This dissertation critically investigates the current framework for psycholegal assessment of accused persons who are suspected or alleged to have lacked criminal incapacity at the time of committing an offence. This system must function as effectively as possible to ensure the interests of justice and the community are best served. Issues that impact how effectively the criminal justice system collaborates with psychologists and psychiatrists, who act as expert forensic mental health assessors, are identified and recommendations are made accordingly. The study first examines the theoretical base regarding the terminology surrounding criminal capacity, mental illness and automatism, with regard to how the understanding of concepts differ in law and psychology and psychiatry and how this negatively affects the process of assessment. The study then investigates the constitutional rights of accused persons admitted for observation, the effect this has on the patient and legal process, the accuracy and reliability of the diagnosis and the admissibility of expert evidence. Next a comparative study is made utilising English Law as a tool for analysis. The main findings are that lack of understanding and clarity are the main issues that hinder the collaboration between the legal and mental health care professions and that this may be remedied by a system of registration and education for forensic psycholegal assessors. An alternate and concurrent method of direct referral is also suggested as it may relieve some of the strain on the current system. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2011. / Public Law / unrestricted

Made available in DSpace on 2017-06-01T18:17:57Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 pre-textuais.pdf: 3441344 bytes, checksum: 2615011cc3163c46824941e427f95e13 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2007-08-01 / This study focus on the use of DNA forensic evidence for the purpose of guardianship of the right to the genetic identity and identifies the possibility of determination ofthe coercive conduction ofthe culprit in the case ofthe culprit's refusal to ~ submitted to DNA forensic testing, when the objective of this test is the determination of the biological bond, taking fito account the principIe of human dignity, the balance between the interests and the fundamental rights, the principIe of proportion, the abuse of right, the principIe of collaboration and the duty of truthfulness, as the foundation of the contemporary civil procedural jurisprudence. The methodology used is explanatory, on the basis of bibliographical studies of the jurisprudence and of the current legislation. The conclusion shows the possibility of performing the DNA forensic testing independently of the acceptance of the culprit, when the objective of the test is the determination of the biological bond between the parts, recognizing the right to the genetic identity as an implicit fundamental right / Este trabalho aborda a utilização da prova pericial no DNA para fins de tutela do direito à identidade genética e identifica a possibilidade de determjnação da condução coercitiva do réu na hipótese de recusa deste em se submeter à prova pericial no DNA, quando o objeto desta prova é a determinação do vínculo biológico, a partir da aplicação do princípio da dignidade da pessoa humana, do critério da ponderação de interesses em face de colisão de direitos fundamentais, do princípio da proporcionalidade, do abuso de direito, do princípio da colaboração e do dever de verdade, como fundamentos do direito processual civil contemporâneo. A metodologia adotada é a explicativa, com base em levantamento bibliográfico, jurisprudencial e da legislação vigente. A conclusão aponta para a possibilidade de realização da prova pericial no DNA independentemente da anuência do réu, quando o objeto da prova é a determinação do vínculo biológico entre as partes, reconhecendo o direito à identidade genética corno um direito fundamental implícito

This thesis deals with the very topical issue in the sphere of the expert activity, which is requested by the general public at the same time. It sets a task of improvement, or better to saythe simplification in the approach to the appraising of real estate, with the aid of systemic methodology. There is as an example of the correct application of systemic methodology in the preparation of a sample expert opinion used in real estate (apartment house) located in Brno – Starý Lískovec. The property in question is appraised in accordance with the assignment by using the systemic approachonly after the evaluation of the current situation in appraising and discussing systemic methodology. A systemic approach to the appraising of aproperty is appropriately chosen largely because it better ensures the indispensable fact that, in the case of the expert opinion made by an expert, it is practically impossible to omit those important requisites which are inextricably linked to the expert opinion.

The objective of the diploma thesis is to explore the ways and methods of valuation applied in Hungary. Thesis demonstrates historical evolution of property market in Hungary and describes the current market supported by data and graphs. The process of expert evidence preparation is characterized, as well. The result of the thesis is an example of a complex expert evidence for property type flat in accordance with Hungarian statutory.

OPSOMMING Gebeurlikhede kan omskryf word as onsekere omstandighede van positiewe of negatiewe aard wat, onafhanklik van die verweerder se optrede en indien dit sou realiseer, waarskynlik 'n persoon se gesondheid, inkomste, verdienvermoë, lewenskwaliteit, lewensverwagting of onderhoudsafhanklikheid in die toekoms kan beïnvloed of in die verlede kon beïnvloed het en wat gevolglik op billike en realistiese wyse in ag geneem moet word ter bepaling van die skadevergoedingsbedrag. Die skadevergoedingsbedrag kan vanweë gebeurlikhede verminder of vermeerder word waar die eiser wel met `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid die volle omvang van die skade bewys het, maar die hof nie kon oortuig dat geen ander oorsaak die skade waarskynlik ook sou kon veroorsaak nie (sg "gebeurlikheids-aanpassings"). In gevalle waar die eiser nie die volle omvang van die skade op `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid kon bewys nie, kan die hof nogtans `n verminderde bedrag toeken op grond van die gebeurlikheid dat die skade wel waarskynlik in die toekoms kan realiseer (sg "gebeurlikheidstoekennings"). Die eiser moet getuienis voorlê van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verhoog, en die verweerder van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verlaag. Die waarskynlikheid dat die gebeurlikheid sal realiseer, moet deur die hof aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe en op grond van feitelike bewerings en logiese afleidings uit deskundige en ander getuienis in die vorm van `n waarskynlikheidsgraad van tussen vyf persent en tagtig persent uitgedruk word. Hipotetiese kousaliteit word deur die hof aangewend om gebeurlikhede op `n billike wyse in ag te neem en verwys na die kousale ketting van hipotetiese feite wat waarskynlik sou gerealiseer het indien die skadestigtende gebeurtenis nie plaasgevind het nie. Gebeurlikhede kan in twee kategorieë geklassifiseer word: Algemene gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik in enige stadium by alle persone kan voorkom (bv vroeë dood, siekte ens) en spesifieke gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik op spesifieke tydstippe by spesifieke individue kan voorkom (bv hertroue, egskeiding ens). Terwyl die hof geregtelik kennis behoort te kan neem van die invloed van algemene gebeurlikhede, behoort die hof hoofsaaklik op grond van ondersteunende getuienis van die invloed van spesifieke gebeurlikhede oortuig te word. Algemene gebeurlikheidsaanpassings is gewoonlik relatief laag (gemiddeld tien persent), terwyl gebeurlikheidsaanpassings vir spesifieke gebeurlikhede fluktueer (gewoonlik tussen vyf persent en vyftig persent), afhangende van die getuienis en omstandighede van die eiser. Gebeurlikheidstoekennings is gewoonlik laer as vyftig persent. SUMMARY Contingencies can be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independent of the defendant's conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a person's health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in a fair and realistic manner in the quantification of damages. Contingencies can be used to increase or reduce damages in circumstances where the plaintiff succeeded in proving the full loss on a preponderance of probability, but could not convince the court that there was no probability that any other cause could also have given rise to the loss (so-called "contingency adjustments"). In circumstances where the plaintiff could not prove the full loss on a preponderance of probability, the court can nevertheless award a reduced amount on the basis of the contingency that loss could probably realise in future (so-called "contingency allowances"). The plaintiff must adduce evidence of contingencies that can increase damages, and the defendant of contingencies that can reduce damages. The degree of probability that the contingency will realise, must be expressed by the court as a percentage of between five percent and eighty percent, in view of objective measures and on the basis of factual allegations and logical deductions derived from expert and other evidence. Hypothetical causation assists the court in taking account of contingencies in a fair manner and refers to the causal link of hypothetical events which would probably have realised if the damage-causing event did not occur. Contingencies can be classified into two categories: General contingencies that usually can be present in the lives of all people at any point in time (eg early death, sickness, etc) and specific contingencies that usually are present in the lives of specific individuals at specific times (eg remarriage, divorce, etc). While the court should be able to take legal notice of the influence of general contingencies, the court should be convinced of the influence of specific contingencies primarily on the basis of supporting evidence. General contingency adjustments are usually relatively low (on average ten per cent), while contingency adjustments for specific contingencies fluctuate (usually between five per cent and fifty per cent), depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff. Contingency allowances are usually lower than fifty per cent. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

This Dissertation is focused on issues concerning the position of an expert in international arbitration proceedings and in international investment disputes. Unlike proceedings conducted before general courts of law, arbitration proceedings have a number of advantages, and therefore they are used very often to resolve disputes in this area, and arbitration proceedings are used almost exclusively with regard to resolution of disputes relating to international investments. The aim of the Dissertation was an analysis of dispute resolution in arbitration proceedings from the expert's point of view and the expert's position in this procedure. It is without any doubt that experts can help arbitrators to reach a qualified resolution of disputes in a significant way. At first, the Dissertation deals with general and historical issues, such as comparison of methods of dispute solution where an international element appears, in both arbitration and judicial proceedings, and it lists the advantages of arbitration proceedings as well. After specification of the term "expert", the Dissertation provides a view into the expert's profession history in the territory of our country and into its legal regulation. With regard to our membership in the European Union it is, of course, necessary for the Dissertation to...

Lo studio si propone di esaminare la valutazione della prova scientifica periziale a partire da elementi del diritto comparato, proponendo la tesi secondo la quale il magistrato può avere vincoli diversi con il risultato dell'attività periziale a seconda dei requisiti di questo mezzo probatorio scelti tra quelli disponibili e che sono sotto il controllo del giudice, nonché del tema discusso nel processo (standard de valutazione probatorio applicabile). Vengono utilizzati in questo studio i precedenti e la legislazione straniera, sempre con il dovuto contrappunto nella legislazione brasiliana, quando possibile. Il punto di partenza è l'esame del diritto fondamentale a un giusto processo e il conseguente diritto fondamentale alla prova, distinguendolo da altri diritti fondamentali (il contraddittorio e l’ampia difesa), addensandolo e mostrando le diverse implicazioni legate al suo riconoscimento, tra le quali, il diritto a un'adeguata valutazione delle prove. In seguito si affrontano questioni fondamentali legate al tema della prova, come il concetto di verità e la ricostruzione dei fatti nel processo, costruendosi un’eventuale scienza giuridica della prova a partire da presupposti epistemologici, soprattutto dal Foundherentism. Una volta stabilite le premesse giuridiche ed epistemologiche di questo lavoro, si procede all’esame della prova periziale propriamente detta, caratterizzata nell’ambito del sistema di valutazione vincolata della prova, nel tutto diverso dalla prova legale. Si esamina, quindi, il metodo scientifico e la sua difficoltà di demarcazione, puntando sulla necessità di distinzione tra la ‘buona' e la 'cattiva' scienza (scienza spazzatura). Alla fine, viene proposto, a partire da precedenti paradigmatici, dei criteri atti a determinare il ruolo del giudice nella produzione della prova tecnica e nella sua corretta valutazione, attività ad essere mediata dalle massime di esperienza e dai criteri della prova applicabili al caso, senza dimenticare alcuni diritti processuali fondamentali da prendere in considerazione insieme al diritto fondamentale alla prova. / O estudo tem por objetivo o exame do direito à adequada valoração da prova científico-pericial a partir de elementos do direito comparado, propondo a tese de que o magistrado possui diferentes graus de vinculação ao resultado da atividade pericial conforme uma série de requisitos deste meio probatório que estão sob o seu controle, também dependendo do tema debatido no processo (modelo de constatação aplicável). Permeia o estudo a utilização de precedentes e legislação estrangeira, sempre com o devido contraponto na legislação brasileira, quando possível. O ponto de partida é o exame do direito fundamental ao processo justo e do consequente direito fundamental à prova, distinguindo-o de outros direitos fundamentais (contraditório e ampla defesa), a fim de densificá-lo, delineando diversas implicações de seu reconhecimento, dentre elas, o direito à adequada valoração do material probatório. Em seguida são enfrentados temas fundamentais conectados à prova, como o conceito de verdade e a reconstrução dos fatos no processo, construindo-se uma possível ciência jurídico-probatória a partir de pressupostos epistemológicos, especialmente a partir do Funderentismo. Estabelecidas as premissas jurídicas e epistemológicas do trabalho, passa-se à análise da prova pericial propriamente dita, caracterizando-a no âmbito do sistema de valoração probatória vinculada, em nada similar à prova tarifada. Examina-se, então, o método científico e a sua dificuldade demarcatória, apontando-se a necessária distinção entre ciência ‘boa’ e ciência ‘ruim’ (junk Science). Em derradeiro, propõem-se, a partir de precedentes paradigmáticos, os critérios para determinar o papel do julgador na produção da prova técnica e a valoração adequada pelo juízo, mediando essa atividade pelas máximas de experiência e modelos de constação aplicáveis ao caso, sem olvidar alguns direitos fundamentais processuais que devem ser levados em consideração em conjunto com o direito fundamental à prova. / This study aims to examine the admissibility and the assessment of the scientific expert evidence based on elements of comparative law, proposing that the magistrate has different degrees of attachment to the result of the expert activity according to a series of requirements which they can control, also depending on the topic discussed during the legal process (applicable burden of proof). The use of precedents and foreign legislation also permeate this study, always relating them to Brazilian law whenever possible. The starting point is the examination of the fundamental right to due process and its consequent fundamental right to evidence, differentiating it from other fundamental rights (right to contradiction and broad defense), in order to densify it, outlining the several implications of its recognition, the right to due assessment of evidentiary material particularly. After that, fundamental issues connected to evidence are confronted, such as the concept of truth and the reconstruction of facts in the legal process, leading to a possible legal evidentiary science from epistemological assumptions, especially through Foundherentism. Once the legal and epistemological premises of this paper are established, the analysis of expert evidence itself will be studied by characterizing it in the scope of the bound assessment evidence approach, which is not at all similar to the legal proof. The scientific method is then examined as well as its demarcation difficulty, pointing out the necessary distinction between 'good' science and 'bad' science (Junk Science). At last, from paradigmatic precedents, different criteria is proposed to determine the role of the judge in the production of technical evidence and the subsequent appropriate assessment by the court, mediating this activity through legal maxims and the applicable burden of proof, without forgetting some fundamental procedural rights which should be taken into consideration along with the fundamental right to evidence.

OPSOMMING Gebeurlikhede kan omskryf word as onsekere omstandighede van positiewe of negatiewe aard wat, onafhanklik van die verweerder se optrede en indien dit sou realiseer, waarskynlik 'n persoon se gesondheid, inkomste, verdienvermoë, lewenskwaliteit, lewensverwagting of onderhoudsafhanklikheid in die toekoms kan beïnvloed of in die verlede kon beïnvloed het en wat gevolglik op billike en realistiese wyse in ag geneem moet word ter bepaling van die skadevergoedingsbedrag. Die skadevergoedingsbedrag kan vanweë gebeurlikhede verminder of vermeerder word waar die eiser wel met `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid die volle omvang van die skade bewys het, maar die hof nie kon oortuig dat geen ander oorsaak die skade waarskynlik ook sou kon veroorsaak nie (sg "gebeurlikheids-aanpassings"). In gevalle waar die eiser nie die volle omvang van die skade op `n oorwig van waarskynlikheid kon bewys nie, kan die hof nogtans `n verminderde bedrag toeken op grond van die gebeurlikheid dat die skade wel waarskynlik in die toekoms kan realiseer (sg "gebeurlikheidstoekennings"). Die eiser moet getuienis voorlê van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verhoog, en die verweerder van gebeurlikhede wat die skadevergoedingsbedrag sal verlaag. Die waarskynlikheid dat die gebeurlikheid sal realiseer, moet deur die hof aan die hand van objektiewe maatstawwe en op grond van feitelike bewerings en logiese afleidings uit deskundige en ander getuienis in die vorm van `n waarskynlikheidsgraad van tussen vyf persent en tagtig persent uitgedruk word. Hipotetiese kousaliteit word deur die hof aangewend om gebeurlikhede op `n billike wyse in ag te neem en verwys na die kousale ketting van hipotetiese feite wat waarskynlik sou gerealiseer het indien die skadestigtende gebeurtenis nie plaasgevind het nie. Gebeurlikhede kan in twee kategorieë geklassifiseer word: Algemene gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik in enige stadium by alle persone kan voorkom (bv vroeë dood, siekte ens) en spesifieke gebeurlikhede wat gewoonlik op spesifieke tydstippe by spesifieke individue kan voorkom (bv hertroue, egskeiding ens). Terwyl die hof geregtelik kennis behoort te kan neem van die invloed van algemene gebeurlikhede, behoort die hof hoofsaaklik op grond van ondersteunende getuienis van die invloed van spesifieke gebeurlikhede oortuig te word. Algemene gebeurlikheidsaanpassings is gewoonlik relatief laag (gemiddeld tien persent), terwyl gebeurlikheidsaanpassings vir spesifieke gebeurlikhede fluktueer (gewoonlik tussen vyf persent en vyftig persent), afhangende van die getuienis en omstandighede van die eiser. Gebeurlikheidstoekennings is gewoonlik laer as vyftig persent. SUMMARY Contingencies can be described as uncertain circumstances of a positive or negative nature which, independent of the defendant's conduct and if it should realise, would probably influence a person's health, income, earning capacity, quality of life, life expectancy or dependency on support in future or could have done so in the past, and which must consequently be taken into account in a fair and realistic manner in the quantification of damages. Contingencies can be used to increase or reduce damages in circumstances where the plaintiff succeeded in proving the full loss on a preponderance of probability, but could not convince the court that there was no probability that any other cause could also have given rise to the loss (so-called "contingency adjustments"). In circumstances where the plaintiff could not prove the full loss on a preponderance of probability, the court can nevertheless award a reduced amount on the basis of the contingency that loss could probably realise in future (so-called "contingency allowances"). The plaintiff must adduce evidence of contingencies that can increase damages, and the defendant of contingencies that can reduce damages. The degree of probability that the contingency will realise, must be expressed by the court as a percentage of between five percent and eighty percent, in view of objective measures and on the basis of factual allegations and logical deductions derived from expert and other evidence. Hypothetical causation assists the court in taking account of contingencies in a fair manner and refers to the causal link of hypothetical events which would probably have realised if the damage-causing event did not occur. Contingencies can be classified into two categories: General contingencies that usually can be present in the lives of all people at any point in time (eg early death, sickness, etc) and specific contingencies that usually are present in the lives of specific individuals at specific times (eg remarriage, divorce, etc). While the court should be able to take legal notice of the influence of general contingencies, the court should be convinced of the influence of specific contingencies primarily on the basis of supporting evidence. General contingency adjustments are usually relatively low (on average ten per cent), while contingency adjustments for specific contingencies fluctuate (usually between five per cent and fifty per cent), depending on the evidence and circumstances of the plaintiff. Contingency allowances are usually lower than fifty per cent. / Jurisprudence / LL.D

Lo studio si propone di esaminare la valutazione della prova scientifica periziale a partire da elementi del diritto comparato, proponendo la tesi secondo la quale il magistrato può avere vincoli diversi con il risultato dell'attività periziale a seconda dei requisiti di questo mezzo probatorio scelti tra quelli disponibili e che sono sotto il controllo del giudice, nonché del tema discusso nel processo (standard de valutazione probatorio applicabile). Vengono utilizzati in questo studio i precedenti e la legislazione straniera, sempre con il dovuto contrappunto nella legislazione brasiliana, quando possibile. Il punto di partenza è l'esame del diritto fondamentale a un giusto processo e il conseguente diritto fondamentale alla prova, distinguendolo da altri diritti fondamentali (il contraddittorio e l’ampia difesa), addensandolo e mostrando le diverse implicazioni legate al suo riconoscimento, tra le quali, il diritto a un'adeguata valutazione delle prove. In seguito si affrontano questioni fondamentali legate al tema della prova, come il concetto di verità e la ricostruzione dei fatti nel processo, costruendosi un’eventuale scienza giuridica della prova a partire da presupposti epistemologici, soprattutto dal Foundherentism. Una volta stabilite le premesse giuridiche ed epistemologiche di questo lavoro, si procede all’esame della prova periziale propriamente detta, caratterizzata nell’ambito del sistema di valutazione vincolata della prova, nel tutto diverso dalla prova legale. Si esamina, quindi, il metodo scientifico e la sua difficoltà di demarcazione, puntando sulla necessità di distinzione tra la ‘buona' e la 'cattiva' scienza (scienza spazzatura). Alla fine, viene proposto, a partire da precedenti paradigmatici, dei criteri atti a determinare il ruolo del giudice nella produzione della prova tecnica e nella sua corretta valutazione, attività ad essere mediata dalle massime di esperienza e dai criteri della prova applicabili al caso, senza dimenticare alcuni diritti processuali fondamentali da prendere in considerazione insieme al diritto fondamentale alla prova. / O estudo tem por objetivo o exame do direito à adequada valoração da prova científico-pericial a partir de elementos do direito comparado, propondo a tese de que o magistrado possui diferentes graus de vinculação ao resultado da atividade pericial conforme uma série de requisitos deste meio probatório que estão sob o seu controle, também dependendo do tema debatido no processo (modelo de constatação aplicável). Permeia o estudo a utilização de precedentes e legislação estrangeira, sempre com o devido contraponto na legislação brasileira, quando possível. O ponto de partida é o exame do direito fundamental ao processo justo e do consequente direito fundamental à prova, distinguindo-o de outros direitos fundamentais (contraditório e ampla defesa), a fim de densificá-lo, delineando diversas implicações de seu reconhecimento, dentre elas, o direito à adequada valoração do material probatório. Em seguida são enfrentados temas fundamentais conectados à prova, como o conceito de verdade e a reconstrução dos fatos no processo, construindo-se uma possível ciência jurídico-probatória a partir de pressupostos epistemológicos, especialmente a partir do Funderentismo. Estabelecidas as premissas jurídicas e epistemológicas do trabalho, passa-se à análise da prova pericial propriamente dita, caracterizando-a no âmbito do sistema de valoração probatória vinculada, em nada similar à prova tarifada. Examina-se, então, o método científico e a sua dificuldade demarcatória, apontando-se a necessária distinção entre ciência ‘boa’ e ciência ‘ruim’ (junk Science). Em derradeiro, propõem-se, a partir de precedentes paradigmáticos, os critérios para determinar o papel do julgador na produção da prova técnica e a valoração adequada pelo juízo, mediando essa atividade pelas máximas de experiência e modelos de constação aplicáveis ao caso, sem olvidar alguns direitos fundamentais processuais que devem ser levados em consideração em conjunto com o direito fundamental à prova. / This study aims to examine the admissibility and the assessment of the scientific expert evidence based on elements of comparative law, proposing that the magistrate has different degrees of attachment to the result of the expert activity according to a series of requirements which they can control, also depending on the topic discussed during the legal process (applicable burden of proof). The use of precedents and foreign legislation also permeate this study, always relating them to Brazilian law whenever possible. The starting point is the examination of the fundamental right to due process and its consequent fundamental right to evidence, differentiating it from other fundamental rights (right to contradiction and broad defense), in order to densify it, outlining the several implications of its recognition, the right to due assessment of evidentiary material particularly. After that, fundamental issues connected to evidence are confronted, such as the concept of truth and the reconstruction of facts in the legal process, leading to a possible legal evidentiary science from epistemological assumptions, especially through Foundherentism. Once the legal and epistemological premises of this paper are established, the analysis of expert evidence itself will be studied by characterizing it in the scope of the bound assessment evidence approach, which is not at all similar to the legal proof. The scientific method is then examined as well as its demarcation difficulty, pointing out the necessary distinction between 'good' science and 'bad' science (Junk Science). At last, from paradigmatic precedents, different criteria is proposed to determine the role of the judge in the production of technical evidence and the subsequent appropriate assessment by the court, mediating this activity through legal maxims and the applicable burden of proof, without forgetting some fundamental procedural rights which should be taken into consideration along with the fundamental right to evidence.

Lo studio si propone di esaminare la valutazione della prova scientifica periziale a partire da elementi del diritto comparato, proponendo la tesi secondo la quale il magistrato può avere vincoli diversi con il risultato dell'attività periziale a seconda dei requisiti di questo mezzo probatorio scelti tra quelli disponibili e che sono sotto il controllo del giudice, nonché del tema discusso nel processo (standard de valutazione probatorio applicabile). Vengono utilizzati in questo studio i precedenti e la legislazione straniera, sempre con il dovuto contrappunto nella legislazione brasiliana, quando possibile. Il punto di partenza è l'esame del diritto fondamentale a un giusto processo e il conseguente diritto fondamentale alla prova, distinguendolo da altri diritti fondamentali (il contraddittorio e l’ampia difesa), addensandolo e mostrando le diverse implicazioni legate al suo riconoscimento, tra le quali, il diritto a un'adeguata valutazione delle prove. In seguito si affrontano questioni fondamentali legate al tema della prova, come il concetto di verità e la ricostruzione dei fatti nel processo, costruendosi un’eventuale scienza giuridica della prova a partire da presupposti epistemologici, soprattutto dal Foundherentism. Una volta stabilite le premesse giuridiche ed epistemologiche di questo lavoro, si procede all’esame della prova periziale propriamente detta, caratterizzata nell’ambito del sistema di valutazione vincolata della prova, nel tutto diverso dalla prova legale. Si esamina, quindi, il metodo scientifico e la sua difficoltà di demarcazione, puntando sulla necessità di distinzione tra la ‘buona' e la 'cattiva' scienza (scienza spazzatura). Alla fine, viene proposto, a partire da precedenti paradigmatici, dei criteri atti a determinare il ruolo del giudice nella produzione della prova tecnica e nella sua corretta valutazione, attività ad essere mediata dalle massime di esperienza e dai criteri della prova applicabili al caso, senza dimenticare alcuni diritti processuali fondamentali da prendere in considerazione insieme al diritto fondamentale alla prova. / O estudo tem por objetivo o exame do direito à adequada valoração da prova científico-pericial a partir de elementos do direito comparado, propondo a tese de que o magistrado possui diferentes graus de vinculação ao resultado da atividade pericial conforme uma série de requisitos deste meio probatório que estão sob o seu controle, também dependendo do tema debatido no processo (modelo de constatação aplicável). Permeia o estudo a utilização de precedentes e legislação estrangeira, sempre com o devido contraponto na legislação brasileira, quando possível. O ponto de partida é o exame do direito fundamental ao processo justo e do consequente direito fundamental à prova, distinguindo-o de outros direitos fundamentais (contraditório e ampla defesa), a fim de densificá-lo, delineando diversas implicações de seu reconhecimento, dentre elas, o direito à adequada valoração do material probatório. Em seguida são enfrentados temas fundamentais conectados à prova, como o conceito de verdade e a reconstrução dos fatos no processo, construindo-se uma possível ciência jurídico-probatória a partir de pressupostos epistemológicos, especialmente a partir do Funderentismo. Estabelecidas as premissas jurídicas e epistemológicas do trabalho, passa-se à análise da prova pericial propriamente dita, caracterizando-a no âmbito do sistema de valoração probatória vinculada, em nada similar à prova tarifada. Examina-se, então, o método científico e a sua dificuldade demarcatória, apontando-se a necessária distinção entre ciência ‘boa’ e ciência ‘ruim’ (junk Science). Em derradeiro, propõem-se, a partir de precedentes paradigmáticos, os critérios para determinar o papel do julgador na produção da prova técnica e a valoração adequada pelo juízo, mediando essa atividade pelas máximas de experiência e modelos de constação aplicáveis ao caso, sem olvidar alguns direitos fundamentais processuais que devem ser levados em consideração em conjunto com o direito fundamental à prova. / This study aims to examine the admissibility and the assessment of the scientific expert evidence based on elements of comparative law, proposing that the magistrate has different degrees of attachment to the result of the expert activity according to a series of requirements which they can control, also depending on the topic discussed during the legal process (applicable burden of proof). The use of precedents and foreign legislation also permeate this study, always relating them to Brazilian law whenever possible. The starting point is the examination of the fundamental right to due process and its consequent fundamental right to evidence, differentiating it from other fundamental rights (right to contradiction and broad defense), in order to densify it, outlining the several implications of its recognition, the right to due assessment of evidentiary material particularly. After that, fundamental issues connected to evidence are confronted, such as the concept of truth and the reconstruction of facts in the legal process, leading to a possible legal evidentiary science from epistemological assumptions, especially through Foundherentism. Once the legal and epistemological premises of this paper are established, the analysis of expert evidence itself will be studied by characterizing it in the scope of the bound assessment evidence approach, which is not at all similar to the legal proof. The scientific method is then examined as well as its demarcation difficulty, pointing out the necessary distinction between 'good' science and 'bad' science (Junk Science). At last, from paradigmatic precedents, different criteria is proposed to determine the role of the judge in the production of technical evidence and the subsequent appropriate assessment by the court, mediating this activity through legal maxims and the applicable burden of proof, without forgetting some fundamental procedural rights which should be taken into consideration along with the fundamental right to evidence.