1 Abstract Thesis title: Hate speech throughout the continents The aim of this thesis is to shed light on standings and rulings of the United States Supreme Court and the European Court of Human rights in hate speech cases. It defines the term "hate speech" and presents grounds used for its restrictions when it comes to freedom of expression. Through introducing established principles that govern the decision-making of both courts and analysing them in key judgments on both continents, the author is trying to determine possible alterations that may lead to enhancing the protection given by hate speech case-law. The author also analyses historical and social impact on the case-law of both the Supreme Court and the ECHR and finds that this influence has led to establishment of crucial principles without which the hate speech cases could hardly be decided today. Both historical and social factors lead the author to the conclusion that the protection against hate speech could still use a tune-up. In author's point of view, the Supreme Court should ease the grip on the First Amendment and give the "true threats" principle, established in Virginia v. Black, leave to prohibit not only intimidating expressions but harmful expressions as well - both physical and mental. The Supreme Court should also strengthen the...

Thesis advisor: Thomas H. Groome / The public schools in the United States fail to deliver a curriculum that adequately addresses religion in general and the many world religions in particular. This lacuna does not represent the constitutionally required neutrality of schools toward religion(s) and non-religion, but instead indicates the existence of what the author terms the hostility of neglect. When the curriculum privileges non-religious epistemologies, ideologies, and worldviews, such as secularism and scientism, often to the exclusion of religious ways of knowing and making meaning, then the schools violate the First Amendment of the Constitution as interpreted by the Supreme Court. In this dissertation, the dominant myths of America’s founding are examined historically in an effort to provide a thick description and critical analysis of the reigning meta-narratives that influence the debate concerning religion in American public schools (chapter 1). Then, turning to the particular, some current models of inclusion or exclusion of religion(s) in/from the curriculum are identified and examined, with a brief proposal for a new way forward called the Meaningful Inclusion Approach (chapter 2). To demonstrate the constitutionality of this new proposal, a careful study of the Constitution and its interpretation by the Supreme Court is presented, highlighting especially the demand for neutrality and the Court’s positive opinion concerning teaching about religion(s) in public schools as part of a secular program of education that is considered complete (chapter 3). The constitutional question is followed by a critique of the reigning educational paradigm, which is unduly subservient to the market economy, too narrowly focused on STEM technical knowledge, and hyper-individualistic. In an exploration of alternative educational philosophies, warrant is found for not only teaching about religion(s) but also learning from religion(s), thus taking seriously the demands of neutrality and the promise of a holistic, liberal education (chapter 4). The author then proposes resituating the educational project in terms of the common good. A basic framework is proposed for education that is rooted in a healthy understanding of the human person in society, and which calls for a problem-posing approach to education that values cooperation, building bridges through dialogue to encourage the virtue and commitment of solidarity, and openness to both religious and non-religious contributions to human knowledge and wisdom (chapter 5). Finally, a consideration of the unique circumstances of our post-secular age and the urgency of the need for religious literacy in a globalized world is presented as a major rationale for changing the curricula of our public schools without delay. The dissertation concludes with a proposal for the Meaningful Inclusion Approach (MIA) to learning about, from, and with religion(s) in age-appropriate ways from kindergarten through grade 12 (chapter 6). / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2021. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Religious Education and Pastoral Ministry.

Academic freedom has gone through three distinct eras yet each era overlaps a great deal with the one following it. The first era was the bureaucratic. It was exemplified by the negotiations between administrators and professors in the 1920s. The American Association of University Professors and the American Association of Colleges began cooperating and a hierarchical structure emerged, with the tenured professor at the top of the faculty. The second era was the political era and it was mainly a result of loyalty oaths, which began after the first World War and then escalated again during the 1930s when communism became a major concern. The political era then gave way to the legal era when the first academic freedom cases went to the United States Supreme Court in the 1950s. The first cases were the result of political pressures that became legal pressures. Most of the early court cases were based on communism. The legal era has produced changes. There are now more rights; for students and teachers of all levels, including pre-college levels, are guaranteed some academic freedom rights. However, the First Amendment and academic freedom are not synonymous because a professor usually cannot win a case based solely on his free speech rights under academic freedom. It is only when academic freedom is guaranteed through some form of due process, custom or contract—and that guarantee has been violated—that a professor normally wins a suit. There are times, too, when a professor's free speech rights have been violated and she can then win a suit based on the First Amendment, but academic freedom is not always a part of the decision. Many times academic freedom is simply used as dictum in a decision that is, in fact, based on a different part of law such as contract law, public employee law, or a First Amendment violation. Academic freedom has been recognized by the courts but standing alone it is not usually sufficient to win a suit.

The Occupy movement has spread over hundreds of cities nationwide and over 1,500 cities around the world. The movement is formed around a common goal, which is to protest the way government actions or inactions have rooted widespread discontent. The Occupy movement has encountered opposition from the cities and counties where it is located. Arrests have been made for a number of violations of city and county codes including resistance to police orders and disorderly conduct charges. In our country, freedom of speech and the right to protest have been regarded as inalienable rights. The question becomes how to balance the rights of the people involved against the rights and obligations of the government. This thesis will provide an in depth look at the issues being discussed in cases and hearings involving the Occupy movement. The key issue plaintiffs argue is that their First Amendment rights are being infringed on. In January 2012, both international human rights and United States civil liberties experts at seven law school clinics across the country met and formed the Protest and Assembly Rights Project. The project investigated the United States response to Occupy Wall Street. This thesis will discuss and recap some of their findings. In addition, it will analyze the Federal Constitutional restrictions to protestor's rights and the cases that arise on the grounds of these restrictions, as well as examine how the courts interpret the First Amendment and clarify these issues along with defining protestor's constitutional rights. Based upon the Constitutional rights and legitimate restrictions, the thesis will make appropriate recommendations on the limits for both the protestors and the local government.

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This goal of this project is to assist liberals and progressives who are reluctant to speak out publicly on religious questions so that they can advance their moral values and protect their religious liberties by encouraging and educating them to use legal protections under the First Amendment. Rights to religious freedom in the American legal system are reviewed on the federal, state, and local levels. The denominational history of and theological evolution within Unitarian Universalism, the target group being studied, are examined. This examination has a particular focus on shifting historically strict intradenominational attitudes on the separation between church and state and using legal protections to advance progressive moral values and social justice objectives. Through a nonprofit legal foundation, the author seeks to educate and to support religious groups seeking to pursue religious projects and ministries that may face legal challenges and government opposition. The project also reviews metrics for assessing attitude change in response to educational workshops presented to Unitarian Universalist audiences.

Master of Arts / Department of Communication Studies, Theatre, and Dance / Charles J. Griffin / This rhetorical history study attempts to refocus the narrow debate on the concept of the “Separation of Church and State.” Most scholars and popular organizations primarily focus their determination of the original intent of the Establishment Clause on the views of James Madison, Thomas Jefferson, and Virginia. However, according to the United States Constitution it takes three-fourths of the states and two-thirds of Congress to ratify an amendment. As a result, most arguments on this topic center on an extremely small minority of evidence: one of fourteen states, and only one of eighty-one members of Congress to determine the Founders’ original intent. This study reverses this trend and consults evidence from all the states involved as well as the records of Congress. Since comparable documents are vital to understanding history, all the state constitutions, state bills of rights, and state proposed amendments to the Federal Constitution are consulted as evidence at the beginning of this study. Additionally, every reference of religion in the above documents are individually presented in order to alleviate concerns of potential evidence manipulation. Further, the debates in Congress and the multiple drafts of the Establishment Clause are evaluated in the process of determining the Founders’ original intent. Throughout the study, several useful tables have been constructed in order to facilitate the processing and evaluation of such a large base of evidence. The results of this study indicate a lack of evidence for the contemporary view that the Founders’ intent was to create a total separation between church and state. From the specific religious concerns voiced in the state ratification debates of the Constitution, what religious limits were written into state constitutions/bills of rights, and the amendments that states proposed concerning religion; it becomes evident that the Founders’ intention was only to prevent a particular Christian denomination from becoming the established "National American Church.”

This thesis examines the views of freedoms of press and speech held by the twelve earliest justices of the U.S. Supreme Court, as the Sedition Act of 1798 raised their earliest First Amendment questions including the breadth of those freedoms and of seditious libel. The thesis discusses three aspects of the early justices' views, which add to existing studies. First, the context of those justices' views was growing challenges to the restrictive Blackstone and Mansfield definition of freedom of press as only freedom from prior restraint (licensing) and as not also freedom from subsequent restraint such as seditious libel prosecution. Those challenges were reflected in broad language protecting freedoms of press and speech, and in the absence of language stating that the English common law of rights or of seditious libel was left unaltered. That crucial context of growing challenges has not been detailed in existing literature. (Chapter 3.) Second, the views of each early justice on press and speech are chronicled for the period 1789-1798. That discloses express commitments to those freedoms, which are absent from existing literature, and no adoption of the Blackstone definition before the 1798 crisis. (Chapters 4-5.) Third, the cases and reasoning of the six sitting justices upholding the Sedition Act of 1798 are chronicled and assessed, along with the views of the six remaining justices. That reveals that most remaining justices and also a significant minority within the Federalist party rejected the Sedition Act. Yet positions on the Sedition Act have been only cursorily discussed for four sitting justices and have been overlooked for the other eight justices, as well as for the Federalist party's minority, for the critical period 1798-1800. (Chapters 6-7.) The thesis proposes reasons for that divergence between the pre-1798 commitment of all justices to freedoms of press and speech, and the support given by most sitting justices to the Sedition Act, in contrast to apparent opposition by most remaining justices. The primary reasons are their opposing positions on several connected issues: the extent of rights to dissent, the challenges to the Blackstone definition and to seditious libel, the effect of new state and federal constitutions on seditious libel and on common law rights, strength of attachment to freedoms of press and speech and to seditious libel, and most sitting justices' changes of position to embrace the Blackstone definition. The thesis calls into question conventional views in existing literature on each of those three aspects. First, Levy and others express the dominant view that freedom of press in state declarations of rights and the First Amendment 'was used in its prevailing common law or Blackstonian sense to mean a guarantee against previous restraints and a subjection to subsequent restraints for licentious or seditious abuse,' so that contrary evidence 'does not exist,' and that 'no other definition of freedom of the press by anyone anywhere in America before 1798' existed. Instead, opposition to the essence of seditious libel had been mounting over the decades. Second, the early justices are usually portrayed as having nothing to say about freedoms of press and speech before 1798. Instead, nearly all exhibited commitment to those freedoms before that crucial year, though half the early justices upheld the Sedition Act during 1798-1800. Third, the Federalist party, the early justices, and the states except Virginia and Kentucky are all usually described as unanimously supporting the Sedition Act. Instead, the Federalists divided over the Act, and the early justices did as well, with an unrecognized but significant minority of the party, and nearly half of the early justices, opposing the Sedition Act, as did several additional states.

Freedom of speech is a right guaranteed by the US, the EU, and China; however, just because a right is guaranteed does not mean the government cannot manipulate the right to achieve its ends. Freedom of speech is commonly associated with the power of language; citizens speak in order to take control of those governing them, in order to assert their desires. In reality, freedom of speech is far more beneficial for governments, who can use this dissent to better control a population. In order to control the population, though, the governments must first control the dissenting speech, the discourse, surrounding an issue. In the case studies that follow, these three governments with very different regimes will manipulate discourses elicited in the name of free speech in order to advance the governments’ plans, even when these plans went against the stated public interest and ignored the dissenting citizens. This thesis, in essence, examines how freedom of speech can become a tool of power for regimes.

This study examined how Fox News, CNN, MSNBC, ABC, NBC, and CBS portrayed the Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission decision from the time of the decision, January 21, 2010 until the mid-term elections November 2, 2010. The broadcast transcripts were read for emergent frames to see how the stations framed coverage. The cable channels had the most coverage. MSNBC, ABC, NBC, and CBS framed the decision negatively, Fox News portrayed it positively, and CNN was neutral to negative in coverage.