Between 1914 and 1919, Germans and Austrians experienced previously unimaginable sociopolitical transformations: four years of war, military defeat, the collapse of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies, the creation of democratic republics, and the redrawing of the map of Central Europe. Through an analysis of new state symbols and the staging of political and cultural celebrations, this dissertation explores the multiple and conflicting ways in which Germans and Austrians sought to reconceptualize the relationships between nation, state and politics in the wake of the First World War. Whereas the political right argued that democracy was a foreign imposition, supporters of democracy in both countries went to great lengths to refute these claims. In particular, German and Austrian republicans endeavored to link their fledgling democracies to the established tradition of großdeutsch nationalism – the idea that a German nation-state should include Austria – in an attempt to legitimize their embattled republics. By using nineteenth-century großdeutsch symbols and showing continued support for an Anschluss (political union) even after the Entente forbade it, republicans hoped to create a transborder German national community that would be compatible with a democratic body politic. As a project that investigates the entangled and comparative histories of Germany and Austria, this dissertation makes three contributions to the study of German nationalism and modern Central European history. First, in revealing the pervasiveness of großdeutsch ideas and symbols at this time, I point to the necessity of looking at both Germany and Austria when considering topics such as the redefinition of national identity and the creation of democracy in post-World War I Central Europe. Second, it highlights the need to move beyond the binary categorizations of civic and ethnic nationalisms, which place German nationalism in the latter category. As the republicans’ use of großdeutsch nationalism demonstrates, the creation of a transborder German community was not simply the work of the extreme political right. Third, it contributes to recent scholarship which seeks to move past the entrenched question of why interwar German and Austrian democracies failed. Instead of simply viewing the two republics as failures, it investigates the ways in which citizens engaged with the new form of government, as well as the prospects for the success of democracy in the wake of military defeat. In drawing attention to the differences between the German and Austrian experiments with democracy, this dissertation points to the relative strengths of the Weimar Republic when compared to the First Austrian Republic.

Between 1914 and 1919, Germans and Austrians experienced previously unimaginable sociopolitical transformations: four years of war, military defeat, the collapse of the Hohenzollern and Habsburg monarchies, the creation of democratic republics, and the redrawing of the map of Central Europe. Through an analysis of new state symbols and the staging of political and cultural celebrations, this dissertation explores the multiple and conflicting ways in which Germans and Austrians sought to reconceptualize the relationships between nation, state and politics in the wake of the First World War. Whereas the political right argued that democracy was a foreign imposition, supporters of democracy in both countries went to great lengths to refute these claims. In particular, German and Austrian republicans endeavored to link their fledgling democracies to the established tradition of großdeutsch nationalism – the idea that a German nation-state should include Austria – in an attempt to legitimize their embattled republics. By using nineteenth-century großdeutsch symbols and showing continued support for an Anschluss (political union) even after the Entente forbade it, republicans hoped to create a transborder German national community that would be compatible with a democratic body politic. As a project that investigates the entangled and comparative histories of Germany and Austria, this dissertation makes three contributions to the study of German nationalism and modern Central European history. First, in revealing the pervasiveness of großdeutsch ideas and symbols at this time, I point to the necessity of looking at both Germany and Austria when considering topics such as the redefinition of national identity and the creation of democracy in post-World War I Central Europe. Second, it highlights the need to move beyond the binary categorizations of civic and ethnic nationalisms, which place German nationalism in the latter category. As the republicans’ use of großdeutsch nationalism demonstrates, the creation of a transborder German community was not simply the work of the extreme political right. Third, it contributes to recent scholarship which seeks to move past the entrenched question of why interwar German and Austrian democracies failed. Instead of simply viewing the two republics as failures, it investigates the ways in which citizens engaged with the new form of government, as well as the prospects for the success of democracy in the wake of military defeat. In drawing attention to the differences between the German and Austrian experiments with democracy, this dissertation points to the relative strengths of the Weimar Republic when compared to the First Austrian Republic.

A la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale, la France contribue largement à transformer l’ancienne Autriche-Hongrie, et doit assumer une responsabilité quant à la survie et au devenir de la nouvelle Autriche, à travers différents engagements internationaux, même si aucun traité ne lie formellement les deux Etats. On définit généralement la position française vis-à-vis de l'Autriche par cette alternative : ni Habsbourg, ni Anschluss. A partir de 1930, l'héritier du trône, Otto de Habsbourg, accède à la majorité : se pose alors concrètement la question d'une éventuelle restauration. Les années 1930 voient par ailleurs le développement d'une multitude de projets de réorganisation de l'Europe centrale, alternative à ce retour des Habsbourg. L'arrivée d'Hitler au pouvoir en Allemagne doit pousser la France à des prises de position claires : son dessein est la réunion de l'Autriche au Reich, et le gouvernement français doit déterminer quelle attitude adopter envers le gouvernement autrichien qui choisit la voie de l'autoritarisme contre la poussée nazie. Si une part de l'opinion française a des sympathies pour la cause de l'indépendance autrichienne, le gouvernement n'impose jamais de choix clairs en ce sens, en raison notamment de facteurs idéologiques. Il est aussi prisonnier d'une conception trop économique de l'organisation de l'Europe centrale, qui lui fait sous-estimer les problèmes identitaires existant entre l'Autriche et l'Allemagne. L'absence d'une réflexion sur les spécificités de la nation autrichienne en construction conduit à faire le jeu de l'Allemagne, à travers l'idée d'un « germanisme » commun aux deux Etats. L'Anschluss, sans réaction française, vient couronner plus d'une décennie de contradictions et prépare la défaite symbolique de Munich. / At the end of World War I, France is a major actor of the transformation of old Austria-Hungary and becomes one of the main protectors of Austria through several international commitments; yet no treaty ever connects the two countries. The French policy on Austria is generally admitted to be : neither Habsburg, nor Anschluss. In 1930 Otto von Habsburg, the son of the last emperor, attains the age of majority ; so the issue of restauration appears again to be a major problem in Europe. At the same time, many plans and projects are discussed to reorganize Central Europe, as a possible alternative to the come back of the Habsburg family. With Hitler's appointment as Chancellor in Germany in 1933, France has to make up clear decisions, since Hitler's goal is to achieve the unification of Austria with Germany. The French government has to decide whether to support or not the Austrian government, getting authoritative in order to fight against nazi propaganda and terrorism. Many people in France are quite in favour of the cause of the independence of Austria. Yet the French government doesn't make any decisive choices to defend it, in particular because of ideological reasons. The French policy is also confined to an all-economic conception of international relations in Central Europe, and under-estimates the problems of national identity existing between Austria and Germany. The lack of a reflection on the specificities of an Austrian nation to be built tends to be of a great advantage for Germany, which praises for the idea of a common « germanism » for both countries. The Anschluss is made without any real French reaction, as a consequence of more than ten years of political contradictions ; thus it prepares the symbolical defeat of Munich.