimaginable, but that it is conceivable in the sense that one can misdescribe the contents of imagination.</p>

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.

The theme of truth in the work of Alasdair MacIntyre has rarely been developed. The present thesis aims at filling this lack. In a long first part the goes in details through the whole of MacIntyre’s work with a special attention to the item of truth, which is omnipresent. This heuristic part leads to a hermeneutic part, in which the thought of the Anglo-Saxon philosopher is compared with that of Hans-Georg Gadamer - to whom he affirms to be widely indebted - in order to discern the proper of the Macintyrian researcher and that of his access to truth, which he considers as absolute. The unifying thread of it is the dichotomy Aristotle vs. Heidegger in Gadamer’s work. This dichotomy, which is suggested by the Anglo-Saxon philosopher, proves to be an important key of interpretation of his thought in the field of hermeneutic. In a third part the author studies a diversity of themes for a right understanding of the Macintyrian conception of truth: today’s context of plurality of traditions and civilisations, Macintyrian Thomism, the absolute and what is relative and truth as a good. This thematic part is built upon a confrontation with the thought of the second Hilary Putnam, that of "Reason, Truth and History", which is used as a safeguard in the work of MacIntyre when he tries to define the conception of truth in the tradition rationality. The author makes some critics of MacIntyre’s thought, notably on the credit given to human rationality: the Anglo-Saxon philosopher does not seem to understand the limits proper to it, on theoretical level and practical level as well. / Le thème de la vérité chez Alasdair MacIntyre restait trop peu connu. Cette thèse entend contribuer à combler ce manque. Dans une longue première partie, l’ensemble de l’œuvre macintyrienne est épluché en suivant le thème de la vérité, qui y est omniprésent. Cette partie heuristique débouche sur une partie herméneutique, où la pensée du philosophe anglo-saxon est confrontée à celle de Hans-Georg Gadamer, envers lequel il reconnaît une dette importante, afin de discerner quelle est la part propre de la situation de l’investigateur macintyrien et celle de son accès à la vérité, qu’il considère finalement comme étant absolue. La dichotomie Aristote vs Heidegger chez Gadamer en constitue le fil rouge. Cette dichotomie, suggérée par le philosophe anglo-saxon, s’avère être une clé d’interprétation importante de sa pensée dans le champ de l’herméneutique. Dans une troisième partie sont étudiés divers thèmes importants pour une juste compréhension de la conception macintyrienne de la vérité : le contexte contemporain de la pluralité des traditions et des civilisations, le thomisme macintyrien, le relatif et l’absolu, et la vérité comme (un) bien. Cette partie thématique est charpentée par une confrontation avec la pensée du second Hilary Putnam, celui de "Reason, Truth and History", qui sert en quelque sorte de garde-fou dans l’œuvre macintyrienne quand il s’agit de définir la conception de la vérité impliquée dans la tradition rationality. Certaines critiques de la pensée d’Alasdair MacIntyre sont faites, notamment en ce qui concerne le crédit qu’il accorde à la rationalité humaine : le philosophe anglo-saxon ne semble pas prendre la mesure des limites qui lui sont propres, tant au niveau théorique qu’au niveau pratique.