This paper discusses the implications of autonomous-connected-electric-shared vehicles (ACES) for public finance, which have so far been widely ignored in the literature. In OECD countries, 5-12% of federal and up to 30% of local tax revenues are currently collected from fuel and vehicle taxation. The diffusion of ACES will significantly reduce these important sources of government revenues and affect transport-related government expenditures, unless additional policies are introduced to align the new technological context with the tax revenue requirements. We argue that the realization of socioeconomic benefits of ACES depends on the implementation of tailored public finance policies, which can take advantage of the increase in data availability from the further digitalization of transportation systems. In particular, the introduction of road tolls in line with "user Pays" and "polluter Pays" principles will become more feasible for policy. Moreover, innovation in taxation schemes to fit the changing technological circumstances may alter the relative importance of levels of governance in transport policy making, likely shifting power towards local, in particular urban, governmental levels. We finally argue that, given the risk of path-dependencies and lock-in to sub-optimal public finance regimes if policies are implemented late, further research and near-term policy actions taken during the diffusion process of ACES are required.

L’analyse des politiques fiscales des communautés autonomes de la Val Seriana (XVe-XVIe siècle) montre l’existence d’une relation asymétrique entre la République de Venise, la Commune urbaine de Bergame et les pouvoirs locaux. Dès la conquête, la Dominante et les Communes rurales entament des rapports qui garantissent à la République ses recettes fiscales et aux communautés la tutelle de leur autonomie administrative. La ville perd définitivement son influence directe institutionnelle et donc fiscale sur cette parties de son district. Cette relation continue, renforcée, pendant les deux siècles suivants, en dépit des transformations des modèles de prélèvement (introduction de contributions extraordinaires et d’une taxe militaire unique remplaçant des anciennes charges; fin XVe – début XVIe siècles). Ces changements et l’augmentation de la demande fiscale, due principalement aux guerres en Italie et en Orient, emmènent au développement d’un nouveau système financier local, remplaçant des anciennes organisations fondées sur des impositions tels que les dazi. Bien que bénéfique pour l’entière communauté, ces nouvelles institutions restent sous le contrôle des familles locales qui gouvernent déjà la Commune ; le nouveau système se fonde sur l’emprunt public émis par des créanciers privés, qui font souvent partie de la classe dirigeante locale, et sur la vente et location des biens communs des communautés. / The analysis of the local fiscal policies of the autonomous communities of the Val Seriana during the XV and XVI centuries proves the existence of a three-sided, asymmetrical equilibrium between the Republic of Venice, the Commune of Bergamo and local powers. Whilst the Town manages to influence the communities' choices from a marginalised position, the Republic and the latter share a pact that benefits them respectively in fiscal revenues and protection of autonomy. This relationship will strenghten in time, through the transformations of the Venetian fiscal system (late XV century) that will put more emphasis on extraordinary revenues and monetisation of military corvées. These radical changes combined with the financial strain coming from the renewed war engagement in Italy and in the East that will increase Venetian fiscal demand, will locally set a trend for the development around communal finances of a new apparatus, replacing the old system based on customs. Though beneficial for the whole community, this system will be largely managed by local governing families; its roots will be public borrowing from private businessmen (often, relations to the members of the political management) and the commercialisation of a portion of the communal properties.