This dissertation studies topics in the areas of international finance. In the first chapter, the Unintended Consequences of Financial Sanctions, I study the economic impact of the U.S. financial sanctions against Russian companies in the aftermath of Russia's annexation of Crimea in 2014. I show that this sanctions program, which primarily cut off access to international financial markets for sanctioned firms, produced an unintended consequence of strengthening the sanctions targets relative to their unsanctioned peers. Specifically, while the policy successfully halted new international borrowings by sanctioned companies, the spillover impact of the policy resulted in these targets shrinking in size by less than unsanctioned Russian firms. To explain these results, I argue that sanctions led to a reallocation of domestic resources in favor of sanctioned firms. In particular, sanctions precipitated capital crowding out and credit rationing, causing unsanctioned domestic borrowers to suffer more from the policy. The research highlights the limitation of "targeted sanctions" and also sheds light more broadly on the impact of international financial integration and capital flows on firm size dynamics. In the second chapter, Quantitative Analysis of Sanctions Policy, I theoretically and quantitatively analyze the impact of financial sanctions on the target firms and the target economy. I introduce a heterogeneous firm model with segmented capital markets and financial frictions in which sanctions against international borrowers led to capital crowding out and credit rationing among domestic borrowers. I calibrate the model to the 2014 U.S. financial sanctions episode and use the model to estimate the impact of sanctions on firm sizes and macroeconomic variables. I also evaluate policy alternatives and identify factors for policymakers to consider in calibrating future sanctions programs. I conclude by discussing the 2022 sanctions program and inferring broader policy implications. In the third chapter, the Impact of Monetary Policy on the Specialness of U.S. Treasuries, I estimate the causal effect of monetary policy on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. Quantifying this specialness by the U.S. Treasury Premium, which is the difference in the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries and that of government bonds of other developed countries measured as the deviation from covered interest parity between government bond yields, I find that monetary tightening by the Federal Reserve increases the specialness of U.S. Treasuries primarily by increasing the convenience yield of U.S. Treasuries. I also find that the magnitude of the impact varies across the term structure and across countries, especially after the Global Financial Crisis, and U.S. and foreign monetary policy shocks have asymmetric impacts on the specialness of U.S. Treasuries. These results provide evidence for the unique ability of the Federal Reserve to affect the specialness of U.S. Treasuries by altering the supply of dollar safe assets.

Along this dissertation I propose to walk the reader through several macroeconomic<p>implications of information asymmetries, with a special focus on financial<p>issues. This exercise is mainly theoretical: I develop stylized models that aim<p>at capturing macroeconomic phenomena such as self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups,<p>the rise and the fall of securitization markets, and the creation of systemic risk.<p>The dissertation consists of three chapters. The first one proposes an explanation<p>to self-fulfilling liquidity dry-ups. The second chapters proposes a formalization<p>of the concept of market discipline and an application to securitization<p>markets as risk-sharing mechanisms. The third one offers a complementary<p>analysis to the second as the rise of securitization is presented as banker optimal<p>response to strict capital constraints.<p>Two concepts that do not have unique acceptations in economics play a central<p>role in these models: liquidity and market discipline.<p>The liquidity of an asset refers to the ability for his owner to transform it into<p>current consumption goods. Secondary markets for long-term assets play thus<p>an important role with that respect. However, such markets might be illiquid due<p>to adverse selection.<p>In the first chapter, I show that: (1) when agents expect a liquidity dry-up<p>on such markets, they optimally choose to self-insure through the hoarding of<p>non-productive but liquid assets; (2) this hoarding behavior worsens adverse selection and dries up market liquidity; (3) such liquidity dry-ups are Pareto inefficient<p>equilibria; (4) the government can rule them out. Additionally, I show<p>that idiosyncratic liquidity shocks à la Diamond and Dybvig have stabilizing effects,<p>which is at odds with the banking literature. The main contribution of the<p>chapter is to show that market breakdowns due to adverse selection are highly<p>endogenous to past balance-sheet decisions.<p>I consider that agents are under market discipline when their current behavior<p>is influenced by future market outcomes. A key ingredient for market discipline<p>to be at play is that the market outcome depends on information that is observable<p>but not verifiable (that is, information that cannot be proved in court, and<p>consequently, upon which enforceable contracts cannot be based).<p>In the second chapter, after introducing this novel formalization of market<p>discipline, I ask whether securitization really contributes to better risk-sharing:<p>I compare it with other mechanisms that differ on the timing of risk-transfer. I<p>find that for securitization to be an efficient risk-sharing mechanism, it requires<p>market discipline to be strong and adverse selection not to be severe. This seems<p>to seriously restrict the set of assets that should be securitized for risk-sharing<p>motive.<p>Additionally, I show how ex-ante leverage may mitigate interim adverse selection<p>in securitization markets and therefore enhance ex-post risk-sharing. This<p>is interesting because high leverage is usually associated with “excessive” risktaking.<p>In the third chapter, I consider risk-neutral bankers facing strict capital constraints;<p>their capital is indeed required to cover the worst-case-scenario losses.<p>In such a set-up, I find that: 1) banker optimal autarky response is to diversify<p>lower-tail risk and maximize leverage; 2) securitization helps to free up capital<p>and to increase leverage, but distorts incentives to screen loan applicants properly; 3) market discipline mitigates this problem, but if it is overestimated by<p>the supervisor, it leads to excess leverage, which creates systemic risk. Finally,<p>I consider opaque securitization and I show that the supervisor: 4) faces uncertainty<p>about the trade-off between the size of the economy and the probability<p>and the severity of a systemic crisis; 5) can generally not set capital constraints<p>at the socially efficient level. / Doctorat en Sciences économiques et de gestion / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Using 1980 - 2012 annual data, the study empirically investigates the dynamic relationship between financial development and economic growth in three developing countries (South Africa, Brazil and Kenya) and three developed countries (United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia). The study was motivated by the current debate regarding the role of financial development in the economic growth process, and their causal relationship. The debate centres on whether financial development impacts positively or negatively on economic growth and whether it Granger-causes economic growth or vice versa. To this end, two models have been used. In Model 1 the impact of bank- and market-based financial development on economic growth is examined, while in Model 2 it is the causality between the two that is explored. Using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration and error-correction based causality test, the results were found to differ from country to country and over time. These results were also found to be sensitive to the financial development proxy used. Based on Model 1, the study found that the impact of bank-based financial development on economic growth is positive in South Africa and the USA, but negative in the U.K – and neither positive nor negative in Kenya. Elsewhere the results were inconclusive. Market-based financial development was found to impact positively in Kenya, USA and the UK but not in the remaining countries. Based on Model 2, the study found that bank-based financial development Granger-causes economic growth in the UK, while in Brazil they Granger-cause each other. However, in South Africa, Kenya and USA no causal relationship was found. In Australia the results were inconclusive. The study also found that in the short run, market-based financial development Granger-causes economic growth in the USA but that in South Africa and Brazil, the reverse applies. On the other hand bidirectional causality was found to prevail in Kenya in the same period. / Economics / DCOM (Economics)

Using 1980 - 2012 annual data, the study empirically investigates the dynamic relationship between financial development and economic growth in three developing countries (South Africa, Brazil and Kenya) and three developed countries (United States of America, United Kingdom and Australia). The study was motivated by the current debate regarding the role of financial development in the economic growth process, and their causal relationship. The debate centres on whether financial development impacts positively or negatively on economic growth and whether it Granger-causes economic growth or vice versa. To this end, two models have been used. In Model 1 the impact of bank- and market-based financial development on economic growth is examined, while in Model 2 it is the causality between the two that is explored. Using the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) bounds testing approach to cointegration and error-correction based causality test, the results were found to differ from country to country and over time. These results were also found to be sensitive to the financial development proxy used. Based on Model 1, the study found that the impact of bank-based financial development on economic growth is positive in South Africa and the USA, but negative in the U.K – and neither positive nor negative in Kenya. Elsewhere the results were inconclusive. Market-based financial development was found to impact positively in Kenya, USA and the UK but not in the remaining countries. Based on Model 2, the study found that bank-based financial development Granger-causes economic growth in the UK, while in Brazil they Granger-cause each other. However, in South Africa, Kenya and USA no causal relationship was found. In Australia the results were inconclusive. The study also found that in the short run, market-based financial development Granger-causes economic growth in the USA but that in South Africa and Brazil, the reverse applies. On the other hand bidirectional causality was found to prevail in Kenya in the same period. / Economics / D. Com. (Economics)

Abstracts in English, Zulu and Southern Sotho / The advent of Basel II Capital Accord has revolutionised credit risk measurement (CRM) to the extent that the once “perceived riskier bank assets” are now accommodated for lending. The Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) sector has been traditionally perceived as a riskier and unprofitable asset for lending activity by Commercial Banks, in particular. But empirical studies on the implementation of the Basel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) framework have demonstrated that SME credit risk is measurable. Banks are still finding it difficult to forecast SME loan default and to provide credit to the sector that meet Basel’s capital requirements. The thesis proposes to construct an empirical credit risk measurement (CRM) model, specifically for SMEs, to ameliorate the adverse effects of SME credit inaccessibility due to high information asymmetry between financial institutions (FI) and SMEs in Zimbabwe. A well-performing and accurate CRM helps FIs to control their risk exposure through selective granting of credit based on a thorough statistical analysis of historical customer data. This thesis develops a CRM model, built on a statistically random sample, known-good-bad (KGB) sample, which is a better representation of the through-the-door (TTD) population of SME loan applicants. The KGB sample incorporates both accepted and rejected applications, through reject inference (RI). A model-based bound and collapse (BC) reject inference methodology was empirically used to correct selectivity bias inherent in CRM domain. The results have shown great improvement in the classification power and aggregate supply of credit supply to the SME portfolio of the case-studied bank, as evidenced by substantial decrease of bad rates across models developed; from the preliminary model to final model designed for the case-studied bank. The final model was validated using both bad rate, confusion matrix metrics and Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) curve to assess the classification power of the model within-sample and out-of-sample. The AUROC for the final model (weak model) was found to be 0.9782 whilst bad rate was found to be 14.69%. There was 28.76% improvement in the bad rate in the final model in comparison with the current CRM model being used by the case-studied bank. / Isivumelwano seBasel II Capital Accord sesishintshe indlela yokulinganisa ubungozi bokunikezana ngesikweletu credit risk measurement (CRM) kwaze kwafika ezingeni lapho izimpahla ezazithathwa njengamagugu anobungozi “riskier bank assets” sezimukelwa njengesibambiso sokuboleka imali. Umkhakha wezamaBhizinisi Amancane naSafufusayo, phecelezi, Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) kudala uqondakala njengomkhakha onobungozi obukhulu futhi njengomkhakha ongangenisi inzuzo, ikakhulu njengesibambiso sokubolekwa imali ngamabhange ahwebayo. Kodwa izifundo zocwaningo ezimayelana nokusetshenziswa nokusetshenziswa kwesakhiwo iBasel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) sezikhombisile ukuthi ubungozi bokunikeza isikweletu kumabhizinisi amancane nasafufusayo (SME) sebuyalinganiseka. Yize kunjalo, amabhange asathola ukuthi kusenzima ukubona ngaphambili inkinga yokungabhadeleki kahle kwezikweletu kanye nokunikeza isikweletu imikhakha enemigomo edingekayo yezimali kaBasel. Lolu cwaningo beluphakamisa ukwakha uhlelo imodeli ephathekayo yokulinganisa izinga lobungozi bokubolekisa ngemali (CRM) kwihlelo lokuxhasa ngezimali ama-SME, okuyihlelo elilawulwa yiziko lezimali ezweni laseZimbabwe. Imodeli ye-CRM esebenza kahle futhi eshaya khona inceda amaziko ezimali ukugwema ubungozi bokunikezana ngezikweletu ngokusebenzisa uhlelo lokunikeza isikweletu ababoleki abakhethekile, lokhu kususelwa ohlelweni oluhlaziya amanani edatha engumlando wekhasimende. Imodeli ye-CRM ephakanyisiwe yaqala yakhiwa ngohlelo lwamanani, phecelezi istatistically random sample, okuluphawu olungcono olumele uhlelo lwe through-the-door (TTD) population lokukhetha abafakizicelo zokubolekwa imali bama SME, kanti lokhu kuxuba zona zombili izicelo eziphumelele kanye nezingaphumelelanga. Indlela yokukhetha abafakizicelo, phecelezi model-based bound-and-collapse (BC) reject-inference methodology isetshenzisiwe ukulungisa indlela yokukhetha ngokukhetha ngendlela yokucwasa kwisizinda seCRM. Imiphumela iye yakhombisa intuthuko enkulu mayelana namandla okwehlukanisa kanye nokunikezwa kwezikweletu kuma SME okungamamabhange enziwe ucwaningo lotho., njengoba lokhu kufakazelwa ukuncipha okukhulu kwe-bad rate kuwo wonke amamodeli athuthukisiwe. Imodeli yokuqala kanye neyokugcina zazidizayinelwe ibhange. Imodeli yokugcina yaqinisekiswa ngokusebenzisa zombili indlela isikweletu esingagculisi kanye negrafu ye-Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) ukulinganisa ukwehlukaniswa kwamandla emodeli engaphakathi kwesampuli nangaphandle kwesampuli. Uhlelo lwe-AUROC lwemodeli yokugcina (weak model) lwatholakala ukuthi luyi 0.9782, kanti ibad rate yatholakala ukuthi yenza i-14.69%. Kwaba khona ukuthuthuka nge-28.76% kwi-bad rate kwimodeli yokugcina uma iqhathaniswa nemodeli yamanje iCRM model ukuba isetshenziswe yibhange elithile. / Basel II Capital Accord e fetotse tekanyo ya kotsi ya mokitlane (credit risk measurement (CRM)) hoo “thepa e kotsi ya dibanka” ka moo e neng e bonwa ka teng, e seng e fuwa sebaka dikadimong. Lekala la Dikgwebo tse Nyane le tse Mahareng (SME) le bonwa ka tlwaelo jwalo ka lekala le kotsi e hodimo le senang ditswala bakeng sa ditshebetso tsa dikadimo haholo ke dibanka tsa kgwebo. Empa dipatlisiso tse thehilweng hodima se bonweng kapa se etsahetseng tsa tshebetso ya moralo wa Basel II internal-ratings-based (IRB) di supile hore kotsi ya mokitlane ya SME e kgona ho lekanngwa. Leha ho le jwalo, dibanka di ntse di thatafallwa ke ho bonelapele palo ya ditlholeho tsa ho lefa tsa diSME le ho fana ka mokitla lekaleng leo le kgotsofatsang ditlhoko tsa Basel tsa ditjhelete. Phuputso ena e ne sisinya ho etsa tekanyo ya se bonwang ho mmotlolo wa kotsi ya mokitlane (CRM) tshebetsong ya phano ya tjhelete ya diSME e etswang ke setsi sa ditjhelete (FI) ho la Zimbabwe. Mmotlolo o sebetsang hantle hape o fanang ka dipalo tse nepahetseng o dusa diFI hore di laole pepeso ya tsona ho kotsi ka phano e kgethang ya mokitlane, e thehilweng hodima manollo ya dipalopalo ya dintlha tsa histori ya bareki. Mmotlolo o sisingwang wa CRM o hlahisitswe ho tswa ho sampole e sa hlophiswang, e leng pontsho e betere ya setjhaba se ikenelang le monyako (TTD) ya batho bao e kang bakadimi ba tjhelete ho diSME, hobane e kenyelletsa bakopi ba amohetsweng le ba hannweng. Mokgwatshebetso wa bound-and-collapse (BC) reject-inference o kentswe tshebetsong ho nepahatsa tshekamelo ya kgetho e leng teng ho lekala la CRM. Diphetho tsena di bontshitse ntlafalo e kgolo ho matla a tlhophiso le palohare ya phano ya mokitlane ho diSME tsa banka eo ho ithutilweng ka yona, jwalo ka ha ho pakilwe ke ho phokotseho ya direite tse mpe ho pharalla le dimmotlolo tse hlahisitsweng. Mmotlolo wa ho qala le wa ho qetela e ile ya ralwa bakeng sa banka. Mmotlolo wa ho qetela o ile wa netefatswa ka tshebediso ya bobedi reite e mpe le mothinya wa Area under Receiver Operating Characteristic (AUROC) ho lekanya matla a kenyo mekgahlelong a mmotlolo kahare ho sampole le kantle ho yona. AUROC bakeng sa mmotlo wa ho qetela (mmotlolo o fokotseng) e fumanwe e le 0.9782, ha reite e mpe e fumanwe e le 14.69%. Ho bile le ntlafalo ya 28.76% ho reite e mpe bakeng sa mmotlolo wa ho qetela ha ho bapiswa le mmotlolo wa CRM ha o sebediswa bankeng yona eo. / Graduate School of Business Leadership / D.B.L.