This is a deconstruction of "child pornography" through an analysis of media images of child spanking and their relationship with the criminal law and cinema, video and broadcasting regulation in Britain and Canada. It suggests that the law's primary concern is not the protection of children but the elimination of the heresy that children are sexually attractive. Chapter 1 introduces the phenomenon under discussion, namely internet sites that collect stills and clips from mainstream movies and television showing children receiving corporal punishment. The chapter postulates that these sites are for sexual gratification and explores what society understands by "sexual exploitation of children" and "sex" itself. Part I considers whether the web sites are child pornography under English or Canadian criminal law. Chapter 2 looks at Canada's definitions of obscenity and child pornography. Chapter 3 asks whether the images might be indecent according to England's law. These chapters examine the law's understanding of child spanking as a sexual act, exploring what constitutes "sex". While Part I declines to state definitively whether such web sites are illegal, it argues that the movies and television from which the images originate are tolerated for the reasons that give the images sexual appeal. Part II looks at the regulation in Canada and Britain of the movies and television from which the images are taken. Chapter 4 deals with cinema and video regulation, which prohibits eroticising violence and children, and asks how films are nevertheless rife with images of child beating used for sexual arousal. Chapter 5 similarly examines broadcasting regulation and asks whether the ban on sexualising children might be unconstitutional under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Part III concludes by looking at how society permits the eroticisation of children, while condemning the "paedophile". It suggests that the web sites may arise from childhood trauma over corporal punishment, compares the harm of that practice with that caused by the web sites and concludes that if there be prohibition, then it should be of child spanking, rather than the sites, which are non-exploitative testament to ingenuity in the face of a hypocritically censorial regime. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

A research report submitted to the Faculty of Humanities, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts Applied ethics for professionals Johannesburg / The advent of digital ICT has raised a range of privacy problems that previously did not occur, owing to the scope and volume of data that can be collected, as well as the processing capacity of the application. These digital privacy problems are arguably not easily addressed within any particular traditional macroethical framework. We may therefore need to find an alternative approach. One such approach is proposed by Luciano Floridi, who has devised “Information Ethics” - a macroethics for the identification, clarification and solution of digital ethical issues. While IE is useful in that it highlights questions of digital agency, it will be demonstrated that it is flawed when applied to problems of privacy posed by digital ICT. IE, however, points us in the right direction: An object-oriented ethics may be able to address the issue of digital agents. In this essay I develop an argument for the moral intentionality of digital agents, based on the concepts of emergent value and indirect intentionality, that can underpin an object-oriented ethical approach to digital privacy for both digital and human agents. Using Nissenbaum’s concept of contextual spheres, I provide normative guidelines for evaluating the competing interests of agent-objects in various digital spheres. A brief evaluation of the approach, by way of an example, shows that the object-oriented LoA that I am proposing can be adopted for digital privacy problems. In such cases, and for the specific purpose of weighing up the competing rights and values of the agents and patients, we can treat all agents (human and non-human) as both intentionality and real. This provides a reading of the case that goes beyond the consequentialist or ownership-based approaches, and arguably gets closer to the heart of the issue. Where the approach is still open, however, is that we still have to justify and balance these interests. There is no simple formula to apply. A need for practical wisdom or Phronesis, in the form of a judicious weighing of moral interests, continues to apply to digital problems posed by ICT. / GR2017

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The research project discusses the ethical aspects of governance focusing on formalisation of ethics within a state owned enterprises as a mechanism to improve governance practices.

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Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2000. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: Moral theories often view the problem of abortion as oppositional: either fiercely "pro-life" or adamantly "pro-choice". A closer view at their respective arguments suggests that extreme polar views are hardly tenable. The principle of the sanctity of life has its limits, and the liberal view on abortion leading to the logical conclusion that even infanticide is permissible is counterintuitive and at loggerheads with common morality. Softer views on both polar positions are more appealing and more acceptable. The soft "pro-life" stance has serious limitations for it appeals to the doctrine of double effect or to a secular but similar position, the doctrine of self-defence, which would allow abortion only in cases of rape or incest. The soft "pro-choice" position appeals to the concept of sentience: only the abortion of a presentient embryo/fetus is permissible. The difficulty, however, is that we know little about the sentience of the unborn and its occurrence during intra-uterine development. Both extreme and softer views are basically oppositional (either/or). The postmodern mind aims at deconstructing oppositions in order to highlight the ideologies underscoring the advocacy of either view. In a poststructural perspective that takes into account the complexity of life, it becomes possible to understand and to accept the view that a "pro-choice" stance is far from being "pro-death". This is the position which is argued for in the present essay. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die probleem van aborsie word dikwels deur morele teorieë beskou as een van oposisies: "pro-lewe" aan die een kant of "pro-keuse" aan die ander. Wanneer die onderskeie argumente van naderby beskou word, word dit duidelik dat hierdie uiters polêre sieninge skaars geregverdig is. Die beginsel van die heiligheid en onskendbaarheid van lewe het sy beperkinge, en die liberale standpunt oor aborsie, wat onvermydelik en op 'n logiese wyse lei na die konklusie dat selfs kindermoord geregverdig kan word, is kontra-intuitief en gaan die algemene moraliteit teen. Standpunte wat 'n minder radikale blik op beide die polêre posisies het is beide meer aantreklik en meer aanvaarbaar. Die sagte "pro-lewe" uitgangspunt het belangrike beperkinge, omdat dit sigself beroep op die doktrine van dubble-effek, of op 'n sekulêre, maar soortgelyke posisie, die doktrine van selfverdediging, wat aborsie sou wou toelaat in die geval van verkragting of bloedskande. Die sagte "pro-keuse" posisie beroep sigself op die konsep van waarnemingsvermoë: slegs die aborsie van die embrio/fetus wat nog nie oor waarnemingsvermoë beskik nie is toelaatbaar. Hierdie standpunt word egter bemoeilik deur die feit dat ons nie oor veel kennis beskik aangaande die waarnemingsvermoë van die ongebore, of van die voorkoms van waarnemingsvermoë gedurende intra-uterinêre ontwikkeling nie. Beide die uiterste en die sagter uitgangspunte is uiteinelik oposisioneel. Postmoderne denke stel hom ten doe Iom oposisies te dekonstrueer, ten einde lig te werp op die idoelogieë wat die aanhang van enige posisie onderskraag. In 'n poststukturele perspektief wat die kompleksiteit van lewe in ag neem, word dit moontlik om die siening dat 'n "prokeuse" uitgangspunt ver verwyderd is daarvan om "pro-die dood" te wees, te aanvaar. Dit is die posisie waarvoor daar in hierdie opstel geargumenteer word.

Contextual, personal, theoretical, and institutional forces intersect in the development of an intentional and ethical applied drama practice. This document charts several ethical signposts marking the development process of an applied drama project, Child-centered Improvisation, in a pediatric dialysis clinic. It argues for a deep understanding of the fields and contexts in which drama is applied and an awareness of the multiplicity of voices therein. The resulting discussion claims bewilderment as a productive space and privileges a narration of the complementary practices of an applied drama practice in a pediatric healthcare setting. The document concludes with recommendations specific to developing applied drama practices in such settings. / text

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