Bien que non répertorié dans le code civil au titres des modes de preuve admissibles, le constat d'huissier de justice n'en demeure pas moins un outil de référence dans l'établissement de la preuve des faits juridiques. La souplesse de son régime, à laquelle participe notamment la liberté dévolue au constatant dans la relation matérielle, en fait un procédé probatoire malléalble, adapté aux situations les plus diverses. Instrument de prévention des litiges, voire de règlement anticipé de ces derniers, le constat peut aussi permettre au plaideur de satisfaire à la charge processuelle qui lui incombe de rapporter la preuve des faits au soutien de ses prétentions. A cet égard, il constitue assurément un moyen de réalisation du droit à la preuve, entendu comme celui d'imposer au juge une offre ou une demande de preuve présentant un intérêt probatoire légitime et récemment consacré par la jurisprudence sur le fondement de l'article 6 de la Convention européenne des droits de l'homme. L'absence de carcan juridique enfermant la réalisation de la mesure de constat pourrait cependant faire douter de la qualité de celle-ci. L'allégation mérite d'être éprouvée au regard de la qualité particulière de son auteur. Indifférent à la règlementation sporadique de la mesure, l'huissier de justice en garantit une réalisation licite, respectueuse des principes directeurs du procès et des droits subjectifs des tiers. Le renforcement en matière civile de la valeur probante des constatations établies par cet officier ministériel est à ce titre une confirmation officielle de leur qualité indiscutable. / Although not listed in the civil code in conformance with the approved modes of evidences, the statement of ofacts drawn up by a judicial officer is still a reference tool in the establishment of the proof of legal facts. The flexibility of its regime, in which participates in particular the freedom devolved in the material relation, makes it a probationary process moldable, adapted to the most diverse situations. Instrument of prevention of the disputes, or of their advance settlement, the statement of facts can also allow the litigant to satisfy the procedural burden which falls to him to prove the facts to the support of its claims. In this respect, it serves undoubtedly as a means of realization of the right to evidence, settled as the right to impose to the judge an offer or a request of evidence that hold a legitimate probative interest and recently confirmed by case-law on the basis of the Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. The absence of legal straightjacke locking the establishment of the statement of facts could however raise doubts about its quality. This allegation deserves to be felt with regard to the particular quality of the judicial officer. Indifferent to the sporadic regulations of the measure, he guarantees its lawful realization according to the general principles of the trial and the subjective rights third parties. The strengthening in civil maters of the probative value of the findings made by the judicial officer is as such an official confirmation of their indisputable quality.

<p> In his book <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language </em>(1982)<em> </em>Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book <em>Philosophical Investigations </em>(1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´<em> </em>different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher.</p><p>This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it <em>is</em>. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life.</p> / <p>I <em>Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages</em> (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i <em>Filosofiska undersökningar </em>(1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening.</p><p>Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det <em>är</em>. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet</p>

<p>This thesis explores the possibility of formulating an intermediate approach towards global justice. The desired approach should be intermediate in the sense that it is located in the normative space between the two rather exterme philosophical positions of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism for reasons explained in the thesis. As it turns out in the argumentation within this thesis it is an appropriate identification of the facts that can be thought morally relevant in the context of global justice which is of crucial importance for achieving this task. This is the case since such morally relevant facts, as will be shown, are decisive not only for making definite sense of the ideals at stake with regard to the issues of global inequality and absolute poverty. They furthermore also are essential for determining normatively appropriate and empirically effective obligations for working towards a more just world.</p>

Résumé : voir fichier attaché

This thesis explores the possibility of formulating an intermediate approach towards global justice. The desired approach should be intermediate in the sense that it is located in the normative space between the two rather exterme philosophical positions of cosmopolitanism and liberal nationalism for reasons explained in the thesis. As it turns out in the argumentation within this thesis it is an appropriate identification of the facts that can be thought morally relevant in the context of global justice which is of crucial importance for achieving this task. This is the case since such morally relevant facts, as will be shown, are decisive not only for making definite sense of the ideals at stake with regard to the issues of global inequality and absolute poverty. They furthermore also are essential for determining normatively appropriate and empirically effective obligations for working towards a more just world.

In his book Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language (1982) Saul Kripke claims that Wittgenstein argues for a certain form of scepticism in his book Philosophical Investigations (1953), namely a new form of philosophical scepticism, a result of Wittgenstein´s idea of language as language games. Nihilism, scepticism of meaning or of concept, constitutive scepticism are other commentators´ different names of the same phenomenon. The philosophy of Wittgenstein accounts for how our words, including the words of mathematics, have no meaning and there are no a priori justified objective facts as to what I mean about a word. We follow the rules blindly and without justification. We are unable to find any facts against this proposal. Like a ´sceptic´ Wittgenstein denies the ´superlative fact,´ a fact supposed to give an a priori justification to our words. The consensus of a language community is enough to give meaning and assertions to what we in ordinary language call facts, but objective facts in logical meaning a priori, do not exist, a sceptical view in Kripke´s interpretation. Wittgenstein rejects explicit scepticism, but Kripke thinks Wittgenstein did not want to repudiate common belief as a common sense philosopher. This paper ´Wittgenstein and Scepticism´ says that Wittgenstein certainly denies ´superlative fact´, but his reason was founded on conclusions from his investigation of grammar and language, which we use and misuse according to what we want, not to how it is. We demand that logic ought to be absolute, general and consistent, but there is no such logic a priori. Wittgenstein thinks we have to stick to reality and facts of experience. Facts a priori are very convincing facts, but they are not ´sublime´ in a logical metaphysic way. Logic is not rejected and the philosophy of logic uses the same words as common language. Logic has a normative function in our language. We learn words and rules in a certain context and use them in certain situations. How we use the word tells us the meaning of the word and the correct understanding. Our following the rules depends on how they work in real life. / I Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Languages (1982) hävdar Saul Kripke att Wittgensteins resonemang i Filosofiska undersökningar (1953) leder till en speciell  form av skepticism, en filosofisk skepticism, en konsekvens av Wittgensteins uppfattning om språket som språkspel. Nihilism, meningsskepticism, begreppsskepticism, konstitutiv skepticism är andra kommentatorers beteckningar. Wittgensteins filosofi visar att språkets ord, inklusive matematikens ord, saknar mening och inga rättfärdigade objektiva a priori fakta finns om vad jag menar med ett ord. Vi följer språkets regler blint och som det passar oss Argument saknas för att vederlägga  detta påstående. Som en skeptiker förnekar Wittgenstein filosofins "superlative fact", som förmodas ge en a priori grund för vad jag menar med ett ord. En språkgemenskaps konsensus ger dock orden mening och bekräftar vad som i vanligt språk kallas fakta, men objektiva fakta i logisk mening, fakta a priori saknas, d.v.s. en skeptisk uppfattning, enligt Kripkes tolkning Att Wittgenstein själv tar avstånd från skepticismen beror på att han inte vill bryta med den allmänna uppfattningen om fakta och  mening. Uppsatsen "Wittgenstein och skepticismen" visar att visserligen överger Wittgenstein "superlative fact", men detta är ett resultat av hans grammatiska undersökning av språket, vilket vi brukar och missbrukar för våra syften, inte som det är. Vi önskar och fordrar att logiken ger oss ett absolut, generellt och beständigt svar, men ett  sådant svar kan inte logikens a priori ge. Wittgenstein menar att verkligheten och erfarenhetsfakta är vad vi har att hålla oss till. A priori fakta är enligt Wittgenstein mycket övertygande fakta, men inte i den "sublima" logikens metafysiska mening. Logiken förkastas inte, ty logikens filosofi talar inte om ord i någon annan mening än vi gör i det vanliga livet. Logiken har en styrfunktion i språket. Orden lärs in i ett sammanhang och används i ett sammanhang. Användningen av ordet visar om ordets mening är korrekt uppfattad. Vi följer regler efter hur de fungerar i en verklighet

Visually impaired (VI) individuals struggle with grocery shopping and have to rely on either friends, family or grocery store associates for shopping. ShopMobile 2 is a proof-of-concept system that allows VI shoppers to shop independently in a grocery store using only their smartphone. Unlike other assistive shopping systems that use dedicated hardware, this system is a software only solution that relies on fast computer vision algorithms. It consists of three modules - an eyes free barcode scanner, an optical character recognition (OCR) module, and a tele-assistance module. The eyes-free barcode scanner allows VI shoppers to locate and retrieve products by scanning barcodes on shelves and on products. The OCR module allows shoppers to read nutrition facts on products and the tele-assistance module allows them to obtain help from sighted individuals at remote locations. This dissertation discusses, provides implementations of, and presents laboratory and real-world experiments related to all three modules.

Dans ce travail, la stabilité transitoire et l'amortissement des oscillations dans les réseaux électriques sont améliorés en utilisant la commande en ligne du SMES (Superconducting Magnetic Energy Storage) et du SSSC (Static Synchronous Séries Compensator). Les commandes proposées sont basées sur la théorie de la logique floue. Dans le cas du SSSC, elle est associée à la fonction d'énergie transitoire. Nous avons également associé une loi de type mode glissant pour éliminer le lien hors ligne entre la commande du SMES et le centre de contrôle des réseaux. Ceci permet un maintien du fonctionnement du régulateur en l'absence.de phase d'apprentissage. Le SMES et le SSSC sont connectés à un point intermédiaire d'une longue ligne qui relie deux parties du réseau. Une réalisation pratique du régulateur à été étudie et les mesures nécessaires pour la commande peuvent s'obtenir à partir du noeud auquel est connecté le régulateur. Afin de valider les commandes proposées, celles-ci ont été implanté en simulation sur deux exemples de réseaux : un réseau comportant une ligne et le réseau de New England. Les résultats obtenues montrent une amélioration considérable du temps critique d'élimination du défaut ainsi que l'amortissement des oscillations après le défaut. Notre méthode a également apporté une augmentation de la capacité de transfert correspondant aux lignes de transmission.

Many different Flexible AC Transmission System (FACTS) devices have been studied in recent years in order to control the flow of power through transmission lines and reduce the overall burden on the power grid. The net results of these devices are decreased utility costs, increased system stability, and improved system flexibility. The main issues with most currently available FACTS controllers are the high costs of installation, and operation. The Sen Transformer (ST) is a new FACTS device that decreases these costs by using relatively inexpensive and industry familiar transformer technology to independently control the active and reactive power in a transmission line.<p> This thesis introduces the first full transient model for the ST developed in an ElectroMagnetic Transients Program (EMTP) using a hybrid transformer modeling approach. This technique handles all the non-linearities of the core, including losses and saturation effects, as well as inter-phase coupling, and zero sequence effect with an attached topographically correct core model. This new model can be used in a variety of power system studies such as transient and dynamic simulations, and protection analysis. The flexibility of the hybid ST model allows for different core and winding configurations as well as response to very fast transients with little modification. Fault analysis studies are presented to showcase the capabilities of the transient ST model developed.<p> The first ST transient model using the Finite Element Analysis (FEA) technique is also created for comparison with the hybrid ST model. This method uses Maxwells equations, material non-linearities and coupled electric circuits to obtain a precise transient solution for the ST. There is good agreement between the two models in a test system for multiple types of fault scenarios. The hybrid ST model is therefore the preferred model to use for fault analysis since it reduces simulation time drastically when compared to the FEA ST model.<p> The hybrid ST model is then used to develop and test differential, and ground protection schemes that ensure device safety during faulted scenarios. The protection schemes are analyzed and compared with analogous Phase Angle Regulator (PAR) schemes that have been implemented for many years.

Electricity systems are very complex systems and are composed of numerous transmission lines, generators and loads. The generating stations are generally far away from load centres and that may cause transmission line congestion and overloading. Series capacitive compensation is the most economical way to increase transmission capacity and improve transient stability of transmission grids. However, one of the impeding factors for the widespread use of series capacitive compensation is the potential risk of Subsynchronous Resonance (SSR). Subsynchronous Resonance is a phenomenon in which electrical power is exchanged with the generator shaft system in an increasing manner which may result in damage to the turbine generator shaft system. Therefore, mitigating SSR continues to be a subject of research and development aiming at developing effective SSR countermeasures.<p>This research work presents new methods of alleviating the SSR problem using a Static Synchronous Series Compensator (SSSC) and a Static Synchronous Compensator (STATCOM). These methods are based on using the SSSC and STATCOM to inject unbalanced series quadrature voltages and unbalanced shunt reactive currents in transmission line just after clearing faults. When the subsynchronous oscillations drive unsymmetrical phase currents, the developed electromagnetic torque will be lower than the condition when the three-phase currents are symmetrical. The unsymmetrical currents result in a lower coupling strength between the mechanical and the electrical system at asynchronous oscillations. Therefore, the energy exchange between the electrical and the mechanical systems at subsynchronous oscillations will be suppressed, thus, avoiding the build-up of torsional stresses on the generator shaft systems under subsynchronous resonance condition. The validity of proposed methods are demonstrated by time simulation results using the electromagnetic transient program EMTP-RV.