Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University / PLEASE NOTE: Boston University Libraries did not receive an Authorization To Manage form for this thesis or dissertation. It is therefore not openly accessible, though it may be available by request. If you are the author or principal advisor of this work and would like to request open access for it, please contact us at open-help@bu.edu. Thank you. / Ethical theory has attempted to be both moral and factual but has had difficulty in being both. I believe an analysis of attempts to strike a balance between the two will show where progress has been made and where we might expect more progress in the future. After establishing a meaaure by which to analyze the balancing of the moral and the factual, that measure will be used on traditional ethical theory. It will be found that difficulties with the factual are most bothersome, so we will turn to the fields which are concerned with the facts of human action, the social sciences. Having learned more about the factual, we will turn to Max Scheler's ethical theory because his phenomenological approach to ethics renders some unique and fruitful solutions not offered by other extant ethical theories to difficulties with the factual. Even Scheler's solutions to those difficulties do not enable a balance to be struck between the moral and the factual, however, so I conclude that finding a balance may well be too difficult even though progress is made in the attempt. [TRUNCATED] / 2031-01-01

No description available.

No description available.

In this thesis I address two related and rarely asked questions: (i) Is a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious possible? (ii) If such a theory is possible, and such a theory is also a credible theory in its own right, then what might such a theory look like? By ‘distinctively virtue ethical,’ I mean a theory in which the virtues and other aretaic concepts are foundational, and which does not collapse into forms of other ethical approaches, such as consequentialism and deontology. By ‘theoretically ambitious,’ I mean a systematic theory that seeks to fulfil all the principal aims of theories of practical reason: to explain, justify, prescribe and to guide action. In this thesis I argue that a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious is possible. I do this by working out what such a theory might look like. In developing the theory, I also make a case that the theory is credible and attractive in its own right. In Chapter 1 I look at what makes an ethical theory distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue for a eudaimonic conception of virtue ethics, and determine a number of constraints on such a theory if it is to be distinctively virtue ethical. In Chapter 2 I look at what a more precisely characterised distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious might look like. I argue in favour of using some ideas derived from Plato. A serious problem remains: the virtue ethical theory I develop in Chapter 2 is unable to give adequate action-guidance, a requirement for the theory to be theoretically ambitious. In Chapter 3 I introduce the central strategy of the thesis: to combine the virtue ethical theory arrived at in Chapter 2 with a form of ethical constitutivism in order to arrive at a distinctively virtue ethical theory that is theoretically ambitious, not least one able to give adequate action-guidance. Chapter 3 is concerned primarily with developing a form of ethical constitutivism suitable for combining with virtue ethics. The chapter is also concerned with examining objections to ethical constitutivism and diagnosing what is required to overcome these objections. In Chapter 4 I combine the virtue ethical theory favoured in Chapter 2 with the form of ethical constitutivism developed in Chapter 3 to form a combined theory. I call this theory: ‘constitutivist virtue ethics.’ I present what the theory involves, and I argue that although the theory incorporates elements from ethical constitutivism, it merits being considered distinctively virtue ethical. I also argue that constitutivist virtue ethics overcomes the objections that, as shown in Chapter 3, ethical constitutivism on its own is unable to overcome. Constitutivist virtue ethics therefore holds out the attractive prospect of a theory incorporating both the advantages of virtue ethics and some of the best of what ethical constitutivism has to offer. In Chapter 5 I address the biggest challenge to constitutivist virtue ethics being regarded as a theoretically ambitious theory: to be able to provide adequate action-guidance. To this end, I present an action-guidance procedure of eight action-guidance principles derived from constitutivist virtue ethics. I then argue that the action-guidance procedure can provide adequate action-guidance, even when faced with a difficult test case. I also examine two objections to the action-guidance procedure, and I argue that these can be overcome. I finish the thesis by considering some topics from the literature relevant to constitutivist virtue ethics, and which might be the basis for further work.

No description available.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

This dissertation is arranged in three parts which address issues concerning death and immortality. These issues all revolve around the temporal limit imposed by death. I have endeavoured to pose some questions which have relevance to a society clutching onto traditional notions of an afterlife despite its headlong thrust into a technologically advanced future where ethical confusions abound. In the first chapter I examine the metaphysics of the soul because postulating an afterlife is the conventional response to death anxiety. I have noticed that many people cling to hope of immortality without having any understanding of the metaphysical architecture of this hope. Consequently, from a philosophical perspective, I contrast arguments on the soul by Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas and Descartes. The second chapter emerges from a fascination with Epicurus's theory of living and, derivatively, of dying. It involves a comparison with (1) Aristotle's distinction between energeia (actuality) and kinesis (movement), and (2) the sybaritic hedonism of the Cyrenaics. Although the theme of this chapter is pleasure, it will be seen that pleasure lies embedded in the living project and is an important component in the drive for survival. In the third chapter I reflect on the meaning of life in conjunction with length of time lived. Here I compare the meaninglessness experienced by Leo Tolstoy (because his life is too short) and the meaninglessness experienced by the fictional character Elena Makropulos (because her life is too long). The Makropulos "case", both a play by Karel Capek and an opera by Leos Janacek, was introduced into the philosophical world by Bernard Williams.

Hans Jonas ranks among a small but expanding group of recent ethicists who have argued that a robust ethical theory must account for human ontological considerations. He is among those who make claims that such considerations issue from biological foundations. In The Phenomenon of Life, he reclaims elements of the Aristotelian biological ontology of the soul while adjusting this ontology to the theory of evolution. The first problem with Aristotelian biological ontology, one suffering from essentialism, is the confrontation with the biological flux of species, presented in the Darwinian theory of natural selection. The dissertation explains that Jonas was correct in his return to Aristotle, insofar as there are elements of human beings that are natural and universal. The task is to follow Jonas by constructing a robust philosophical anthropology. Jonas's philosophical anthropology understands human beings as nature's most magnificent and advanced examples of what he calls "needful freedom." Jonas's argument includes a refutation of reductive materialism and epiphenomenalism, one that leaves the possibilities of the human soul/consciousness and freedom in at least as good a position as offered by Kant. His argument is also an attempt to rescue ontology, human nature, and ethics from the relativism of Heideggerian thought. He does this by replacing Heidegger's concept of "thrown projection" with an idea of "projection" based on biological ontology. With this ontological foundation in place, Jonas's "ethics of the future" sees human beings as the caretakers not only of themselves but of the totality of nature and not simply for anthropocentric reasons. Jonas's philosophical anthropology was incomplete insofar as it lacked an accounting of sexual reproduction, a key element for Jonas's ethical theory where political responsibility is modeled after parenthood. After offering a critique of Jonas's incomplete philosophical anthropology and the gap it leaves for his ethical theory, this dissertation shows that the value of his contribution remains intact. / Philosophy