Spelling suggestions: "subject:"bfinancial expertise"" "subject:"bfinancial dexpertise""
1 |
Do Financial Expert Directors Affect the Incidence of Accruals Management to Meet or Beat Analyst Forecasts?Hsu, Pei Hui 03 October 2013 (has links)
Evidence that firms adjust accruals to just meet or beat analyst forecasts is pervasive. However, the implications for earnings quality are not clear. Managers can use this practice either to mislead investors, resulting in lower quality earnings, or to signal future earnings growth and thereby improve the decision usefulness of earnings. Assuming that boards are concerned about providing higher quality financial information and that they can discern the proper earnings signal, they should discourage managers from adjusting earnings to beat the analyst forecast target if such adjustment diminishes earnings quality. Consistent with this prediction, I find a significantly negative relation between the probability that a firm beats the target by adjusting accruals and the presence of at least one independent audit committee financial expert for firms with poor future performance. I also find that the negative impact of an independent financial expert on the odds of beating the target by adjusting accruals is significantly stronger for firms with poor future performance than for firms with strong future performance. These findings are consistent with financial expertise on the audit committees improving corporate governance by protecting shareholders from accruals management that reduces the decision usefulness of earnings.
|
2 |
The Relationship Between a CFO's Financial Expertise and Firm ProfitabilityRubin, Scott Jeremy 01 January 2017 (has links)
More than 50% of small businesses fail by the 5th year of operation because of lack of economic sustainability. Organizations without a chief financial officer (CFO) with financial expertise may have suboptimal fiscal performance. The purpose of this correlational study was to examine whether there was a relationship between CFO licensure status, CFO age, and firm earnings per share. A sample of 403 small businesses in the United States, taken from the Russell 2000 Index, was used in the study. The theoretical framework for the study was Penrose's resource-based view of the firm. CFO names and firm earnings per share were taken from the 2015 SEC 10-K filings. CPAverify was used to determine specific CFO licensure status. LexisNexis was used to identify CFO age. Multiple linear regression was used to examine the relationship between CFO licensure status, CFO age, and firm earnings per share. A multiple regression model with F(2, 400) = 3.69, p = .03, R2 = .018 demonstrated a relationship between CFO licensure status, CFO age, and firm earnings per share ratio. Having a CPA license F(1, 154) = 8.59, p = .01, R2 = .053 revealed a slightly better correlation between licensure status and firm earnings per share. CFO age F(1, 401) = 3.10, p = .08, R2 = .005 revealed no relationship to firm earnings per share. Small business leaders could use this study's findings as the basis for hiring CFOs with financial expertise. Doing so may help increase the firm's profitability and mitigate the risks of business failure. Positive social change may ensue provided small businesses use this study's findings to improve job retention and the economic viability of a community.
|
3 |
Venture Capital Early Stage Investment Success in ICT Industry: The Role of Technological and Financial ExpertiseLi, Chen 06 September 2019 (has links)
Using a human capital perspective, this study investigates the relationship between the specific human capital of the top management teams of venture capital firms (VCFs) and the firms’ investment performance. The results of this study demonstrate that, in the early-stage information technology and communication (ICT) industry, VCFs’ technological expertise strongly predict better venture capital firm performance in the form of greater portfolio exit ratio. While financial expertise shows a positive but not significant effect. This study finds that although venture capital investing is a financial activity, technological expertise is the human capital characteristic that is more appropriate for this sub-environment. Future research is suggested.
|
4 |
Experience, episodic knowledge and judgment in an audit committee member task: experimental evidenceSingtokul, Ong-Ard 07 July 2010 (has links)
I conduct experiments to investigate how episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor or a manager affects audit committee members' judgment in supporting the auditor in a disagreement with management. This paper sheds light on the advantage of first-hand accounting-related experience in the important oversight task. It also brings to bear the potential benefit from direct manager experience as claimed by researchers and regulators. I find that the episodic knowledge obtained from prior experience as an auditor, especially the experience of having been a diligent auditor, strengthens the degree of auditor support of participants in the role of an audit committee member. By contrast, the effect of episodic knowledge from first-hand experience as a manager on the likelihood of auditor support varies with the manager type. While the episodic knowledge acquired from direct experience as an aggressive manager augments the level of auditor support, such knowledge attained by prior experience as a conservative manager has no significant effect.
|
5 |
Extern ekonomisk kompetens : Familjeföretag och anlitandet av extern ekonomisk kompetens / External financial expertise : Family businesses and the use of external financial expertiseYüksel, Simon, Sedin, Peter January 2012 (has links)
Forskningen om familjeföretag är relativt omfattande. Men det finns fortfarande många frågor som är obesvarade. En viktig fråga som berör familjeföretags utveckling är viljan att ta in extern kompetens inom ekonomiområdet. Det kan röra sig om tjänster såsom ekonomichef, controller eller redovisningekonom. I detta arbete har vi försökt besvara frågan om varför ledningen i familjeföretag väljer att ta in extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Teorin för fram att familjeföretag i det längsta drar sig för att ta in extern kompetens till förmån för den egna familjens medlemmar. Slutsatserna man kan dra efter att ha utvärderat svar från åtta familjeföretags VD:ar samt externt tillsatt personal inom ekonomi är att de till största delen ser mycket positivt på tillsättandet av extern personal inom ekonomi. De flesta för fram åsikten om att utan att tillsätta extern personal hade bolagen i fråga inte kunnat utvecklas så framgångsrikt som de har gjort. De ser extern personal inom ekonomiområdet som en styrka med avseende på de nya kunskaper, erfarenheter och kompetenser som kommer företagen till del. Det många pekar på i intervjerna är att man får in en person som kan komma med andra lösningar på problemen än de konventionella, men även en mindre känslosam attityd till familjeföretagets affärer, vilket kan vara en klar fördel. Nya synpunkter och kunskaper kommer företaget till godo. Dock är den personliga dynamiken med den externa kompetensen av stor vikt för företagen i undersökningen, man bör passa in i företagsandan samt vara lätt att ha att göra med, men ända ha integritet. Nackdelar som man har pekat på är till exempel om den externt tillsatte experten eventuellt slutar sin tjänst eller manipulerar bokföringen. Med tanke på alla de lagar och regelverk som styr företagens vardag krävs en hel del specialistkunskap inom ekonomiområdet, särskilt inom koncernredovisning, beskattning, bokslut och årsredovisning. Dessa kunskaper kan i ett fåtal fall tillgodoses av familjemedlemmar, men i de allra flesta företag är det kompetens man måste få in i företaget utifrån. Vi anser att vår undersökning har gett oss svar på de frågor som vi hade ställt upp angående familjeföretags syn på att anlita extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Nämligen att familjeföretag som vill utvecklas vinner mycket på att anlita extern kompetens inom ekonomi. Inte bara ekonomiskt utan även på många andra områden. Nyckelord: Familjeföretag, Extern ekonomisk kompetens, Bolagsstyrning, Familjeföretags komplexitet, Successionsplanering. / Research on family business is quite extensive. But there are still many questions that remain unanswered. An important issue relating to family business development is the desire to bring in external expertise in the finance area. It may involve services such as finance manager, controller or accountant. In this work the authors have attempted to answer the question of why the management of family businesses chooses to bring in external expertise in economics. The theory implies that the family business as long reluctant to bring in external expertise for the benefit of their own family members. The conclusions to be drawn after evaluating responses from eight family business CEOs and externally added staff in finance is that they are mostly very much welcoming the appointment of external staff in finance. Most of the view implies that without the addition of external staff, the companies would not develop as successfully as they have done. They see external staff within the finance area as strength for the new knowledge, experience and skills that businesses will benefit from. Many CEO: s advocates that you get in a person who can come up with other solutions to the problems than the conventional ones, but also a less emotional approach to family business affairs, which may be a distinct advantage. New ideas and knowledge will benefit the company. However, the personal dynamics of the external competence are of great importance to companies in the survey, it should fit into the entrepreneurial spirit and be easy to deal with, but still have privacy. Disadvantages as some have pointed out are for example, if the externally appointed expert may terminate their service or manipulate the records. Given all the laws and regulations that govern todays businesses requires a lot of expertise in economics, especially in the consolidated financial statements, taxation, financial statement and annual reports. This knowledge can in a few cases be met by family members, but in the vast majority of companies, you need to get the skills into the company from outside. We believe that our study has given us answers to the questions we had put up on the family company's approach to the use of external expertise in economics. Namely, those family businesses that want to develop win a lot of hiring external expertise in economics. Not just economically but also in many other areas. Keywords: Family firm, External financial competence, Corporate governance, Complexity of family firms, Succession planning.
|
6 |
Three Essays on the Role of Corporate Governance in Firms' Spending on R&D and Controlling Earnings-Management Practices: The Role of Independent Directors’ Tenure and Network in Controlling Earnings-Management Practices; The Impact of Board Diversity on the Corporate Propensity to R&D Spending; The Association between Directors’ Multiple-Board Sittings, Tenure, Financial Expertise, and R&D SpendingAsad, Muhammad January 2021 (has links)
This thesis comprises three research essays. The study documents empirical
evidence around the research themes by analysing a sample of the UK’s listed non-financial firms from 2005 to 2018. It applied panel data analysis (fixed or random effects) techniques and the potential endogeneity issue is controlled by using the two-step system, GMM. Earnings-management research holds that manipulating a firm's real activities is more damaging to its long-term growth and value than accruals manipulation. Therefore, by building on agency theory and emphasising board
monitoring, first essay investigates the role of independent directors’ tenure and
connection to several boards in controlling real earnings management (REM). This study finds that independent directors elected to board before appointment of current
CEO are negatively associated with the level of REM. Furthermore, this research
provides evidence that REM is higher in those firms whose INDs are connected to
several boards at a time. Though economically insignificant in most of the models,
this research also shows that the association between INDs’ tenure and REM varies
with the phases of their tenure. Directors in the early stage of their tenure are
observed as being less effective in controlling REM. However, as INDs’ tenure
grows, they employ better oversight over management's conduct, thereby reducing
REM. Contrary to this, the extended tenure of INDs is associated with higher REM.
These results collectively suggest that the board monitoring role protects the stakes
of shareholders/stakeholders by constraining REM; when INDs are free from the
influence of CEO, they are not over-committed due to their presence on several
boards, and they have moderate board tenure which is neither too short nor too long.
Furthermore, drawing on collective contributions and group performance
perspectives, second essay explores the role of board diversity in the firm’s R&D
investment decisions. Additionally, building on a fault-line argument about a team's
demographic attributes, the current research decomposes the impact of
demographic and cognitive diversity on R&D spending. The research observes a
positive relationship between board diversity and the level of R&D spending.
Moreover, this research documents that cognitive diversity is positively associated
with R&D investment. However, demographic diversity has an insignificant
relationship with firms’ spending on R&D projects. Further, this study confirms that
demographic diversity negatively moderates the relationship between cognitive
diversity and R&D investment. These results suggest that the board's attributes as
a group carry the significance to influence the decisions having strategic importance.
The findings on the sub-dimensions of board diversity imply that board
functional/cognitive diversity is more relevant to corporate decisions and outcomes
than is demographic diversity.
Based on the monitoring perspective (agency theory) and resource provision view
(resource dependency theory), third essay investigates the role of independent directors’ specific attributes in the corporate propensity to R&D investment. The
study documents a positive association between INDs’ moderate (median) tenure
and the firm’s spending on R&D projects, but early and extended tenure is observed
as being insignificant. INDs with a presence on three or fewer boards are observed
to promote R&D investment. However, INDs sitting on more than three boards
negatively affect the firm’s propensity to invest in R&D initiatives. Financially expert
INDs are negatively associated with corporate R&D investments, suggesting that
such directors may resist funding these projects beyond optimal risk level because
of their expertise. These results suggest that INDs’ monitoring and advising
competence improves as they spend time on the firm’s board, but that extended
tenure is counterproductive as it impairs INDs’ impartiality. Furthermore, INDs’
capital (resources) accruing from connection to multiple boards is only beneficial for
the firm’s strategic decisions if their monitoring role is not compromised because of
their over-commitment (busyness). / Mirpur University of Science and Technology (MUST)
|
Page generated in 0.0581 seconds