Part I investigates the idea that kinds (as opposed to individuals) have some modal properties. I argue that concerning typical kind-essentialist claims there is a non-trivial question—the transworld identity problem—about what the relevant kind terms are supposed to refer to in non-actual possible worlds. I reject several ideas for solving the problem. The upshot is a worry about the coherence of modal talk concerning kinds. Waiving this worry for the sake of argument, in Part II the target is the use of modal talk in the sciences. I offer a deflationary account of modalities, based on the familiar idea of reducing modalities to logical relationships between non-modal statements and non-modal background theories. I argue that this account is adequate for making sense of modal talk in the sciences. Moreover, I argue that irreducible modal properties of the world, if there are any, cannot be scientifically discovered or inferred. Thus we have a number of arguments against modalities: the threat of incoherence, their epistemic inaccessibility, and the dispensability of modal talk in the sciences.

Part I investigates the idea that kinds (as opposed to individuals) have some modal properties. I argue that concerning typical kind-essentialist claims there is a non-trivial question—the transworld identity problem—about what the relevant kind terms are supposed to refer to in non-actual possible worlds. I reject several ideas for solving the problem. The upshot is a worry about the coherence of modal talk concerning kinds. Waiving this worry for the sake of argument, in Part II the target is the use of modal talk in the sciences. I offer a deflationary account of modalities, based on the familiar idea of reducing modalities to logical relationships between non-modal statements and non-modal background theories. I argue that this account is adequate for making sense of modal talk in the sciences. Moreover, I argue that irreducible modal properties of the world, if there are any, cannot be scientifically discovered or inferred. Thus we have a number of arguments against modalities: the threat of incoherence, their epistemic inaccessibility, and the dispensability of modal talk in the sciences.

Although feminists resist accounts that define women as having certain features that are essential to their being women, feminists are also guilty of giving essentialist definitions. Because women are extremely diverse in their experiences, the essentialist critics question whether a universal (non-essentialist) account of women can be given. I argue that it is possible to formulate a valuable category of woman, despite potential essentialist challenges. Even with diversity among women, women are oppressed as women by patriarchal structures such as rape, pornography, and sexual harassment that regulate women’s sexuality and construct women as beings whose main role is to service men’s sexual needs.

Artist Ana Mendieta frequently conjoined the female body with nature to express her search for personal identity and support for feminist topics. Her last intended and least scholarly examined work, La Maja de Yerba (Grass Goddess), continues specific visual and thematic elements of her previous Silueta Series (Silhouette) yet also presents an aesthetically unique creation. Despite its incompletion as a result of her premature death, the preserved maquette directly stipulates a female form to be planted in grass on the Bard College campus grounds. This alignment of women and nature garners criticism for its reliance on universalism and categorizations of women’s experiences; however, Mendieta’s use of essentialism in public art contributes to circulating feminist discourse to a wider audience. This paper considers the artistic influences, thematic concepts, and employment of strategic essentialism in Mendieta’s La Maja de Yerba.

The tradition of semantic externalism that follows Kripke (1972) and Putnam (1975) is built on the assumption that the folk have essentialist commitments about natural kinds. Externalists commonly take the body of empirical data concerning psychological essentialism as support for this claim. However, recent empirical findings (Malt, 1994; Kalish, 2002) call the psychological theory of essentialism into question. This thesis examines the relevance of these findings to both essentialism and semantic externalism. I argue that these findings suggest that these theories fail to reflect folk beliefs about natural kinds and folk natural kind term usage. This leads me to propose an alternative thesis-- the Ambiguity Thesis-- that is better able to accommodate the existing body of empirical data.

Research as to how humans group natural kinds, such as animals, is essential to understanding categorization processes. However, it lacks conventional application and generalization to everyday life. Humans are social beings that encounter a wide array of individuals on a daily basis. In these situations, we are required to consider various properties that make up these people. As Keller (2005) suggests, the way we categorize is shaped by our theories about the world. Therefore, when we determine the rationale behind people’s social categorization processes, we are better able to understand people’s perceptions of their social environment. Moreover, when we conduct scientific research on how people categorize race, we gain substantial information about their perceptions and understanding of race. Thus, the goal of the present study was to determine how and to what extent people categorize race and if they use the principles of psychological essentialism to do so. In order to determine if people tend to essentialize race in a similar manner as other natural kinds, the third study of the Hampton, Estes, Simmons (2007) research was replicated. In Study 1 and Study 2, undergraduate participants were obtained from Western Kentucky University’s psychology study board. In Study 1, participants were presented with transformation stories in which an animal or person came to look and act like another animal or person as a result of either mutation or maturation. Approximately one-half of the participants received scenarios that included information about the exemplar’s offspring. Approximately one-half received scenarios that excluded this information. Additional transformation stories that described changes to artifacts and the body (i.e. weight and hair length) were added as filler items. Participants rated the artifact/animal/person’s typicality, category membership, and their level of confidence in their ratings. In addition, they provided justifications for their responses. In Study 2, transformations were described as being the result of unintended or intended changes. In Study 2, one-half of the scenarios included a statement that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the initial state, I. One-half of the scenarios included a statement that the animal or human’s offspring resembled the final state, F. Participants rated the artifact/animal/person’s typicality and category membership. They were also asked to provide justifications for their responses. This study provides further support for the belief of race as a natural kind given that subjects were more likely to essentialize race than animals. The study also suggests that people view race differently than other factors related to appearance (i.e. hair length and weight). In both studies, the majority of subjects were willing to state that a person changed if their hair or weight changed; however, they were unwilling to indicate a person could change their race. Furthermore, the justification data obtained in the study was one of the first studies to differentiate the reasoning used by those who did and did not essentialize animals and race.

Thesis (M. Phil.)--University of Hong Kong, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 220-231) Also available in print.

Thesis (M. A.) , Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1998. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (Ph. L.)--Catholic University of America, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 74-79).

In this essay a theory of proper names is developed and applied to the construction of quantified modal logics and to a discussion of problems concerning identity across possible worlds. The theory is then used to aid discussion of essentialism, empty singular terms, quantification into epistemic contexts, and Frege' s problem with identity . In the first chapter, after a preliminary discussion of Russell's and Frege's theories of names, a theory is developed. It is argued that in the giving of a name a relation is established between the name and what is named. That relation is the sense of the name. It is also argued that names can be given to imaginary, fictional, and other such non-existent things. The second chapter is devoted to a discussion of Quine's programme for eliminating singular terms. It is there argued that the programme cannot be justified. The third chapter centres around the construction of logical systems to deal with identity across possible worlds. It is assumed that once a name is given and its sense thereby established the name is a rigid designator. Quantificational systems are constructed without modal operators yet in terms of which cross world identity can be discussed. Modal operators are then introduced to facilitate a discussion of essentialism and identity. At each point the formal systems are constructed in accordance with clearly stated assumptions about constant singular terms, the domains of quantification, and the interpretation of modal operators.