Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1972. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliography.

The idea that some sub-set of the properties of an object captures what it is to be that thing i.e. that it has an essence which is there to be discovered and about which we can be mistaken - is a commonsense assumption that we use all the time. However, philosophers of this century have regarded the realism about essence with skepticism, arguing that we impose essences on things by the way we define our concepts as opposed to discovering them. Essences are supposedly characteristics of our concepts rather than of objects in the world. This was the orthodox view until a group of philosophers of language developed the theory of direct reference. They claimed that proper names and certain other words refer non-connotatively which entails that the real properties of objects are crucial to the establishment of the reference of such terms. It can be shown that the properties involved in reference determination must be all and only the necessary properties of those objects. This discovery has been taken to mark the rehabilitation of the notion of essence, with an object’s essence being taken to be that set of properties which it must have in all possible worlds in which it exists. I will argue that the theory of direct reference is correct up to the point at which it assimilates the necessary properties of objects to their essences. I will show that the set of an object’s necessary properties cannot fulfill the role reserved for the concept of essence in metaphysical hypotheses concerning the nature of objects. I will go on to show that a sub-set of a thing’s necessary properties can fulfill this role and I will suggest that we identify the members of this sub-set by testing their ability to furnish the kinds of explanations we expect from essences. I will demonstrate how this can be done using the Aristotelian idea that the notion of essence is required in order to explain how it is that objects can persist through change.

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Doctor of Philosophy / This thesis begins from the belief that it is currently essential for us to relearn the essence of learning. To commence this task, this thesis works with the assumption that the essence of learning lies in the way learning can be ontological, changing the essence of what is, and instituting a new ‘what is’. This thesis is thus an attempt to take account of the radical constructivism that is the unavoidable anthropocentrism of such essential learning. The philosophical teachings of Martin Heidegger are brought to bear on this question concerning learning. This thesis suggests that on the one hand, the way in which Heidegger teaches, teaches us that learning is a process of instituting, a formative projection of necessities that metaleptically installs what is essential; on the other hand, what is thereby learned with and from Heidegger clarifies that this process of learning is a reflexively finitudinal praxis, a thingly effort that must be performed anew every time and can never be taken-as-finished. This means that the ‘freedom’ to change the essence of ‘what is’ by learning is never merely available to us because essential learning involves making-necessary in a sustained manner over-and-against what currently has been learnt-as-necessary, that is, ‘what presently is’. This thesis therefore learns that learning is an avowed act of willing, but one which cannot and must not be represented as a technical economy under the control of a humanist subject. The latter misrepresentations can in fact be understood as manifestations of the current withdrawal of essential learning. In the end, to try to capture what is being learned in this thesis, the process of essential learning is called ‘design’ as understood in relation to the current concern for sustainability

Throughout the present dissertation, we have intended to present and understand better a particular form of prejudice, namely, infra-humanization. Indeed, before being able to act upon prejudice reduction, we need to understand it. Infra-humanization is the tendency to perceive members of outgroups as less human than members of the ingroup. Infra-humanization is a process that has been largely studied in the last few years, however, a number of questions remained unclear. Specifically, we concentrated our work on the search of potential variables and conditions that could influence the process.

Throughout the present dissertation, we have intended to present and understand better a particular form of prejudice, namely, infra-humanization. Indeed, before being able to act upon prejudice reduction, we need to understand it. Infra-humanization is the tendency to perceive members of outgroups as less human than members of the ingroup. Infra-humanization is a process that has been largely studied in the last few years, however, a number of questions remained unclear. Specifically, we concentrated our work on the search of potential variables and conditions that could influence the process.

Edition commerciale de : Dissertation : Philosophie : Freiburg : 1982-1983. / Bibliogr. p. 440-448. Index.

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Much scientific and media attention has been devoted to the growing body of research into the genetic correlates of human phenomena. However, many of the resulting reports lead to a deterministic interpretation of the role of genes, and involve fundamental misunderstandings of genetics and heredity. Hence, questions arise regarding the ways in which people make sense of the behavioural genetics research they encounter in everyday life. Furthermore, essentialist accounts are often embedded within popular understanding of politically sensitive topics, such as eugenics, race, and sex, and therefore it is important to examine how people comprehend genetic influences on behaviour. In this dissertation, I review current findings regarding the effects of genetic attributions on beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours in the context of the social world. Particular attention is paid to such effects in the context of gender issues. Specifically, in three studies I examine the effects of exposure to scientific theories concerning human sexuality on attitudes towards and evaluations of men’s dubious sexual behaviors. The results indicate that among men exposure to evolutionary psychology arguments leads to more lenient evaluations and judgments of an array of dubious sexual behaviors, compared with exposure to social constructivist arguments. It also seems that men implicitly hold nativist perceptions with regards to male sexuality and promiscuity. The findings were less conclusive among women, with some indication that women are less affected by such exposure as well as less likely to naturally hold a nativist perspective in the context of human sexuality. This empirical research has direct implications for previously suggested intervention programs and adds to the incurrent resurgence of interest in the effects of genetic theories. Finally, I identify areas where further exploration is needed, suggest potential solutions for specific problems, and evaluate related individual and social implications.

Much scientific and media attention has been devoted to the growing body of research into the genetic correlates of human phenomena. However, many of the resulting reports lead to a deterministic interpretation of the role of genes, and involve fundamental misunderstandings of genetics and heredity. Hence, questions arise regarding the ways in which people make sense of the behavioural genetics research they encounter in everyday life. Furthermore, essentialist accounts are often embedded within popular understanding of politically sensitive topics, such as eugenics, race, and sex, and therefore it is important to examine how people comprehend genetic influences on behaviour. In this dissertation, I review current findings regarding the effects of genetic attributions on beliefs, attitudes, and behaviours in the context of the social world. Particular attention is paid to such effects in the context of gender issues. Specifically, in three studies I examine the effects of exposure to scientific theories concerning human sexuality on attitudes towards and evaluations of men’s dubious sexual behaviors. The results indicate that among men exposure to evolutionary psychology arguments leads to more lenient evaluations and judgments of an array of dubious sexual behaviors, compared with exposure to social constructivist arguments. It also seems that men implicitly hold nativist perceptions with regards to male sexuality and promiscuity. The findings were less conclusive among women, with some indication that women are less affected by such exposure as well as less likely to naturally hold a nativist perspective in the context of human sexuality. This empirical research has direct implications for previously suggested intervention programs and adds to the incurrent resurgence of interest in the effects of genetic theories. Finally, I identify areas where further exploration is needed, suggest potential solutions for specific problems, and evaluate related individual and social implications.