李敬國. / "2001年9月" / 論文 (哲學碩士)--香港中文大學, 2001. / 參考文獻 (leaves 133-140) / 附中英文摘要. / "2001 nian 9 yue" / Li Jingguo. / Lun wen (zhe xue shuo shi)--Xianggang Zhong wen da xue, 2001. / Can kao wen xian (leaves 133-140) / Fu Zhong Ying wen zhai yao. / 凡例 --- p.1 / 前言 --- p.4 / Chapter 第一章 --- 康德的前驅：希臘及代關於「自由」的學說 --- p.8 / Chapter 〈一〉 --- 導言 --- p.8 / Chapter 〈二〉 --- 自由意志與自由槪念的發展 --- p.9 / Chapter 〔I〕 --- 多德 --- p.9 / Chapter 〔II〕 --- 笛卡爾 --- p.13 / Chapter 〔III〕 --- 斯賓諾莎 --- p.16 / Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 休謨 --- p.21 / Chapter 〔V〕 --- 萊布尼茲 --- p.25 / Chapter 〈三〉 --- 小結 --- p.30 / Chapter 第二章 --- 康德的自由槪念 --- p.32 / Chapter 〈一〉 --- 自由槪念底價値與意義 --- p.32 / Chapter 〈二〉 --- 自由槪念 --- p.39 / Chapter 〔I〕 --- 《純粹理性之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.39 / Chapter (A) --- <超驗辯證論> 〉 --- p.39 / Chapter (1) --- 「二律背反」底推述 --- p.39 / Chapter (2) --- 「超驗自由」與兩重世界之界分 --- p.45 / Chapter (B) --- <純粹理性底法規> 〉 --- p.47 / Chapter (C) --- 自由底任意與天然自由之關係 --- p.51 / Chapter 〔II〕 --- 《道德底形而上學之基礎》中的自由槪念 --- p.53 / Chapter (1) --- 從《純粹理性之批判》到「實踐理性之批判 」 --- p.54 / Chapter (2) --- 自由槪念底發現 --- p.56 / Chapter (3) --- 自由槪念底兩種意義 --- p.61 / Chapter (4) --- 「自由」與有理性者底關係 --- p.63 / Chapter (5) --- 關於循環論證底問題 --- p.65 / Chapter 〔III〕 --- （實踐理性之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.67 / Chapter (1) --- 自由與道德底關係 --- p.67 / Chapter (2) --- 「自由」理念一作爲實踐理念底公設 --- p.72 / Chapter 〔IV〕 --- （判斷力之批判》中的自由槪念 --- p.74 / Chapter (1) --- 從「自由」至「自然」之過 渡 --- p.74 / Chapter (2) --- 「自由」與「合目的性」槪念 --- p.77 / Chapter 第三章 --- 康德哲學中的自由意志 --- p.81 / Chapter 〈一〉 --- 引言 --- p.81 / Chapter 〈二〉 --- 意志概念 --- p.81 / Chapter 〔I〕 --- 意志槪念底基本義 --- p.81 / Chapter 〔II〕 --- 意志與理性 --- p.85 / Chapter 〔III〕 --- "“Wille´ح 與""Willkur´ح 之意義" --- p.87 / Chapter (1) --- 《純粹理性之批判》中的「意志 」 --- p.87 / Chapter (2) --- 《道德底形而上學之基礎》中的「意志 」 --- p.89 / Chapter (3) --- 《實踐理性之批判》中的「意志」 --- p.91 / Chapter (4) --- 《道德底形而上學》中的/意志 」 --- p.92 / Chapter (5) --- 「意願」與「意念」之區分 --- p.96 / Chapter (6) --- 「意念」與「意志」之區 分 --- p.98 / Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 善的意志 --- p.100 / Chapter 〈三〉 --- 義務槪念 --- p.103 / Chapter 〔I〕 --- 義務槪念乃唯有理性者所專屬 --- p.103 / Chapter 〔II〕 --- 「出於義務」與「合乎義務」 --- p.104 / Chapter 〔III〕 --- 「義務」與「愛好」 --- p.106 / Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 善的意志與義務間底關係 --- p.108 / Chapter 〈四〉 --- 定言令式 --- p.117 / Chapter 〔I〕 --- 道德律則僅唯一定言令式 --- p.118 / Chapter 〔II〕 --- 定言令式底原則 --- p.121 / Chapter 〔III〕 --- 目的王國與意志自律 --- p.122 / Chapter 〔IV〕 --- 意志自律爲一切道德律則所依據底惟一原則 --- p.125 / 結語 --- p.128 / 參考書目 --- p.133

CoordenaÃÃo de AperfeÃoamento de Pessoal de NÃvel Superior / Sabemos que o problema do livre-arbÃtrio à tratado, pelo menos, desde Epiteto. A liberdade de escolha que âjulgamosâ possuir à algo que supomos ser inerente à natureza humana. AlÃm disso, parece que sà poderemos ser pessoalmente responsÃveis por nossos atos se os realizarmos livremente. Acreditamos que ser responsÃveis por nossas aÃÃes e escolhas à o que nos torna diferentes dos outros animais. No entanto, apesar de todas essas nossas intuiÃÃes, nÃo sà algumas correntes filosÃficas defendem que nÃo somos livres, mas tambÃm a ciÃncia parece nos dizer que somos sistemas ou mÃquinas determinÃsticas. Os resultados de vÃrios experimentos neurocientÃficos tÃm sugerido que nÃo escolhemos conscientemente fazer o que fazemos. E, posto que a noÃÃo de livre-arbÃtrio tem como prÃ-requisito bÃsico a noÃÃo de consciÃncia, entÃo parece que hà um conflito entre nossas intuiÃÃes cotidianas e as conclusÃes cientÃficas e filosÃficas. O objetivo central desta dissertaÃÃo serÃ, nÃo somente analisar a coerÃncia conceitual das diversas teses sobre o livre-arbÃtrio que surgiram na GrÃcia clÃssica e nos estudos neurocientÃficos atuais, mas tambÃm mostrar que as explicaÃÃes que tentam conectar os fenÃmenos subjetivos e objetivos relativos ao problema nos levaram, ao menos, atà o presente momento, a uma lacuna explicativa. Isto Ã, uma lacuna na explicaÃÃo sobre como podemos conectar nossas intuiÃÃes subjetivas sobre como somos os autores de nossas aÃÃes e as explicaÃÃes objetivas sobre como nosso corpo executa tais aÃÃes.

The most systematic work Martin Luther ever created was his De servo arbitrio / The Bondage of the Will (1525), his powerful polemic against the leading Humanist of his day, Erasmus, who had criticized Luther in his De libero arbitrio diatribe sive collatio / The Freedom of the Will (1524). Luther's The Bondage of the Will is regarded as a work representing the organic unity of his entire theological thought; it can be seen as his theology in a condensed form. In spite of the immense significance of Luther's magnum opus, its theological structure and content have so far not yet been satisfactorily revealed. Much research has been conducted on certain detailed aspects of this work of Luther's, such as the problems of the free will, determinism, and predestination. The basic weakness of those analyses is that the details of The Bondage of the Will can be correctly understood only on the basis of a comprehension of the basic systematic theological idea of his work. The very kernel of Luther's own thought and the deepest intentions of his theology in this work are best comprehended by analyzing the inner structure and cohesion of his own thinking and by seeing how his argumentation developed in his dispute with Erasmus. The task of this study is to expose the fundamental systematic theological idea and structure in Luther's The Bondage of the Will. The method employed in the present study is a comprehensive systematic analysis of Luther's thought in his work. Attention will be paid to the conceptualization of issues by Luther, to his main propositions and the arguments he uses to support his claims, and to the structural principles and the core body of his thinking system. The debate between Luther and Erasmus contained genuine paradigmatic differences in their understanding of the Christian faith, but also some misunderstandings, even intentional misinterpretations. The present study aims at clarifying these conceptual confusions and at exploring the possibility of some degree of reconciliation between the conflicting views. My hypothesis is that Luther's own specific and comprehensive understanding of the Trinitarian theology of grace, with special emphasis on Pneumatology, alongside the more obvious Christology, strongly linked with the theology of creation, is the fundamental thought structure of his magnum opus. This enables him to get rid of the common Late Medieval teaching of the free choice of the human being, represented by Erasmus. Above all, Luther is a theologian of grace, sola gratia. The Bondage of the Will, the most Pneumatological treatise he ever wrote, offers a radical and comprehensive Trinitarian theology of grace. Luther understands the human being as an "ecstatic" creature who receives his/her existence and the quality of his/her existence from extra se. Luther argues for this paradigm in terms of the theology of creation, Christology, Pneumatology, and soteriology. As such, the human being was created a creature which is destined for union with his/her Creator in the Holy Spirit who is the actual presence of the Creator in his creature, God sharing his life with the human being. After losing this original state of union, the human being became a battlefield of the opposing transcendental powers, Satan and sin on the one side, and God and his grace, on the other side. The human is free in "things below oneself," in matters that belong to daily human life, but he/she is not free in "things above oneself," in matters that transcend the human being. Luther sees sin as human infirmity, inability to get rid of unbelief and pride which destroyed the human's union with God. The human being cannot change his/her evil orientation but must continue such as he/she is: this is Luther's concept of "the necessity of immutability"; he applies this philosophical concept to soteriological usage. The human being is in a desperate situation in regard to his/her capacities of contributing to his/her own salvation; here Luther follows his logic of theologia crucis. Both in terms of creation and salvation, the human being is meant to be in a communion of life with the Triune God. Luther develops a strong soteriology, understood in terms of an intimate union between the Triune God and the human being. This union is not primarily a cognitive-rational and morally responsible relation, as Erasmus was inclined to think, but a union of being with Christ in the Holy Spirit, koinonia/unio cum Christo in Spiritu sancto. The quality of a human being's life in this world and his/her eternal beatitude depends on whether his/her person is or is not in union with the Holy Trinity. In his Trinitarian theology of grace, Pneumatology, arguably neglected in Medieval times, is powerfully revived. Luther's conception of divine grace, with some peculiarities of his own, recalls Augustine's doctrine of grace, differing from the soteriological views of Scholasticism and Nominalism. The present study culminates in a systematic presentation of the three dimensions of Luther's Trinitarian doctrine of grace: First, contrition, conversion, and faith are effected by God's Spirit, sola fide is a thoroughly Pneumatological concept - a fact not sufficiently emphasized in research. Second, Luther sees the union with Christ simultaneously as a Christological and as a Pneumatological reality - a view not underscored in research. Third, sanctification means growth in love by way of being increasingly controlled by the Holy Spirit, who is the essence of divine love. This three-dimensional conception of grace can be supported by other works of Luther's mature theology. There are strong points of contact with Johannine, Pauline, Augustinian, and Greek Patristic theology here; a more detailed analysis of these connections, however, is not in the scope of the study at hand. The results of the study intensify the ecumenical potential of Luther's doctrine of grace. Moreover, these results contribute an amendment to the Finnish school of Luther interpretation where the Pneumatological dimension is underemphasized in the first and the second dimensions of Luther's doctrine of grace. Finally, the possibility of some degree of reconciliation between the views of Erasmus and Luther will be considered.

Whether the weakness of the evidence for God’s existence is not a sign that God is hidden, but rather a revelation that God does not exist is the question I will explore in this paper. I will investigate whether the absence of sufficient evidence for God constitutes evidence of his absence. Since it is not clear a-priori that God would be more clearly revealed to humans, reasons must be provided to show the degree of clarity and level of accessibility one would expect to find if God exists and remains hidden.

The questions of what kind of freedom morality requires and how to reconcile the capacity for free agency within a determined temporal sequence represent the crux of the free will debate. Traditional compatibilists claim that determinism does not preclude our capacity for moral agency. Nuanced determinists, such as Derk Pereboom, deny the existence of moral agency and argue that free will is not required to save the basic modes of our practical lives, such as our capacity to affect each other and to lead practically morallives. I will argue in favor of Kant’s view, which holds that since freedom and moral agency is metaphysically possible we cannot deny the possibility of free will and morality. The object of this thesis is to argue for why Kant’s position holds an advantage over determinism and compatibilism; it is not necessarily to argue for Kant’s argument, although I do explain and argue for aspects of it in support of my broader goal of establishing the superiority of Kant’s account.

The overarching goal of this study was to examine whether perceptions of others’ free will would differ depending on perceiver race as well as target race. The current study proposed that such a racial bias may be one mechanism by which racial disparities in medical treatment recommendations arise. By bridging findings from four different lines of research (i.e., the literatures on racial health and medical treatment disparities, racial bias, free will beliefs, and social identity), it was hypothesized that: (1) participants would perceive greater amounts of free will for a hypothetical racial ingroup patient than an outgroup patient; (2) such effect would be moderated by participant racial identity and/or racial bias, such that greater racial identity and/or ingroup racial bias would result in greater differences in racial ingroup vs. racial outgroup members’ free will; and (3) greater perception of the patient free will would indirectly affect treatment recommendation for the patient through increased perceived patient self-control. In order to test these hypotheses, the study used a 2 (Participant race: Black vs. White) x 2 (Target race: Black vs. White) x Continuous (Racial Identity/Racial Attitudes) between-subjects design, in which target race was manipulated experimentally. The results indicated that Black participants’ perceptions of patient free will was moderated by both racial identity and racial bias. Specifically, those who weakly identified with their racial group perceived a greater amount of free will in the White target patient than the Black target patient. Also, Black participants who displayed pro-White racial bias, a greater amount of free in the White target patient than the Black target patient. These moderating effects of racial identity/racial bias were not found for the White participants. Also, patient free will had an indirect effect on treatment recommendation by way of perceived patient self-control, such that perceived free positively predicted the more rigorous of two treatments. Limitations of the current research include the undergraduate college student sample, the use of a general measure of racial identity, and the use of the old IAT algorithm. Future work should examine empirically whether findings from the present study can be generalized to provider samples.

O objetivo deste trabalho é investigar as implicações políticas da negação do livre-arbítrio da vontade na filosofia de Bento de Espinosa. Trata-se de compreender como é possível pensar a vida em sociedade sem recorrer à livre vontade humana para punir os atos contrários aos direitos comuns. Se o ser humano possui livre-arbítrio para fazer ou deixar de fazer algo, isto é, se a vontade é causa total das ações humanas, é compreensível que as pessoas sejam punidas por suas ações que são prejudiciais à liberdade comum, já que poderiam perfeitamente ter escolhido agir de outra forma. Contudo, em uma filosofia como a espinosana, para a qual a liberdade da vontade não passa de um preconceito e para a qual tudo ocorre necessária e não contingentemente, é preciso indagar qual a melhor maneira de lidar com as injustiças que causam danos aos cidadãos. / The aim of this research is to investigate the political implications of the denial of the free will in Spinozas philosophy. Our goal is to understand how is it possible to think about social life without having to resort to human free will to punish the acts that are contrary to the common rights. If human beings have the free will to do or to avoid doing something, that is, if the will is the total cause of human actions, it is comprehensible that a person is punished for acting against the common freedom, because the person could have chosen otherwise. However, in a philosophy like that of Spinoza, in which the freedom of the will is just a prejudice and everything happens necessarily, not contingently, we must inquire what is the best way to deal with the injustices that do harm to the citizens.

Thesis (Th. M.)--Dallas Theological Seminary, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves [56]-68).

This paper considers the influences of fate and free will in J.K. Rowling’s Harry Potter series. Current scholarship on the topic generally agrees that Rowling champions free will by allowing her characters learning opportunities through their choices. By using Friedrich Nietzsche’s philosophy on fate and free will and by more closely examining the Harry Potter texts, this paper demonstrates fate’s stronger presence in Rowling’s fictional world. Certain strong-willed characters rise above their peers’ fated states by embracing their personal fates and exercising their wills to create themselves within fated destinies. The paper also explores the possibility of an authority directing fate.

This study discusses how the literary device of time travel can limit or empower protagonists. The main focus is on H.G. Wells The Time Machine and the two films of the same name inspired by the novel. The popularity of time travel in film springs from the myriad storytelling possibilities the device provides, and the writers agenda determines what place, if any, logic and causality have in the story. Some narratives endorse the theory of eternalism, where time is fixed and the time travellers actions are fated to be consistent with the history the traveller knows. But many films rely on theories of multiple timelines and many worlds, giving the traveller a much greater range of agency. Paradoxes of causality can inhibit the travellers actions as well. This essay discusses the broad spectrum in time travel narrative, where at one end travellers are imprisoned in history, and at the other they enjoy a great deal of freedom.