The text explores the multifaceted role of a compliance officer in the Liechtenstein financial market. Drawing parallels to Forrest Gump's life analogy, the compliance officer's routine is marked by unpredictability, earning them the reputation of either a business killer or an everyday hero. Their primary responsibility is ensuring that their company adheres to legal and regulatory requirements. The compliance officer is a vigilant source of information, staying abreast of law amendments, geopolitical developments, and fraud schemes. They act as a second line of defense, rigorously assessing business profiles and monitoring risks associated with client relationships. Additionally, compliance officers play roles as counselors/psychologists, subject matter experts, protectors, and liaisons with the Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU). The text emphasizes their liability for actions or inactions, citing examples of legal repercussions for non-compliance. Despite the challenges, the conclusion depicts compliance officers as everyday heroes contributing to the integrity of the financial industry in Liechtenstein.

Depuis le début des années 1970 la communauté internationale, sous l’impulsion des États-Unis, a progressivement abordé le blanchiment d’argent sale comme un nouveau problème de sécurité représentant une menace pour la sécurité intérieure des États et l’équilibre du système financier international. La création, en 1989, du Groupe d’action financière (GAFI) lors du sommet du G7 se tenant à Paris, marquera l’engagement politique international en faveur de la lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux devant constituer « une contribution décisive à la lutte contre les activités criminelles et particulièrement contre le trafic de la drogue et permettre de renforcer la solidité du système financier international » [GAFI, 1991, p. 21]. À travers la publication en 1990, de ses quarante recommandations pour la mise en place d’un régime global de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux, les pays membres du GAFI – les membres du G7 auxquels se sont joints, dès la première année, la Commission européenne et huit autres pays dont la Suisse – viennent concrétiser l’« invention d’un nouveau crime » [Amicelle, 2016, p. 37] : le blanchiment d’argent et la nécessité d’une nouvelle forme de réaction sociale contre la criminalité lucrative. Créé au départ pour lutter contre les revenus issus du trafic de drogue, le dispositif englobe aujourd’hui l’ensemble des revenus issus d’une activité criminelle. En 2001, il a été adapté pour lutter contre le financement du terrorisme et en 2012 élargi aux infractions fiscales pénales et au financement de la prolifération des armes de destructions massives. Ainsi, le dispositif anti-blanchiment est aujourd’hui un instrument théoriquement mobilisable pour lutter contre toutes les formes de criminalité et toutes les personnes (physiques ou morales) – « des plus faibles aux plus puissantes » [Amicelle, 2014, p. 88] – associées à des flux financiers illicites. Plus de trente ans après sa création, le GAFI représente un réseau mondial de plus de 190 juridictions ayant adopté ses recommandations, conduisant en 2019 son président à célébrer « trente ans de succès » et à affirmer que la « valeur de l'organisation pour la sécurité de nos nations et l'intégrité du système financier international n'ont jamais été aussi claires » [GAFI, 2019, p. 5]. À travers l’adaptation de leur législation, la plupart des pays, se sont dotés d’un dispositif de lutte contre le blanchiment de capitaux et le financement du terrorisme (LBC/FT) reposant sur des pratiques inédites de coopération et d’échanges d’informations entre des acteurs provenant du monde de la finance et des acteurs publics d’application de la loi [Amicelle, 2018 ; Helgesson et Mörth, 2019 ; Huysmans, 2014 ; Sheptycki, 2002]. S'appuyant sur les travaux de Latour, de Goede [2018] introduit le concept de la « chaîne de sécurité » pour décrire l’architecture générale du dispositif de LBC/FT composée de trois maillons, décrivant la division du travail et les tâches relatives à la mise en œuvre d’un modèle théorique de policing guidé par le renseignement – financier – ou d’« Intelligence-led policing ». Le premier maillon concerne les institutions financières désignées comme entités déclarantes, obligées par la loi d’organiser la traçabilité des opérations financières devant supporter la surveillance, la détection et le signalement des opérations suspectes en matière de BC/FT dans leurs établissements. Le deuxième maillon concerne la cellule de renseignement financier (CRF) désignée dans chaque pays, comme le centre national chargé de la collecte et l’analyse des déclarations d’opérations suspectes et des autres informations concernant le BC/FT et de la production de renseignement financier mobilisable par les acteurs publics d’application de la loi – dernier maillon de la chaîne – devant lutter contre la criminalité en s’attaquant aux flux financiers illicites. À travers le concept de la « chaîne », de Geode [2018] décrit le dispositif anti-blanchiment selon un processus linéaire, suivant le cheminement des transactions suspectes – les traces financières – qui sont successivement « collectées, stockées, transférées et analysées afin d’aboutir à des actes de sécurité (par exemple des avoirs gelés, des comptes fermés, et des condamnations judiciaires) » (p. 27). Dans cette nouvelle configuration du policing – financier – , le processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » ou de « making crime » introduit par Ericson [1981] – pour décrire le processus à travers lequel les acteurs du policing sont confrontés à des problèmes de sécurité qu’ils vont transformer, en fonction de leur réaction, en crime et en criminel – se déplace a priori, dans une logique de « multilatéralisation du policing », des seules organisations policières vers d’autres acteurs devenant de nouveaux « promoteurs » et « prestataires » du policing [Bayley et Shearing, 2001]. Jusqu’ici, de nombreuses études ont été consacrées à l’analyse du premier maillon de la « chaine de sécurité » questionnant l’implication des acteurs financiers dans la mise en œuvre « réticente » des mesures de vigilance, de détection et de signalement des flux financiers illicites au sein de leurs institutions. Cependant, très peu d’études prêtent attention aux autres maillons de la « chaîne de sécurité » et encore moins lorsqu’il s’agit d’analyser la « chaîne de sécurité » dans son ensemble, seul moyen pour saisir empiriquement l’étendue des relations et la diversité des dispositifs de production de sécurité mis en œuvre, supportant dans sa globalité le processus de réaction sociale aux pratiques de BC/FT. Ainsi, c’est ce vide de connaissances académiques que cette recherche vise à combler à travers l’analyse empirique de la mise en œuvre du dispositif de LBC/FT en Suisse et au Canada. Plus de 30 ans après la création du GAFI et la mise en place par les États d’un dispositif de LBC/FT reposant sur un modèle opérant de policing guidé par le renseignement financier, cette recherche vise à comprendre dans sa globalité : « À quoi sert le renseignement financier ? » Répondre à cette question de recherche, c’est contribuer dans une triple dimension à (a) l’analyse de la mise en œuvre empirique d’un modèle opérant de policing guidé par le renseignement dans une environnement particulier : l’environnement financier, (b) dépassant la vision lacuneuse des travaux centrés sur les acteurs financiers de l’anti-blanchiment et (c) saisir la manière dont les pratiques de production et d’utilisation du renseignement financier contribuent à analyser dans son ensemble tout le processus qui détermine la visibilité des cas de BC/FT, leur signalement à une autorité de contrôle et leur éventuelle poursuite et condamnation. Le dispositif anti-blanchiment n’ayant plus vocation à cibler une forme de criminalité lucrative par rapport à une autre, notre étude est aussi une analyse du processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » décrit par Ericson [1981], par lequel les acteurs du policing financier vont désigner, en fonction de leurs intérêts et de leurs règles propres, les comportements criminels portés à leur connaissance qu’ils vont décider de poursuivre, d’ignorer, d’infirmer ou de vérifier. Alors cette recherche soutiendra la thèse que malgré toutes les promesses implicites portées par la reconfiguration des activités de policing dans ses logiques contemporaines de fonctionnement – redéfinissant a priori, la division du travail et la répartition des tâches situées au cœur du processus de « fabrique de la criminalité » –, l’exemple de la lutte anti-blanchiment en Suisse et au Canada, montre comment les acteurs publics d’application de la loi (APAL) ont su conserver la mainmise sur le processus de « making crime » en développant des stratégies pour détourner les normes anti-blanchiment et les dispositifs qu’elles impliquent, à leur avantage dans la poursuite de leurs priorités opérationnelles. Ainsi, les APAL replacent – dans un mouvement contre-intuitif aux reconfigurations contemporaines des activités de policing – les relations de pouvoir, associées au contrôle et au maintien de l’ordre, dans un rapport de verticalité entre l’État et la société et dont les manifestations contribuent à reproduire la « fabrique de la criminalité » selon, comme l’avait noté Manning [2010], « un ensemble d’habitudes et de suppositions axées sur le trope du crime qui envisage uniquement la nécessité de contrôler, de dissuader et de punir les contestataires visibles et connus » – justifiant aussi une analyse en termes de gestion différentielle des illégalismes. À travers l’accès à un matériau empirique – jamais mobilisé auparavant – dans deux pays membres fondateurs du GAFI, cette recherche repose sur une approche comparée à l’échelle internationale et une méthodologie d’analyse mixte, de la base de données, dénominalisées, colligeant l’ensemble des déclarations d’opérations suspectes et des informations associées reçues par la CRF suisse entre 2004 et 2014 – analyse quantitative – et des entretiens auprès d’une quarantaine d’agents au sein de la CRF suisse et d’un panel « représentatif » de l’ensemble des acteurs publics d’application de la loi habilités à mobiliser le renseignement financier en Suisse et au Canada – analyse qualitative. Alors cette recherche contribue empiriquement et conceptuellement à la littérature sur les transformations du policing soutenues par les modèles de policing guidé par le renseignement – ou d’« Intelligence-led policing » –, évitant l’écueil de penser les processus génériques de renseignement comme les manières de les organiser. De plus, cette recherche questionne à nouveaux frais la réaction sociale aux différentes formes de criminalité lucrative, justifiant une analyse en termes de gestion différentielle des illégalismes renvoyant aux diverses modalités pratiques de jeu avec les règles légales tout en situant socialement les groupes qui en usent. / Since the early 1970s, the international community, led by the United States, has progressively addressed money laundering as a new security problem representing a threat to the security of states and financial system. The creation of the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) in 1989 at the G7 summit in Paris marked the international political commitment to combat money laundering as “a decisive contribution to the fight against criminal activities, particularly drug trafficking, and will improve the soundness of the international financial system” [FATF, 1991, p. 20]. The FATF's forty recommendations, published in 1990, for the establishment of a global anti-money laundering regime, embody the “invention of a new crime” [Amicelle, 2016, p. 37]: money laundering and the need for a new form of social reaction against profit-making crime. Initially created to combat drug trafficking, the system now covers all profit from criminal activity. In 2001, it was adapted to combat the financing of terrorism and in 2012 extended to cover criminal tax offences and the financing of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Thus, the anti-money laundering system is today an instrument that can theoretically be mobilised to combat all forms of crime and all persons – “from the weakest to the most powerful” [Amicelle, 2014, p. 88] - associated with illicit financial flows. More than thirty years after its creation, the FATF represents a global network of more than 190 jurisdictions that have adopted its Recommendations, leading its President in 2019 to celebrate “thirty years of success” and to assert that the “value of the organisation to the security of our nations and the integrity of the international financial system has never been clearer” [FATF, 2019, p. 5]. Today, most countries have anti-money laundering and combating the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) systems based on innovative practices of cooperation and information exchange between financial and public law enforcement actors [Amicelle, 2018; Helgesson and Mörth, 2019; Huysmans, 2014; Sheptycki, 2002]. Building on Latour's work, de Goede [2018] introduces the concept of the “security chain” to describe the general architecture of the AML/CFT system composed of three links, describing the division of labour and tasks related to the implementation of a theoretical model of intelligence-led policing. The first link concerns the financial institutions designated as reporting entities, which are obliged by law to organise the traceability of financial transactions that should support the monitoring, detection and reporting of suspicious ML/FT transactions in their institutions. The second link concerns the financial intelligence unit (FIU) designated in each country as the national centre responsible for collecting and analysing suspicious transaction reports and other ML/FT information and producing financial intelligence that can be mobilised by public law enforcement actors - the last link in the chain - to fight crime by tackling illicit financial flows. Through the concept of the “chain”, de Geode [2018] describes the anti-money laundering system as a linear process, following the path of suspicious transactions - financial traces - which are successively “collected, stored, transferred and analysed in order to lead to security acts (e.g. frozen assets, closed accounts, and judicial convictions)” (p. 27). In this new configuration of financial policing, the process of “making crime” introduced by Ericson [1981] - to describe the process through which policing actors are confronted with security problems which they will transform, according to their reaction, into crime and criminality - is shifted a priori, in a logic of “multilateralization of policing”, from police organisations alone to other actors who become new “promoters” and “providers” of policing [Bayley and Shearing, 2001]. Many studies have been devoted to the analysis of the first link of the “security chain”, questioning the involvement of financial actors in the “reluctant” implementation of vigilance measures, detection and reporting of illicit financial flows within their institutions. However, very few studies pay attention to the other links in the “security chain” and even fewer analyse the “security chain” as a whole, which is the only way to empirically grasp the extent of the relationships and the diversity of the security production mechanisms implemented, which support the whole process of social reaction to ML/FT practices. It is this gap in academic knowledge that this research aims to fill through the empirical analysis of the implementation of the AML/CFT system in Switzerland and Canada. More than 30 years after the creation of the FATF and the implementation by States of an AML/CFT system based on an operational model of policing led by financial intelligence, this research aims to understand in its entirety: “What is financial intelligence used for?” Answering this research question means contributing in a triple dimension to (a) the analysis of the empirical implementation of an operating model of intelligence-led policing in a particular environment: the financial environment, (b) going beyond the flawed vision of work focused on the financial actors of anti-money laundering and (c) grasping the way in which the practices of production and use of financial intelligence contribute to analyse as a whole the process that determines the visibility of ML/FT cases, their reporting to a supervisory authority and their possible prosecution and conviction. As the anti-money laundering system is no longer intended to target one form of lucrative crime over another, our study is also an analysis of the “making crime” process described by Ericson [1981], whereby financial policing actors will designate, according to their own interests and rules, the criminal behaviour brought to their attention that they will decide to pursue, ignore, deny or verify. This research will therefore support the thesis that despite all the implicit promises made by the reconfiguration of policing activities in its contemporary operating logics - redefining a priori the division of labour and the distribution of tasks located at the heart of the “making crime” process –, the example of the fight against money laundering in Switzerland and Canada shows how public law enforcement agencies (APAL) have been able to maintain control over the process of “making crime” by developing strategies to turn anti-money laundering norms and the mechanisms they imply to their advantage in the pursuit of their operational priorities. Thus, public law enforcement actors situate the power relations associated with policing in a vertical relationship between state and society, the manifestations of which help to reproduce the “making crime” according to, as Manning [2010] noted, a set of habits and assumptions that “envisions only the need to control, deter and punish the visible and known contestants”. Through access to empirical material - never before mobilised - in two founding member countries of the FATF, this research is based on a comparative approach on an international scale and a mixed methodology of analysis of the database of all suspicious transaction reports and related information received by the Swiss FIU between 2004 and 2014 - quantitative analysis - and forty interviews with agents within the Swiss FIU and a "representative" panel of all public law enforcement actors empowered to mobilise financial intelligence in Switzerland and Canada - qualitative analysis. Thus, this research contributes empirically and conceptually to the literature on the transformations of policing supported by models of intelligence-led policing, avoiding the pitfall of thinking about generic intelligence processes as well as ways of organizing them. Moreover, this research questions the social reaction to the different forms of lucrative crime, justifying an analysis in terms of differential management of illegalisms referring to the various practical modalities of playing with the legal rules while socially situating the groups that use them.

No description available.

Politically exposed persons have become a specific risk factor in money laundering. The Financial Action Task Force has formulated clear and specific requirements for dealing with these individuals. Internationally, various jurisdictions such as the United Kingdom and the European Union have adopted effective legislation encompassing the 2003 Financial Action Task Force Recommendations. In South Africa the requirement to apply appropriate, risk based procedures to politically exposed persons has been limited to banks. The aim of this research study was to identify whether the South African anti-money laundering regulatory framework, adequately addresses managing the risks of politically exposed persons. The regulatory frameworks of the United Kingdom and the European Union, as well as the requirements of the Financial Action Task Force, were used to determine whether best practice is followed in South Africa with regard to politically exposed persons. The process of how money is laundered has been examined as well as the methods that corrupt politically exposed persons use in order to launder money. The study has shown that politically exposed persons are not regulated in South Africa in accordance with the Financial Action Task Force Recommendations issued in 2003, while the South African Anti-Money Laundering Regulatory Framework does not adequately address the risk posed by corrupt, politically exposed persons. Both international best practice and the recommendations of the World Bank were considered in terms of the way in which to address the risks posed by these persons effectively. / Dissertation (MPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2013. / Auditing / unrestricted

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM

The opening of a bank account serves as the genesis of a bank customer relationship. It is imperative that the establishment of a bank customer relationship be regulated by law. Both the common law and statutory law regulate the admission of new clients to the realm of banking. It is a minimum requirement, in terms of both statutory and common law, that the identity of a prospective client who wishes to open a bank account must both be established and verified. This, the need to know one’s customer, is not only good law but common sense and an effective measure to prevent criminals from accessing the banking system. Parties who work together must know each other. The need to establish and verify the identity of a potential customer is commonly referred to as the Know Your Customer standards, alternatively the Customer Due Diligence framework. The Know Your Customer standards are neither unique to South Africa nor have their origins in South Africa. The Know Your Customer standards are international standards which the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision have been advocating for quite some time. A confluence of the Recommendations of the Financial Action Task Force and the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision greatly influenced the birth of the Financial Intelligence Centre Act in South Africa. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 prescribes the steps that a bank has to take in order to establish and verify the identity of a potential client. It will be shown in this dissertation that the identification and verification regime established by the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 0f 2001 and the common law are not fool proof. This dissertation makes recommendations on how the current loopholes that exist in the law can be addressed. / Mercantile Law / LLM

Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.

Money laundering involves activities which are aimed at concealing benefits that were acquired through criminal means for the purpose of making them appear legitimately acquired. Money laundering promotes criminal activities in South Africa because it allows criminals to keep the benefits that they acquired through their criminal activities. It takes place through a variety of schemes which include the use of banks. In this sense money laundering control is based on the premise that banks must be protected from providing criminals with the means to launder the benefits of their criminal activities. The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (‘FICA’) in aggregate with the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 121 of 1998 (‘POCA’) form the backbone of South Africa’s anti-money laundering regime. Like its international counterparts FICA imposes onerous duties on banks seeing that they are most often used by criminals as conduits to launder the benefits of crime. In turn, POCA criminalises activities in relation to the benefits of crime and delineates civil proceedings aimed at forfeiting the benefits of crime to the state. This study identifies the idiosyncrasies of the South African anti-money laundering regime and forwards recommendations aimed at improving its structure. To this end nine issues in relation to money laundering control and banks are investigated. The investigation fundamentally reveals that money laundering control holds unforeseen consequences for banks. In particular, a bank that receives the benefits of crimes such as fraud or theft faces prosecution if it fails to heed FICA’s money laundering control duties, for example, the filing of a suspicious transaction report. However, if the bank files a suspicious transaction report, it may be sued in civil court by the customer for breach of contract. In addition, if the bank parted with the benefits of fraud or theft whilst suspecting that the account holder may not be entitled to payment thereof, it may be sued by the victim of fraud or theft who seeks to recover loss suffered at the hand of the fraudster or thief from the bank. Ultimately, this study illustrates that amendment of some of the provisions of South Africa’s anti-money laundering legislation should enable banks to manage the aforementioned and other unforeseen consequences of money laundering control whilst at the same time contribute to the South African anti-money laundering effort. / Criminal and Procedural Law / Mercantile Law / LL.D.