Chapter 1: Intrafamily Bargaining and Love Popular culture and common wisdom testify that the way partners in a relationship feel for one another very much depends on how they treat each other. This paper posits the hypothesis that altruism or love in a relationship is endogenous to the actions of the partners and studies how this influences allocations and efficiency in a bargaining model of household decision-making. The main results are that agents treat their partner in a kinder way than without endogenously evolving love, this leads to more equitable allocations in household decision making and greater intertemporal efficiency. There are two mechanisms at work: agents treat their partner nicely to avoid retribution by a less loving partner in the future; and they treat the partner nicely so that the kind reciprocal behavior raises their own love towards the partner, which lets them enjoy higher utility. As to love, two interpretations emerge: love is a commitment device by which couples can implement Pareto superior allocations; and love is an investment good in the sense that costly nice behavior towards the partner today may ensure higher levels of trust and efficiency in the future. Chapter 2: Perception of Technology and Technological Progress under Extractive Institutions This paper explores the impact of different perceptions of the nature of technology - whether it may grow in an arithmetic or geometric fashion - on the choices of an elite that lives on extracting resources from the productive populace. We show that slow potential growth destroys the credibility of inclusive institutions that the elite may consider in order to foster growth whereas these can and will be implemented if populace and elite believe in fast growth. Belief in the potential of technological growth leads to growth-friendly policies under both extractive and inclusive institutions and, as history progresses, the true nature of technology reveals itself and this belief spreads. Chapter 3: A critical literature review of the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and the communication of Unprotected Information Assets This paper reviews the literature centred on the question of what kind of settings facilitate the transmission of unverifiable pieces of information that re- side with an agent whose incentives are not well aligned with an agent for whom this piece of information is useful. The question is framed within the Property Rights Theory of the Firm and its answers make extensive use of the modelling device of Cheap Talk. The main findings are that communication leads to costly distortions and the efforts to decrease bias and information loss may trigger major revisions to the structure of incentive systems and the allocation of decision-rights. The paper argues that the literature has so far failed to properly examine the question of property rights of information and is therefore focused on niche applications.

While some countries are thriving in political stability and economicprosperity, others are struggling with political instability and poverty. The fundamental difference between the successful and the failed nations boildown to their institutions, as stated by Acemoglu and Robinson in their influential institutional economics work, “Why Nations Fail”. Inclusive institution is the reason why some countries achieved economic success and prosperity because they allow the population to participate and take advantage of the economic activities while extractive institutions hinder it incase of failed nations. The purpose of this study is to explore more closely how extractive institutions persist in an ex-colonised country in spite of institutional drift andthe political disruptions of post-colonial governments avowedly vying to rid the present of the past. Indonesia is chosen as the subject for this historical desk research case study wherein the relevant history surrounding thecolonial period and the subsequent development will be explored andanalysed through the lens of secondary literature. In addition to being based on textual evidence, the institutional economics approach will be used as a theoretical framework to break down the social, economic, and political aspects of the history. Furthermore, the mechanism of how the institutions evolve will be seen through the political development framework. The result will show that patrimonialism is present as an extractive feature in both modern and colonial Indonesia and how it has been sustained after independence. This study also suggests other extractive features as a legacy ofthe Dutch colonialism that is separate from the native tradition and customs which are Javacentrism and racism in the form of social stratification between races as a result of colonial policies.

It has been over sixty (60) years since decolonization in Africa. In years gone by, a pattern has emerged of former French colonies being marginally worse off than their British counterparts. Britain and France as the two most dominant colonial powers in Africa allows for these comparisons in growth and development to be made. Using a case study of Cote D’Ivoire, this study argues the continuous existence of neocolonialism in former French colonies through cooperation agreements as an explanation to this divergence in growth. The research question posed is: “To what extent was the Cooperation Agreements signed between France and Cote D’Ivoire in 1960 a pivot from France colonial to neocolonial rule in Cote D’Ivoire?” In order to answer this question a conceptual framework focusing in particular on colonialism, extractive political and economic institutions, neocolonialism, dependency, and the structural theory of imperialism were chosen. The methods employed were secondary literature review, content analysis of the cooperation agreements signed between France and Cote D’Ivoire in 1960, and a conducted survey of Ivorians. This study concludes that these Agreements cede to France indirect and subtle control in all aspects of Ivorian statehood: economy, finance, military, foreign policy, diplomacy, trade, judiciary, education, natural resources, and even internal security. This has resulted in Cote D’Ivoire being politically and economically dependent on France. Arguably, the most detrimental to Ivorian growth and development is its lack of monetary control through the continuous use of the colonial currency of the CFA franc and membership in CFA Zone. As a currency, the CFA franc is pegged to the French franc and now Euro. This study argues that the currency is overvalued and incongruent to growth and development in an agricultural export-based economy like Cote D’Ivoire. And being political dependent on France renders Ivorian leaders reluctant to opt their country out from the CFA Zone, thus perpetuating a cycle of exploitation and inhibiting growth. The result of this study contributes to studies on growth divergence in Africa, and towards understanding relations between former colonies and colonizers, and its impact on global wealth divides and dependency.