This diploma thesis was composed as a part of the resolution of the student team research project GAJU 029/2011/S of the Grant Agency of the University of Southern Bohemia in Ceske Budejovice. The main goal of this thesis is an evaluation of the economic behavior of non-financial enterprises in the ownership of the government (NPVV) in the selected sector of the national economy. The theoretical part is dealing with a short description of these enterprises and with issues with their efficiency. This was analysed in separate studies. The practical part deals with a development of the individual types of the profitability (type of an income of the production) in the context of the national economy and industry type if the of selected national accounts during the 1999 - 2010 period. The conclusions of the individual chapters are interconnected at the end of this thesis. The method is to compare the conclusions from the industry subsectors with the conclusions from the national economy subsector. The conclusions are compared with the NPVV informations extracted from the related studies. The non-financial enterprises subsector indicator results are also evaluated in this thesis. The analysed branch was the ground and pipeline transportation branch due to substantial share of the public non-financial enterprises NPV (13.3 %) and the national private non-financial enterprises NPS (3.74 %) production in 2010 (these were the main subsectors of the researched non-financial enterprises). The production and the income have been approsimately developed at the same average as in the sector and the national economy also. Their output is comparable due to that. The comparation of the profitability by using the gross added value shows us that the NPV have better results. However the position of NPV and NPS switches and the differences become deepen when we use the net added value and other sources of income. There is even a regular negative profitability if we use the net disposable income of the NPV. There is an issue with the salary of the employees mainly in the NPV according to the research. But it is interesting that issues related to the financial crisis are not affecting the NPV as fast as the NPS. The NPS is affected by the problems almost immediately, however the NPV are affected with a delay and with a less intensity. The essential recommendation is to introduce a control of any commercial enterprises with any state partnership through the Highest inspecting office.

Avec l’annonce de la création d’une Union bancaire européenne, l’évolution du cadre institutionnel de la régulation prudentielle est actuellement au coeur des débats politiques. Le projet de réforme prévoit la dévolution d’une importante partie du contrôle prudentiel des entreprises financières à la Banque centrale européenne. Les conflits d’intérêts potentiels susceptibles d’être générés dans le cadre de la détermination de la politique monétaire et de la mise en oeuvre du contrôle prudentiel ont souvent été mis en exergue par les détracteurs du modèle de régulation intégré aux institutions d’émission. Cependant, les influences réciproques ainsi que la complémentarité tenant à l’exercice des missions de stabilité monétaire et de stabilité financière par le banquier central pourraient tendre à justifier l’adoption de telles mesures. La concentration des pouvoirs monétaires et prudentiels dans le giron des banques centrales impliquerait néanmoins pour ces dernières de répondre au principe de la légitimité démocratique, cela tout en conservant un certain degré d’indépendance à l’endroit du pouvoir politique. La conciliation de ces deux exigences semblerait nécessaire dans l’hypothèse où les banques centrales se verraient amenées à exercer un rôle croissant au sein de la sphère financière. Plus largement, c’est peut-être dans la recherche de cet équilibre que réside le secret de la conception d’un cadre institutionnel optimal dans le domaine de la régulation monétaire et financière. Les insuffisances dénoncées des modèles de supervision pourraient-elles ainsi se voir pallier par l’institution d’un Système mondial de banques centrales en charge du contrôle prudentiel ? / With the announcement of the creation of an European banking union, the evolution of institutionnal framework of prudential supervision is currently at the center of political debates. The draft reform provides for the devolution of a significant part of prudential supervision of financial enterprises to the European central bank. The potential conflicts of interest which might be generated in the framework of the determination of monetary policy and the implementation of prudential supervision have often been underlined by critics of the integrated regulatory model within issuing institutions. However, both reciprocal influences and complementarity in the exercice of the missions of monetary stability and financial stability by the central banker might tend to justify the adoption of such measures. The concentration of monetary and prudential powers within central banks would imply, though, for those latter to satisfy the principle of democratic legitimacy, this while keeping some degree of independence from the political power. The conciliation between these two requirements would seem necessary assuming that central banks would be set to exercise an increasingly important role within the financial sphere. More extensively, perhaps the secret of the design of an optimal institutionnal framework in the area of financial and monetary supervision lies in the search for this balance. Might insufficiencies highlighted in supervisory models be overcome by setting up a world system of central banks in charge of prudential supervision?