The European Commission is currently working on a legislative draft to harmonise the corporate income tax provisions for multinational groups of companies throughout the European Union. For that purpose the European Commission has installed a working group with the mission to draft a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) applicable for multinational companies. As the EU member states are not willing to surrender their taxing power to the supranational level of the EU each group entity's tax base would be determined by apportionment of the group's overall taxable income according to a predefined micro-economic factor based formula whereas the group income will be calculated by consolidating earnings beforehand separately determined by each group entity (preconsolidation income). The situs state of the particular group entity would then apply its statutory corporate tax rate on the apportioned tax base. This paper evaluates the effects of this prospective apportionment procedure on any given corporate group entity and finds that the share of the group's income allocated to a particular entity using the apportionment formula does regularly not equal the pre-consolidation income of the respective group entity. The reasons for this regular observable deviation can be found on the one hand in the concept of the apportionment formula and on the other hand in the specifics of the definitions of the apportionment factors. (author's abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

The thesis examines the international taxation rules of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) and their interaction with third-country corporate tax practice. The aim is to assess the effectiveness of the CCCTB vis-à-vis third countries, with Egypt as a practical example. The CCCTB has the potential to reduce corporate tax obstacles faced by businesses in the EU in having to comply with up to twenty seven different domestic systems for determining their taxable profits. However, the international taxation rules of the CCCTB system are likely to have an impact on the corporate tax practice in third countries, and may conflict with existing bilateral tax treaties concluded between CCCTB-Member States and third countries. The discussion presents a detailed analysis of the CCCTB’s unilateral framework for the avoidance of double taxation and for the protection of the common consolidated tax base. It reveals that, by means of ordinary credit and exemption methods provided in the CCCTB Directive, international double taxation will be eliminated in relation to third countries. Furthermore, the CCCTB’s anti-abuse rules are effective in protecting the common tax base and in eliminating non-double taxation. Nevertheless, the unilateral measures are in conflict with a number of important provisions of bilateral tax treaties, based on the OECD Model, concluded between the potential CCCTB-Member States and third countries. Egypt exemplifies this – but the problem is generic. These conflicts between the CCCTB and OECD Model bilateral treaties are detrimental to the effective functioning of the CCCTB system vis-à-vis third countries, and need to be redressed. This thesis suggests a simple and practical solution - replacement of the bilateral tax treaties between CCCTB-Member States and third countries with a multilateral tax treaty to be concluded between every third country and all CCCTB-Member States.

The European Commission on 16 March 2011 proposed a harmonized system for the tax base calculation of companies operating in the EU. The proposed Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) indicates that businesses would benefit from a "one-stop-shop" system for filing their tax returns and would be able to consolidate all the profits and losses they incur across the EU. Member States would maintain their full sovereign right to set their own corporate tax rate. However, many Member States are against this new system as they think that CCCTB does not meet principles of subsidiarity and proportionality and is not available to reach its goals. Therefore, the hypothesis of this Master Thesis was formulated that CCCTB is an appropriate way to reach company tax harmonization in the EU and abolish obstacles which arise because of 27 different taxation systems in EU. After comprehensive analysis of major company taxation obstacles in the first chapter, these main barriers were identified: double taxation, additional compliance cost, over-taxation which arise in cross-border activities. The main measures such as Parent-Subsidiary Directive, Merger Directive, Interest and Royalties Directive and Arbitration Convention designed to cope with these barriers were discussed and the main challenges needed to solve by CCCTB were formulated. Proposed Directive and main elements of CCCTB were investigated in the second chapter. As there is a disagreement between Member States regarding to... [to full text] / Europos Komisija 2011 m. kovo 16 d. pateikė pasiūlymą harmonizuoti pelno mokesčio bazės apskaičiavimą. Pasiūlyta Bendra konsoliduota pelno mokesčio bazė (BKPMB) reiškia, kad būtų taikomas „vieno langelio” principas pildant vieną deklaraciją ir įmonės galėtų konsoliduoti visą pelną ir nuostolius pagal bendras taisykles. Valstybės išlaikytų nepriklausomą teisę nustatyti apmokestinimo tarifus. Tačiau dauguma ES valstybių yra prieš šios sistemos įvedimą, jos savo prieštaravimus grindžia tuo, kad BKPMB pažeidžia subsidiarumo ir proporcingumo principus bei nėra pajėgi pasiekti savo tikslų. Dėl to buvo šiame darbe buvo iškelta hipotezė: BKPMB yra tinkamas būdas siekti įmonių apmokestinimo harmonizavimo ir panaikinti kliūtis, kurios kyla taikant 27 skirtingas apmokestinimo sistemas ES. Atlikus išsamią analizę pirmojoje dalyje šios pagrindinės kliūtys buvo nustatytos: dvigubas apmokestinimas, didelės mokestinių reikalavimų laikymosi sąnaudos bei tarpvalstybinės nuostolių užskaitos apribojimas. Taip pat buvo nagrinėjami pagrindiniai dokumentai: Direktyva dėl bendrosios mokesčių sistemos, taikomos įvairių valstybių narių patronuojančioms ir dukterinėms bendrovėms; Direktyva dėl bendros mokesčių sistemos, taikomos įvairių valstybių narių įmonių jungimui, skaidymui, turto perleidimui ir keitimuisi akcijomis; Direktyva dėl bendros apmokestinimo sistemos, taikomos palūkanų ir autorinių atlyginimų mokėjimams tarp skirtingų valstybių narių asocijuotų bendrovių; Konvencija dėl dvigubo... [toliau žr. visą tekstą]

Evolutionary stability is a necessary condition for imitative dynamics of policy learning and innovation to come to a rest. We apply this concept to profit tax competition in a regime where a common and consolidated profit tax base for multi-jurisdictional firms is divided among governments by means of formulary apportionment. In evolutionary play, governments exhibit aggregate-taking behavior: when comparing their performance with others, they ignore their impact on the consolidated tax base. Consequently, evolutionarily stable tax rates are less efficient than tax rates in best-response tax competition. / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

With the ambition to reduce compliance costs for multinational enterprises within the European Union, but also in order to reduce the erosion of the tax base through transfer pricing and harmful tax competition among member states, the European Commission has promised to deliver a proposal for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) by the end of 2008. A vast literature has since emerged on the advantages and disadvantages of a move towards formulary apportionment (CCCTB). Whilst no official proposal has yet been submitted by the European Union, several documents have since been released. It is the novel contribution of this paper to critically evaluate the proposal itself. We argue that the formula is overly complex and should be simplified to source and destination based revenue weights only. (author´s abstract) / Series: Discussion Papers SFB International Tax Coordination

Formulary apportionment is an intensively debated mechanism for allocating tax base within multinational groups. Systems under which the formula is identical in all jurisdictions and systems under which jurisdictions can determine the weights on the formula factors individually can be observed. The latter systems produce uncertainty about the overall tax-liable share of the future group tax base. Counter-intuitively, I identify scenarios under which increased uncertainty leads to higher expected future group income. My results provide helpful insights for firms and policy makers debating the specific design of a formulary apportionment system. (author's abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series

Le terme de « prix de transfert » désigne le prix des transactions conclues entre les filiales d’une même entreprise multinationale. La thèse traite, sous un angle essentiellement normatif, de la problématique de réglementation de ces prix, c'est-à-dire de la détermination du mode de partage optimal du profit d’un groupe entre ses filiales. La thèse s’attache tout d’abord à montrer l’effet de la réglementation des prix de transfert sur les décisions de production et d’investissement des entreprises, puis sur le bien-être mondial. Sur la base des résultats obtenus, les objectifs qu’un dictateur bienveillant international devrait assigner à ce type de réglementation sont ensuite établis. Ce double travail permet de tracer le contour d’un projet de réglementation optimale, fondé sur le concept d’équité inter-nations, et dont l’application conduirait à attribuer à chaque filiale sa valeur de Shapley dans un jeu préalablement défini. La thèse éclaire également le débat contemporain en proposant un protocole permettant de comparer le principe de pleine concurrence avec la méthode d’allocation forfaitaire. / The prices of the transactions set between subsidiaries of a multinational corporation are usually called « transfer prices ». The dissertation deals with the normative questions raised by the regulation of such prices, particularly the optimal way of distributing the profit of a multinational between its subsidiaries. The dissertation first shows how the transfer prices regulation can influence corporate production and investment decisions, thereby impacting worldwide welfare. Based upon these results, the objectives that an international benevolent dictator would pursue through such a regulation are then identified. This program allows for the sketching of an optimal transfer prices regulation, which relies strongly upon the inter-nation equity concept, and which application would grant each subsidiary its Shapley value in a certain game. The dissertation also makes a contribution to the current debate by proposing a protocol to compare the arm’s length principle with the formulary apportionment method.

The draft for a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Directive in the European Union includes the suggestion for an apportionment formula which allocates taxable group profits to group member corporations. These allocated profits shall then be taxed in the respective Member States. The draft directive delegates the right to define one factor of the apportionment formula, the term "Employee" to the Member States, who are therefore free to choose a narrow or a broad definition, the latter including also atypical employment schemes. Using a game-theoretic approach the paper shows that the individually rational strategy of any Member State to define "Employee" broadly so as to maximize the volume of the apportionment factor and thus maximize the allocated share of taxable income is only the best solution when tax rate differences and differences in the volume of atypical employment schemes are disregarded. If such differentials and the corporate groups' reactions to different Member States' definitions are included in modelling the game's pay-offs a narrow definition of "Employee" yields the highest individual pay-offs to the Member States involved. This change of dominant strategies is triggered by the corporate group's shifting of the employment factor from high-tax to low-tax Member States. Our paper differs from previous research on the economic effects of the CCCTB apportionment formula as it is the first paper identifying and analysing the employment factor and its distorting effects. The paper discusses possible tax minimizing strategies for corporate groups by shifting workforce and develops a model to quantify these potential relocations. Furthermore the paper presents advice to policy makers in their "Employee" definition decision and shows how Member States could use this definition to both minimize outward factor shifting and maximize inward factor shifting.(authors' abstract) / Series: WU International Taxation Research Paper Series