This thesis seeks to explore the points of dissonance and resonance around the understanding and deployment of the term 'religion' between Human Rights Watch, and the government of the People's Republic of China. In doing this, it is highlighted that a fundamental disjunction exists in the meaning of, and the boundaries of, the word 'religion' between these two groups. The space that this difference creates makes discussions on religion and religious freedom between these two groups extremely problematic, primarily because Human Rights Watch seeks to protect the right to religious freedom of groups and individuals that the Chinese government does not consider ‘religion’, but that Human Rights Watch demands they should. This thesis addresses the question of the role of social and cultural relativism in the defining, and the subsequent role in defending, of the term and contents of 'religion'.

This thesis seeks to explore the points of dissonance and resonance around the understanding and deployment of the term 'religion' between Human Rights Watch, and the government of the People's Republic of China. In doing this, it is highlighted that a fundamental disjunction exists in the meaning of, and the boundaries of, the word 'religion' between these two groups. The space that this difference creates makes discussions on religion and religious freedom between these two groups extremely problematic, primarily because Human Rights Watch seeks to protect the right to religious freedom of groups and individuals that the Chinese government does not consider ‘religion’, but that Human Rights Watch demands they should. This thesis addresses the question of the role of social and cultural relativism in the defining, and the subsequent role in defending, of the term and contents of 'religion'.

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

Viena svarbiausių žmogaus teisių ir demokratinės visuomenės atributų, įtvirtinančių ideologinį, kultūrinį, politinį pliuralizmą, yra minties, tikėjimo ir žodžio laisvė. Šios laisvės deklaruojamos įvairių valstybių konstitucijose, tarptautiniuose teisės dokumentuose. Žodžio laisvė, vykstant taikiems debatams padeda nustatyti tiesą. Minties ir saviraiškos laisvė skatina visuomenės narius atskleisti savo sugebėjimus ir realizuoti save ne tik politinėje arenoje, bet ir meno, kultūros srityse. Tikėjimo laisvė vysto atvirą, tolerantišką, pilietinę visuomenę, skatina sugyventi skirtingas kultūras, gina įvairiausių etninių bei religinių mažumų teises. Minties, tikėjimo ir žodžio laisvę galima suprasti dvejopai – kaip subjektyvią teisę turėti savo įsitikinimus bei laisvai juos reikšti. Tačiau šios laisvės nėra absoliučios – jos ribojamos reikalavimais, būtinais demokratinėje visuomenėje konstitucinei santvarkai bei kitoms žmogaus teisėms bei laisvėms apsaugoti. Išnagrinėjus mokslininkų doktriną, Lietuvos Respublikos Konstitucijos nuostatas, įtvirtinančias minties, tikėjimo ir žodžio laisves, Lietuvos Respublikos įstatymus, susijusius su nagrinėjama laisve, Lietuvos Respublikos teismų ir Europos Žmogaus teisių teismo jurisprudenciją bylose, susijusiose su minties, tikėjimo ir žodžio laisve, darytina išvada, kad Lietuvos teisei ypač svarbi Europos žmogaus teisių ir pagrindinių laisvių apsaugos konvencija, reglamentuojanti minties, tikėjimo ir žodžio laisvės turinį ir jos įgyvendinimo... [to full text] / One of the most important human rights and attributes of open democratic society, which establishes ideological, cultural and political pluralism, is the freedom of thought, religion and word. The freedom of word helps to find out the truth during the peaceful debates. The freedom of though and expression encourages members of society to reveal their individuality and realize themselves not only in the poltical arena, but also in the area of art and culture. The freedom of religion develops open, tolerant, civil society, prompts different cultures to get along, defends the rights of various etnic and confession minorities. The right to the freedom of thought, religion and expression can be understood in two ways – as the subjective right to have convictions and the right to freely express them. However these freedoms are not absolute and unconditional – they are restricted by the requirements necessary to protect the constitutional political system of democratic society and other human rights and freedoms. Having analysed the doctrine of scientists, norms of Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania instituting the freedom of thought, religion and expression, the national laws of Lithuania, jurisprudence of Lithuanian courts and European Court of Human Rights in cases connected with the said freedom, a conlusion may be drawn that the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms regulating content of freedom of thought, religion and expression and... [to full text]

<p>Within the context of South Africa&lsquo / s diverging religious, cultural and social backgrounds, new questions on the nature of a multicultural society are raised from the perspective of human rights.&nbsp / The universality and indivisibility of human rights are challenged by this diversity and consequently implies that standards, concepts and structures for implementation have to be reconsidered.&nbsp / International and national standards are being (re)interpreted and attention is not only focused on the contents of the norms but on the limitations imposed thereupon. The debate on whether limits should be set in permitting or accommodating cultural or religious pluralism is becoming extremely relevant. The manner in which these questions are responded to&nbsp / is even more prominent in the light of our history of apartheid which has disregarded respect for religious and cultural diversity. In the scope of this research emphasis will be placed on the&nbsp / right to freedom of religion and in particular the limitation of the right to religion in an attempt to balance conflicting rights and accommodates religious diversity. The right to freedom of religion&nbsp / albeit constitutionally entrenched is subject to reasonable and justifiable limitations. However, no clear guidelines have been formulated on the criteria for limiting the right to freedom of&nbsp / religion. The main aim of this research is to find guiding criteria to facilitate the imposition of limitations on the right to freedom of religion. The limitations of the right to freedom of religion are&nbsp / interrelated with the following research questions: Firstly, the definition afforded to the right to freedom of religion in accordance with national and international standards / secondly, the relationship between culture and religion and any interconnection that exists between these rights. This is followed by the influence of the particular value framework or normative commitments&nbsp / f the judiciary on the interpretation of the right to religion, as well as the relationship between the state and religion. The above issues will be researched both on a national and&nbsp / an international level. The aim is to conduct research that will build on an appreciation of the guidelines that should be employed in ensuring the protection of the right to freedom of religion. To this end comparisons will be drawn with other legal&nbsp / systems, which on the one hand acknowledge the protection of the right to freedom of religion and on the other hand have to find ways in which the right can be balanced in the event of conflict. It is envisaged that the research of the criteria imposed on the limitation of the right to religion both on a national and an international level will assist in suggesting criteria that will influence&nbsp / scholarly debate on the topic. In addition that this debate will allow for the formulation of a transformative approach within the South African context that sanctions the celebration of diversity in all&nbsp / its aspects and in particular the right to freedom of religion.<br /> &nbsp / </p>

The aim of this essay is to investigate how a demarcation is made between employees’ right to religious freedom next to employers’ interest in running their enterprise in an efficient way. Case law shows that the Arrowsmith-principle forum internum and forum externum could be used when a demarcation has to be made. Furthermore, case law shows that that the employee—when accepting a contract of employment—have accepted certain restrictions of his or her religious freedom. When the employee later on isn’t willing to fulfill duties stated in the contract—due to his or her religious beliefs—it has been defined as labor refusal. However, it seems as though The Court has come to develop a nuanced view on the matter, arguing in the case of Eweida v the United Kingdom for restrictions—when made on employee’s freedom of religion—to be proportionate. Case law further shows that religious beliefs are not protected when they’re challenging other fundamental rights such as protection from discrimination due to sexual orientation. Conflict has surfaced when religious employees were unable to shake hands with employers of the opposite sex, asked for time to pray during working hours and requested to wear a headscarf or a turban at work. The essay also investigates the Swedish legal case ”handskakningsfallet” where the religious manifestation was decided on the basis of direct discrimination. However, the essay finds strong reasons for such manifestations to be assessed in relation to indirect discrimination, which would enable for proportionate assessments. Furthermore, such assessments would pave way for fair and correct judgements when investigating if one has been discriminated or not.   Lastly the essay highlights the importance of making such proportionate assessment stated above when deciding if religious interests should be protected or not on the labour market to enable a fair balance between all interests. / Uppsatsen undersöker hur gränsdragningen görs när arbetstagare vill nyttja sin religionsfrihet i relation till arbetsgivares intresse att på ett effektivt sätt leda och fördela arbetet. Arrowsmith-principen vad gäller forum internum och externum kan användas vägledande vid sådana gränsdragningar. Rättspraxis visar vidare att anställningsavtalet tillmäts stor betydelse och att arbetstagaren vid ingående av avtal får anses sig ha underkastat sig de regler och krav avtalet ställer. När arbetstagaren sålunda har vägrat att utföra de arbetsuppgifter som faller inom ramen för anställningen med hänvisning till sin religiösa tro har detta bedömts vara arbetsvägran. Europadomstolen synes dock ha utvecklat en mer nyanserad syn i frågan och motiverar i fallet Eweida mot Storbritannien för vikten av en proportionalitetsbedömning när religionsfriheten begränsas i anställningsförhållandet. Vidare visar rättspraxis att religiösa åskådningar inte skyddas när de utmanar andra mänskliga rättigheter, såsom exempelvis skyddet mot diskriminering p.g.a. sexuell läggning.  Konflikt har uppstått när religiösa arbetstagare inte kunnat ta arbetsgivare av det motsatta könet i hand, velat be på arbetstid samt velat bära slöja eller turban på arbetsplatsen. Uppsatsen undersöker också ”handskakningsfallet” och övervägande skäl talar för att frågan om religiösa manifestationer torde bedömas utifrån indirekt diskriminering. Proportionalitetsbedömningar torde på ett rättvist och korrekt sätt avgöra om diskriminering ligger för handen eller inte.  Avslutningsvis betonar uppsatsen vikten av proportionalitetsbedömningar i varje enskilt fall för att avgöra om religiösa intressen ska skyddas respektive inte skyddas på arbetsmarknaden för att sålunda uppnå en balans mellan samtliga intressen.

This thesis seeks to explore the points of dissonance and resonance around the understanding and deployment of the term 'religion' between Human Rights Watch, and the government of the People's Republic of China. In doing this, it is highlighted that a fundamental disjunction exists in the meaning of, and the boundaries of, the word 'religion' between these two groups. The space that this difference creates makes discussions on religion and religious freedom between these two groups extremely problematic, primarily because Human Rights Watch seeks to protect the right to religious freedom of groups and individuals that the Chinese government does not consider ‘religion’, but that Human Rights Watch demands they should. This thesis addresses the question of the role of social and cultural relativism in the defining, and the subsequent role in defending, of the term and contents of 'religion'.

Proportionality review has become a common and expected legal test to determine the limits of rights under Canadian Charter adjudication. Section 2(a) of the Charter, which provides for freedom of religion, is one tool for people of cultural diversity to challenge the social order with their own nomoi. In this thesis I look at the freedom of religion cases that have been decided under section 1, thus also through proportionality analysis for how the proportionality test engages the democratic voice of persons of religious diversity. I argue that while the proportionality test is intended to recognize the democratic voice of diversity the reasoning structure of the test as usually utilized does not facilitate the processes of communication necessary to respectfully engage the voice of religious diversity and results in societal fragmentation. There are however, two recent cases that exemplify a very different and significantly new form of reasoning under the language of the proportionality test. I argue that these forms of proportionality analysis represent a form of deliberative or practical reason in which the nomoi of religious persons is recognized as of equal value as legislative nomoi and where political conflicts might be resolved not solely on the basis of power, but through the construction of shared histories that facilitate creating shared nomoi.

Thesis (M.A.)--Baylor University, 2008. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 135-150)