市場失靈往往是政府介入干預的主要理由，一般常見的干預方法為正向的誘因激勵與負向的懲罰手段。就農地而言，因其所能提供的生態或環境的功能係屬公共財性質，具有無排他性、無敵對性、聯合消費的性質，市場上缺乏私人主動提供農地環境效益的經濟誘因，使得政府基於全民福祉之理由而介入農地保護，以提升外部效益。又為防患於未然，乃訂定管制規則予以規範違規使用行為，以降低外部成本。台灣的農地管理兼採補貼給付、賦稅減免與使用管制之政策措施，其實施經年究竟有無缺失？如何加以改進？適逢台灣主管當局刻正研擬國土計畫法（草案）且需要檢視之際，益發突顯本文研究此課題之重要性。 新古典經濟學者主張以課稅的方式消弭外部成本、以給予補貼的方式鼓勵外部效益的產生；新制度經濟學者主張透過界定財產權，經由利害關係人協商，最後達到社會整體最適生產水準，兩者各有所長，於實際適用時尚須截長補短綜合考量。本文從上述理論基礎切入，採用文獻分析法與焦點人物訪談法來檢討現行農地管理機制不足之處。基於損益均衡的補貼理念，我們意圖將正向誘因、使用市場機制引進農地管理機制中，並改進以往偏重於農地違規使用負向處罰的管理方式，以期健全農地管理，落實農業永續發展目標。 關鍵字：農地管理、誘因機制、公共財、外部性 / Market failure is often the main reason of government intervention. Generally, intervention methods always include positive incentive measures and passive punishment means. From viewpoint of farmland, it serves as biological and environmental functions with the character of public goods, which possesses features of non-exclusion, non-rival and jointly-consume. However, there is lack of economic incentives to provide environmental benefits of farmland by private market, government intervene shall be needed in farmland protection on basis of entire people welfare. Besides, the land use control regulations shall be stipulated to reduce external cost. In Taiwan, incentive programs include incentive payments, tax exemption or reduction and land use control mechanism. Do these programs manipulate efficiently? If not, how to improve them in the future? Discussion of these issues shall play an important role while the draft of National Territory Planning Act is drawn up by the Planning Authority and more examinations are necessary in Taiwan. Neoclassical economists suggest that external costs can be prevented by taxation, and external benefits shall be encouraged by offering subsidy. Neo-institutional economists argue that the problem can be solved through defining property rights, and stakeholders shall negotiate with one another to achieve optimum of social production. This article bases on exploring those theories and takes positive and negative factors into account in practice. The main research methods are literature review and focal person interview to investigate insufficiency of current incentive mechanism in farmland management. Based on concept of benefit-cost equilibrium, we intend to provide positive incentives, and include market approach into incentive mechanism of farmland management and improve passive way of punishing illegal farmland use. Through formulation of these incentive tools, farmland management mechanism shall be established soundly so as to achieve the goals of agricultural sustainable development. Keywords：Farmland Management, Incentive Mechanism, Public Goods, Externality

Le Miscanthus x giganteus est une culture pérenne, nouvellement produite en Europe et présentant un intérêt fort pour son usage énergétique. Son implantation présage donc une réorganisation territoriale pérenne. Pour anticiper cette réorganisation, de nombreuses études modélisent les dynamiques spatialement explicites de son insertion. Notre thèse se positionne dans ce courant de recherche. Celle-ci vise à proposer un nouveau cadre de modélisation des processus de décision des agriculteurs, permettant la dissémination horizontale (scaling out) de ces processus issus d’études de cas, vers des territoires élargis. Pour cela, la thèse exploite le modèle du raisonnement à partir de cas. Elle articule (i) une démarche d’acquisition de connaissances sur les processus de décision des agriculteurs relatifs à l’insertion territoriale du miscanthus et (ii) la conception et évaluation d’un prototype ad hoc de raisonnement à partir de cas. La phase d’acquisition des connaissances montre que le processus d’insertion territoriale du miscanthus est complexe : celui-ci est étroitement lié aux contraintes parcellaires du territoire. Ces connaissances nous conduisent alors à discuter du choix des variables biophysiques et humaines intégrées à ce jour dans les modèles spatialement explicites. La phase de conception et d’évaluation du prototype de raisonnement à partir de cas montre que le modèle du raisonnement à partir de cas est particulièrement bien adapté pour modéliser un phénomène contextualisé. Evalués sur nos données d’enquêtes, ces résultats nous conduisent à discuter des modalités d’application du prototype sur d’autres bassins de production de miscanthus / Miscanthus x giganteus is the perennial crop, newly produced in Europe. Even if miscanthus is not so heavily produced nowadays, this crop would be of great interest for energy use. However, the allocation of miscanthus could produce a sustainable reorganization of the landscape. Therefore, many studies aim to model the land use change caused by miscanthus, in order to identify sustainable supply areas: our research belongs to this field. In our research, we propose a new framework for modeling decision-making process of farmers, relying on scaling out. More accurately, we propose to use the case-based reasoning model which solves problems based on an analogical reasoning. Then our research is structured: (i) by a knowledge acquisition step about decision-making process of farmers, based on farm surveys, conducted in the Côte d'Or department (Burgundy region) and (ii) by the design and evaluation of an ad hoc prototype of case-based reasoning. On the one hand, results of knowledge acquisition phase show that miscanthus allocation process is complex, more accurately, that miscanthus allocation process is closely related to land constraints, particularly in terms of logistic and environmental preservation of plots. These results lead us to discuss the selection of biophysical and human variables included to the current spatially explicit models. On the other hand, the design and evaluation phase of our prototype shows that case-based reasoning is particularly well suited to model a contextual phenomenon. These results lead us to discuss the modalities for implementing the prototype in other production areas of miscanthus

Kyoto University (京都大学) / 0048 / 新制・課程博士 / 博士(工学) / 甲第14224号 / 工博第3008号 / 新制||工||1446(附属図書館) / 26542 / UT51-2008-Q693 / 京都大学大学院工学研究科都市社会工学専攻 / (主査)教授 岡田 憲夫, 教授 小林 潔司, 教授 多々納 裕一 / 学位規則第4条第1項該当