The freedom of establishment is a fundamental right on the internal market which enables companies to take up and pursue activity in other member states, “host states”, in a non discriminatory way. In situations where a company wishes to use the right to establish in a host state, complications will be discovered since the member states are applying different principles for deciding the nationality of a company. Since the Treaty of the Function of the European Union recognize both principles, and both of the legal areas company law and European international private law lack harmonization regarding companies wishing to perform such a transaction, the situation today brings the possibility that such a company could be covered by the legal system of several member states, or maybe no legal system at all. The Court of Justice of the European Union has through case law contributed to make the scope of the freedom of establishment a little bit clearer but there are still difficulties regarding situations when a company wishes to transfer its seat to another member state with a change of nationality. Today’s measures, for example the SE-company, is not enough to satisfy the companies wishing to transfer their seat to another member state. According to the writer, the Cartesio judgment brought an even greater need for a 14th Company Law Directive. The proposal for a 14th Company Law Directive enables companies to cease to be a company according to the legislation in the home state and then become a company according to the legislation in the host state without ever losing its legal personality. The conclusion is therefore that such a directive is crucial in order to make it possible for companies to fully enjoy and exploit the internal market. / Etableringsrätten är en grundläggande frihet på den inre marknaden vilken gör det möjligt för bolag att starta och driva verksamhet i andra medlemsstater utan att för den sakens skull riskera att utsättas för diskriminering. Då dessa bolag önskar utnyttja den fördragsstadgade etableringsfriheten genom att flytta sitt säte till en annan medlemsstat kommer svårigheter att uppstå då medlemsstaterna inom unionen många gånger använder olika anknytningsfaktorer för att bestämma bolags nationalitet. Då fördraget om Europeiska unionens funktionssätt godkänner båda lagvalsprinciperna samt det faktum att bolagsrättens och den europeiska internationella privaträttens område saknar tillfredställande harmonisering, kan situationen idag innebära att de bolag som önskar att vidta en sådan transaktion omfattas av fler än en medlemsstats rättsordning, eller i vissa fall ingen rättsordning alls. EU-domstolen har genom praxis bidragit till att i viss mån klargöra rättsläget på etableringsrättens område men oklarheter kvarstår för de situationer där bolag önskar att flytta sätet till en annan medlemsstat med åtföljande byte av nationalitet. Dagens gemenskapsrättsliga åtgärder, exempelvis SE-bolaget, är inte tillräckliga för att tillfredställa de bolag som önskar att genomföra en sådan transaktion. Enligt författaren har också den förhållandevis nya Cartesio-domen bidragit till ett ökat behov av ett 14:e bolagsdirektiv vilket möjliggör för bolag att flytta sätet till en annan medlemsstat. Processen skulle enligt detta direktiv innebära att bolaget skulle upphöra i ursprungsstaten samtidigt som det skulle bli en juridisk person i den nya medlemsstaten utan att under processen förlora sin status som rättssubjekt. Slutsatsen blir således att det är avgörande att åtgärder på EU-rättslig nivå vidtas, exempelvis genom det 14:e bolagsdirektivet, för att bolag till fullo ska kunna utnyttja den inre marknaden.

The EU jurisdictional scheme, known as the “Brussels Regime”, confers competence to national courts to adjudicate over international matters. The main rule in Article 4(1) of the Brussels Ibis Regulation sets out that the defendant should generally be sued in the courts of the Member State where he is domiciled. For certain subject matters, the scheme allows the action to be brought elsewhere. The raison d’être is to provide an adequate counterbalance to the one-sided rule of Article 4(1). Articles 7(1) and (2) enable the claimant to launch the suit, “in matters relating to a contract”, at the court of the Member State where the contractual obligation was to be fulfilled, and, in “matters relating to tort”, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. Whether to invoke Article 7 is entirely the claimant’s choice, but the final decision on its interpretation is vested in the Court. Thereby, the manner in which the Court views the provisions will effectively decide the extent of the claimant’s choice to invoke so-called special jurisdiction. It also means that greater emphasis on special jurisdiction will reduce the importance of the main rule in Article 4. Conversely, if the Court were to interpret Article 7 narrowly, its intended effect within the system would be denied. In both cases, the balance between Articles 4 and 7 has been upset. In the former case, the claimant is favoured because of the increased possibilities to choose the forum for the dispute, while in the latter case, the defendant is favoured because he retains the advantage of litigating in his home turf. The starting point for this essay is this very idea of a purported balance between litigants’ interests in EU cross-border litigation. The thesis analyses whether the Court’s case-law on general vis-à-vis special jurisdiction has transitioned from being generally defendant-friendly to claimant-friendly. It is argued that already from the first judgments rendered on the original Brussels Convention in 1976, increasingly more disputes have been launched at special fora, which has amounted to a claimant-friendly scheme. It is also argued that this development has been at the expense of the defendant. Greater choice for the claimant means in turn that the defendant’s ability to foresee before what courts he may be sued has been largely impaired. The thesis highlights how this imbalance is the result of inherent challenges in the Brussels Regime, particularly in relation to how the relevant connecting factors are designated. It is proposed that the unwanted effects of the Court’s practice as well as the shortcomings of the scheme itself are to be considered in the Commission’s evaluationof the Brussels Ibis Regulation, which is presently in the works.