This is an analysis of the nature and political significance of Russian messianism: the idea that the Russian people or the Russian State is the `chosen people' or the `chosen instrument'. I outline the genesis of the theory of Moscow, the Third Rome and discuss the ideas and activities of the nineteenth-century Slavophils, the pan-Slavists, Dostoevsky and Vladimir Solovyov. I examine the influence of messianism on Russian Communism, considering Berdiaev's views. The main part of the work investigates the rebirth of interest in Russian messianism in the Brezhnev period. I try to investigate the links between this cultural movement and the Russian nationalist elements within the political éite. My main sources for this are samizdat journals and articles, in particular the journal Veche, cultural journals such as Novyi mir, Molodaia gvardiia and Nash sovremennik, Party documents and éigré/ journals. I find that Russian messianism has been especially important at times when the country is in crisis: Russia is in Golgotha, but where there is suffering there is also redemption, not only for Russia but for humanity. It has by no means been always dominant in intellectual thought. It has had little influence (under either tsars or Communists) on the fields of nationality policy, policy towards religion or foreign policy. Today, as in the nineteenth century, its adherents can be opponents or supporters of the existing State structure. The growth of non-Russian nationalism under Gorbachov, combined with glasnost', has fuelled Russian nationalism. This is unlikely to be co-opted into the official ideology, because it would increase the dissatisfaction of the non-Russians.

This thesis is about the renegotiation of Russia’s Far Eastern and Northwestern borders as political and economic spaces. The disintegration of the Soviet Union was accompanied by the opening of these formerly closed borders which provided Russia’s border-regions with opportunities to develop links within the post-Soviet, as well as international political and economic landscapes. From 1992 onwards, their ability to cope with unfolding economic crisis and political uncertainty, which characterized the process of transition in Russia, was considered to be tied to establishing economic and political cross-border links with neighbouring European and Northeast Asian countries. Using the Republic of Karelia and Khabarovskiy kray as case studies, their development and that of their borders as political and economic spaces is analysed, applying the analytical framework developed in this thesis, according to which the complexity of borders can be best grasped by assessing the activities of border actors and institutions at all levels of governance, as well as the interaction of factors pertaining to the border’s spatio-infrastructural, economic, political and socio-cultural dimensions. The findings show that both regions’ borders have been renegotiated to different extents, but that neither the Republic of Karelia nor Khabarovskiy kray have been able to utilise their borders as opportunity structures to the extent originally anticipated. Main problems have been the distinct lack of scope for regional and local state and non-state actors to get sufficiently involved in the governance of their borders as well as the imbalance between the Asian and European vectors in Russian policy-making. The thesis concludes by proposing a system of multi-layered, heterarchic political and economic governance on both regions’ borders with the development of border-spanners and border-spanning institutions at the centre of such a strategy.

In both the 1936 and 1977 USSR Constitutions conscientious labour in socially useful activity was decreed to be a "duty and matter of honour" for every Soviet citizen. This study examines the various approaches adopted by successive Soviet leaderships in their determined efforts to reinforce that ethos. It focuses, in particular, on the so-called "anti-parasite" laws dating back to 1957, when as a part of Khrushchev's attempt to revive popular justice, several smaller republics experimented with enactments that permitted peer justice institutions in the form of amorphous social assemblies to exile "parasites" via a procedure which bypassed the existing court system. Special attention is devoted to the criticism lodged against the laws (during their adoption and spread to the other union republics in 1961) by members of the legal profession, who complained that the wide punitive given to the extra-judicial bodies and the attitudes and behaviour encouraged in them would erode the respect for "socialist legality" which they had been charged with enhancing in the minds of the mass public. Although as a result of such criticism, the Khrushchev regime modified the peer justice institutions in the early 1960's, and even though his populism was absorbed by or subordinated to the normative sector of social control in Brezhnev's legal policy, the study highlights the fact that complaints of abuses and inconsistencies in anti-parasite proceedings continued to be levelled against the prosecution process. This, it is contended, was due in large part to the extreme vagueness of the notion of social parasitism itself, although the lack of a precise and consistent definition of this peculiar offence (and of the key elements which were deemed to constitute it) was actually seen as necessary and even desirable since it allowed the authorities to use the anti-parasite legislation as a weapon of suppression against a broad spectrum of socially, politically, and economically inconvenient groups within Soviet society.

This thesis examines the role of the Northern Department of the British Foreign Office and its perception of, and attitude towards, the Soviet Union between 1945 and 1953. In these formative years after World War II many assumptions and policies were shaped that proved decisive for years to come. The Northern Department of the Foreign Office was at the centre of British dealings with the Soviet Union after 1945 in an atmosphere of cooling diplomatic relations between both camps. Keeping channels of communications open in order to exploit every opportunity for negotiation and the settlement of post-war issues, officials built up an extensive expertise of Soviet domestic and foreign policy. Their focus on all aspects of Soviet life accessible to them, for example, Soviet domestic and international propaganda, revealed in their view a significant emerging future threat to British interests in Europe and worldwide. This view provided the basis of the analysis of new information and the assessment of the best possible policy options for the British government. The Northern Department tried to exploit those traits of Soviet policy that could persuade the USA and Western Europe to follow British foreign policy initiatives vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in the early Cold War while attempting to balance those weaknesses that could harm this effort. The focus of the Department often varied as a result of Soviet action. Some issues, like the Cominform were of momentary importance while other issues, like the Communist threat and the issue of Western European defence remained on the agenda for many years. A realistic approach to foreign policy allowed officials to exploit and counter-act those Soviet foreign policies seen as most threatening to Britain and those most likely to aid Britain’s recovery of her much desired world role. While the initial optimism after 1945 soon faded and consolidation on both sides was followed by confrontation, officials in London and the embassy in Moscow tried to maintain diplomatic relations to aid Western recovery efforts and support the new foreign policy doctrine of containment. When by the early 1950s entrenchment was speeding up in East and West, the Northern Department nevertheless utilised the available information to support British foreign policy worldwide as well as strengthen the domestic effort to explain the increasing international tension to the British people. Realism on the part of officials, and awareness of the information and options available to them meant that a Britain closely allied to the USA but one that continued to talk to the Kremlin was seen as the best way to achieve a continued world role for Britain and a safe Europe.

This thesis looks at the major factors, both environmental and institutional, which haye affected pastoralism in Kazakhstan throughout this century, concentrating in particular on the changes which have occurred since the end of the socialist period. The recent reforms were found to be highly negative for the livestock sector, leading to a crash in livestock numbers, high levels of poverty and the abandonment of many pasture areas. Winter fodder as a limit to livestock production has gained importance as it is no longer provided free by the state. There have been many reports of overstocking and land degradation in Kazakhstan. The literature on this was reviewed, and stocking rates in the Soviet periods compared with forage availability in different vegetation zones. From this, the regions of the study area which were probably most seriously affected by grazing regimes were identified. It was found that land degradation did not have negative effects on meat production at regional scales in the Soviet period. Since 1994 Kazakhstan's rangelands have undergone a transition from being highly stocked to being virtually empty of livestock. The potential for monitoring vegetation recovery using both biomass data and NDVI from the AVHRR satellite was investigated. Relationships with rainfall were explored for both datasets in order to determine the relative importance of climatic and human influences on forage availability. The NDVI data was found to have poor relationships with rainfall due both to its low sensitivity to the biomass changes involved, and the low rainfall variability. Better relationships between net primary production and rainfall were found using the biomass data. A severe drought occurring just after the stock crash was detected by the NDVI, but confounded any detection of vegetation recovery.

This thesis describes the political-military alliance of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation (WTO) from its origins and founding in 1955 to its 30th Anniversary in 1985, and after. In showing how the WTO has developed and operated, its practical application in the fields of joint foreign policy and military affairs is described and discussed. In the light of this analysis, the WTO is placed in its context within the socialist community. The origins of the WTO are shown to be part of a general trend towards closer co-operation between the European socialist countries. The states were formally brought together as a public response to the London and Paris Agreements of 1954, which officially rearmed the Federal Republic of Germany and incorporated it into the Western military alliance system and NATO. The structural development is described and analysed, showing the practice of the official structure largely to be a response to existing ad hoc arrangements. The limitations placed on the Organisation's political and military roles are explained, detailing how the WTO is formally restrained from operating as an efficient or effective multilateral co-ordinating body. Where it does operate, the WTO is shown principally to be a political organisation. The documentary history of the WTO is analysed, to show how the structure works in practice. Particular stress is placed on the role of the WTO in carrying out its claimed purpose of co-ordinating the foreign policies of the members. The conclusion is suggested that the WTO at most co-ordinates the `basic principles' rather than the diplomatic practice of its members' foreign policies. The participating states are shown not to be significantly bound by the WTO in the practice of their national foreign policies, though they are bound by bilateral factors external to the structure of the Warsaw Treaty. The 30th Anniversary of the signing of the WTO, potentially a historic landmark, is shown to have passed with very little pomp or celebration. The treatment of the Anniversary in the Soviet Union and amongst its allies was low-key. The issues covered by the Anniversary speeches and articles are described, and are analysed both for what they said about the WTO, its origins, practice, ansd significance, and for what was not said or done. Changes are analysed that have taken place under the new Soviet leadership of Mikhail Gorbachev, whose accession occurred just before the signing of the Protocol extending the Treaty. The 30th Anniversary soon followed. Structural changes were hinted at but never took place, though the documents issued by the existing bodies have become much more open in their description of the discussions and disagreements that took place. These events, coinciding with other changes in Soviet internal and externalpolicies, were shown to be part of an apparent attempt by the Soviet authorities to consult and co-ordinate its actions with its allies, or at least to appear to be doing so. It is also shown where past practices, such as unilateral Soviet moves on foreign policy and arms control, have not changed. The conclusion is that the real significance of the WTO is ideological, serving to give the impression of unity. The Warsaw Treaty Organisation is just another means in the many forms of alliance indicating, and used to justify, the `socialist community'. Other forms of alliance, both political and military, take precedence over the WTO in all its functions. These are principally bilateral, rather than multilateral, forms, and in many cases they are party, rather than state, forms of alliance. Research into the WTO has not been fruitless, but has proved to be the study of issues other than the foreign or defence policies of a multilateral alliance.

No description available.

This work discusses the role of the economic elites of Russia and Ukraine in the development of relations between the two countries in the period between 1994-1998. A “Pragmatist approach” to bilateral relations, that emerged in Kyiv and in Moscow in the mid-1990s, and the doctrine of CIS integration are identified as the ideological underpinnings for the participation of the economic elites in the process of foreign policy-making. According to these approaches, economic elites in Russia and Ukraine share similar economic interests derived from the necessity to restore a post-Soviet common economic space. Convergent interests of the economic elites are assumed to be powerful incentives to increase bilateral co-operation and eventually foster economic and political reintegration between the two countries. In an analysis based on the study of domestic sources of foreign policy, the author contests these approaches. This work argues that, contrary to expectations, the consolidation of nation-based economic elites led to the emergence of conflicting rather than convergent interests. The redistribution of national wealth, following the demise of the Soviet structure of state-ownership, sparked a struggle between domestic and economic elites for the control of economic resources. The penetration of external economic actors was viewed, in this perspective, as a factor that might upset the delicate balance of power between domestic institutions and economic agents. A nationalist vocabulary, resulting from a century-long struggle for independence, was used in Ukraine to express a protectionist mood against Russian competitors. This research contributes to the debate on co-operation between states and the role that domestic factor play in encouraging or hindering such a process. In particular, this study supports the argument that recently established independent states are less prone to join co-operation schemes, especially when a process of redistribution of national resources follows the demise of the previous regime. The economic elites may be identified in this process as active participants or even promoters of nationalist movements.

This thesis examines how the three Baltic countries constructed their internal and external sovereign statehood in the interwar period and the post Cold War era. Twice in one century, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were confronted with strongly divided multiethnic societies, requiring a bold and wide-ranging ethnics policy. In 1918 all three Baltic countries promised their minorities cultural autonomy. Whereas Estonian and Latvian politicians were deeply influenced by the theories of Karl Renner and Otto Bauer, the Lithuanians fell back on the historic Jewish self-government in the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Many politicians were convinced that the principle of equality of nationalities was one of the cornerstones of the new international order, embodied by the League of Nations. The minority protection system of the League was, however, not established to serve humanitarian aims. It only sought to ensure international peace. This lack of a general minority protection system was one of many discussion points in the negotiations of the Estonian and Latvian minority declarations. Although Lithuania signed a much more detailed minority declaration, its internal political situation rapidly deteriorated. Estonia, on the other hand, established full cultural autonomy with corporations of public law. Although a wide-ranging school autonomy was already established in 1919, Latvia never established cultural self-government. The Second World War and the subsequent Soviet occupation led to the replacement of the small historically rooted minority groups by large groups of Russian-speaking settlers. The restoration in 1991 of the pre 1940 political community meant that these groups were deprived of political rights. In trying to cope with this situation, Estonia and Latvia focused much more on linguistic integration than on collective rights. Early attempts to pursue a decolonisation policy, as proposed by some leading Estonian and Latvian policymakers, were blocked by the ‘official Europe’ which followed a policy analogous to the League of Nations.

This thesis analyses the developments in the South Caucasus region since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. The disintegration brought about the decleration of independence from teh states in the region, namely Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia. However, the conflicts in the aftermath of independence drawing the region into instability brought about the question of whether the instability in the region is an end result of teh policies of regional actors in the region. Whether teh stability in the South Caucasus is directly bound to teh constructive policies of the main actors? Whether actors act as stability providers or instability exploiters in the region? Are the actors especially since 9/11 Russia and the United States while expressing intentions on regional stability, with their differing interests acts as instability exploiters? In fact, these questions stems from the dilemma of discourse and commitment.