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台灣高階主管薪酬揭露規範之探討 / Research of Executive Compensation Disclosure of Taiwan李相嬅 Unknown Date (has links)
金融海嘯爆發後,突顯了許多經營績效不佳之公司,卻仍支付高薪予其管理階層之問題,使社會大眾開始關注企業肥貓現象。針對此不合理現象,投資大眾期望能透過公司所揭露之資訊,對公司進行監督並瞭解其經營績效與經理人薪酬間是否具合理之關聯性。我國目前對於高階主管薪酬資訊揭露之要求,僅需總額揭露即可,這樣便給予公司有模糊地帶的空間,且對比修法前之條文,台灣之規範是由個別揭露走向總額揭露,就揭露實益來看,其實是讓資訊越發不透明,使投資人無法透過薪酬資訊來分析企業經營狀況,也有違證券交易法保障投資人之意旨,本研究建議台灣之薪酬資訊揭露規範應參酌美國規定,無論是公開發行公司或未公開發行公司,高階主管之薪酬均應改採個別揭露,並增加揭露之獎酬項目,文末並提供揭露之項目表格以供參考,期台灣能再加強資訊揭露之透明度,創造更有保障之投資環境。 / After the outbreak of the financial crisis, it highlights the problem that many poorly performing company still pay high compensation to their managements, and the public began to focus on the phenomenon of corporate fat cats. For this anomaly, the investing public expect to monitor the company through the information disclosed by them, and see whether a reasonable correlation between its operating performance and executive compensation. Taiwan's current regulation for disclosure of executive compensation the only require to disclose the total amount, thus giving the company room for a gray area. Compare to the law before amending, Taiwan’s regulation has changed from individually disclosure to comprehensive disclosure. This change, in fact, makes the information become more nontransparent. Therefore the investor can-not analyze the state of operation through compensation information of the company. Also, this change contrary to intention of the Securities Exchange Act to protect in-vestors. Thus this thesis suggests that the executive compensation disclosure regula-tion of Taiwan shall deliberate US regulations. To disclosure executive compensation individually no matter publicly company or private company, and increase the rewards to expose project. At the end of the text provide a table about executive compensation disclosure for reference, hopes Taiwan to strengthen the transparency of information disclosure and create a more safeguarding investment environment.
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中國肥貓對夥計慷慨嗎? / Do china Fat Cats pay their employees more?林玉婷 Unknown Date (has links)
本研究檢視以下兩項議題之研究:高管薪酬以及異常高管薪酬對職工工資的線性及非線性影響,以及所有權型態(國有企業與民營企業)對前述兩者關係之影響。而實證結果發現,高管薪酬及職工工資皆與公司績效呈正向相關,市場化程度高的地區亦會影響其薪酬水準。若以董事會獨立性與是否設立薪酬委員會做為公司治理良窳的指標則與高管薪酬的水準為正相關,但董事會獨立性與職工工資無關。另外與高管薪酬不同的是,機構投資人持股比率會提高職工工資的水準,但對高管薪酬的影響並不顯著。對所有權型態而言,在其他條件不變的情況下,國有企業的高管薪酬及職工工資皆大於非國有企業的高管薪酬。
最後,本研究對發現異常高管薪酬與職工工資的關係呈顯著正相關。而就任職於國有企業的職工與就職於民營企業的職工相比,若其服務企業的異常高管薪酬皆屬於每年前20%者,二組的職工工資並無顯著差異。但是,若其服務企業的異常高管薪酬皆屬於每年後20%者,則國有企業的職工工資會大於民營企業的職工工資。 / This study focuses on two issues: the effect of executive compensation and abnormal executive compensation on salary, and the effect of different ownership types on the relations of two types of compensation and salary. The empirical results show that executives and employees of companies with better performance enjoy higher compensation and salary. Moreover, the marketization level can affect the level of compensation and salary. The results also indicate that the independence level of boards of directors and the establishment of compensation committee both have a positive relationship with executive compensation. However, the independence level of the board of directors has no effect on salary. On the other hand, the shareholding ratio of institutional investors has a positive relationship with salary level, but has no effect on executive compensation. For all the ownership types, all other conditions remain constant, the executive compensation and salary of state-owned enterprises are higher than those of non-state enterprises.
In conclusion, this study states that abnormal executive compensation has a positive relationship with salary level. There is no significant difference in salaries between state-owned enterprises and non-state enterprises if the abnormal executive compensation belongs to the top 20% of the sample each year. Conversely, if abnormal executive compensation belongs to the last 20% of the sample each year, the salary of state-owned enterprises is higher than that of non-state enterprises.
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