Corporate Autonomy: Law, Constitutional Democracy, and the Rights of Big Business is a normative, interdisciplinary and analytical examination of the rights and internal governance of business corporations in constitutional liberal democracies. Drawing from political theory, economics and law, it concludes that corporations should not merit legal protections unless they first exhibit some internal democratic credentials. In contrast to theories of collective moral personhood, I argue that the question of corporate ontology should not determine the kinds of legal rights it can claim. Rather, following Dewey (1926) and Habermas (1996), I maintain that the law, as a reflection of popular sovereignty, should respond flexibly to shifting social configurations by defending the principle of equal human worth (Arendt) regardless of whether or not corporations are properly understood as “real” entities with a will of their own, aggregations of individual rights-holders, or state-created legal fictions. I argue that corporations can make a prima facie case for legal autonomy rights based upon human beings’ associational freedoms. I then conclude that corporate legal autonomy rights are more likely to vindicate associational liberty if corporations first exhibit some internal democratic credentials. Permitting corporate members a voice in decision-making can ensure that corporate purposes align with the individual purposes upon which associational freedom derives. (Laborde, 2017) Nevertheless, after consideration of the literature on group agency (e.g., List and Pettit 2011) and group rights, (e.g., Benhabib 2002; Levy 2014) I also conclude that autonomy rights founded on associationalism must be tempered to protect the equal rights and liberties of those that might be harmed by corporate action. Given labor markets characterized by monopsony, financial markets characterized by the “forced capitalism,” (Strine, Jr., 2017) and the ongoing control exercised by corporate leadership under the constraints of product market competition, I find that ascribing associational rights to corporations is a tall order indeed. It may require that corporations assume further democratic institutions designed to protect those whose rights are vulnerable to corporate autonomy: e.g., intra-corporate individual autonomy rights, accountability mechanisms, internal counter-powers, and systems of discursive justification. I then argue that this theory of corporate autonomy rights incorporates the best, and jettisons the worst, of alternative theories of workplace democracy. In particular, it integrates and tempers the associationalist instincts of syndicalist, participatory democratic theories while building on the protective instincts of republican theories. The dissertation concludes by addressing a common objection to workplace democracy: that it is so inefficient that it would destroy the very good its members mean to pursue as they exercise their associational freedoms. It finds that accountable representation, delegation of decision-making functions, and market exit can help a corporation maintain its democratic credentials while permitting it to respond to market constraint.

This project outlines the existence of neoliberal multiculturalism and identifies the implications and limitations of its practice. Neoliberal multiculturalism involves the institutionalization of group autonomy by the state to download responsibility to jurisdictions that have historically lacked sufficient fiscal capacity and have been hampered by colonialism in the development of the political capacity necessary to fully meet the requirements entailed by the devolution. At the same time, this practice releases the formerly responsible jurisdiction from the political burden of the policy area(s) despite its continued influence and effect. As demonstrated by my analysis of the Indigenous child welfare devolution that has occurred recently in Manitoba, neoliberal multiculturalism therefore involves a certain kind of “privatization”—that is, it involves the appearance of state distance from said policy area. This practice problematizes the traceability of power and decision making while at the same time it co-opts and in many ways neutralizes demands from critics of the state by giving the appearance of state concession to these demands. In response to the dangers of neoliberal multiculturalism, I situate multiculturalism in a robustly political model of democratic multi-nationalism (characterized by both agonism and deliberation) in order to combat multiculturalism’s tendency simply to rationalize “privatization” and to enhance democratic accountability. My approach goes beyond dominant constructions of group autonomy through group rights by emphasizing that autonomy is a relational political practice rather than a resource distributed by a benevolent state. Building on my analysis of Indigenous autonomy and the unique challenges that it presents for traditional democratic practices, I outline a contextually sensitive, case-specific employment of what I term “democratic multi-nationalism”. This approach conceives of Indigenous issues as inherently political in nature, as opposed to culturally defined and constituted, and therefore better meets the challenges of the colonial legacy and context of deep difference in which Indigenous-state relations take place today.

ABORIGINALITY, EXISTING ABORIGINAL RIGHTS AND STATE ACCOMMODATION IN CANADA: ABSTRACT The central focus of this dissertation is the relationship between aboriginality, aboriginal rights and state accommodation in Canada. The work considers how the existence of a plurality of conceptions of aboriginality impacts the capacity of aboriginal rights to protect and accommodate this collective identity. This dissertation takes the position that aboriginal rights, as they are currently constructed in Canada, cannot account for the existence of this definitional multiplicity, and so impose serious limits on the degree to which aboriginality is accommodated and protected by the state. This case is built by looking at Supreme Court cases that deal with Section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982. The investigation contained herein examines the written legal submissions of the aboriginal and non-aboriginal participants in these cases, as well as the Court’s decisions, in an effort to trace the various articulations of aboriginality put forward by the parties. The dissertation demonstrates that, even though there is a multiplicity of conceptions of aboriginality – in other words, the aboriginal litigants, the provinces, the federal government and the Supreme Court justices advance different and often competing conceptions of aboriginality – aboriginal rights are constructed to protect and accommodate a single, particular vision of this collective identity. Moreover, this version of aboriginality does not coincide with the version of this collective identity advanced by the aboriginal litigants themselves. Consequently, the work in this dissertation argues that aboriginal rights fail to accommodate and protect aboriginal peoples’ collective identities and pose a substantial threat to these identities. / Thesis (Ph.D, Political Studies) -- Queen's University, 2008-07-09 23:23:43.659

This project outlines the existence of neoliberal multiculturalism and identifies the implications and limitations of its practice. Neoliberal multiculturalism involves the institutionalization of group autonomy by the state to download responsibility to jurisdictions that have historically lacked sufficient fiscal capacity and have been hampered by colonialism in the development of the political capacity necessary to fully meet the requirements entailed by the devolution. At the same time, this practice releases the formerly responsible jurisdiction from the political burden of the policy area(s) despite its continued influence and effect. As demonstrated by my analysis of the Indigenous child welfare devolution that has occurred recently in Manitoba, neoliberal multiculturalism therefore involves a certain kind of “privatization”—that is, it involves the appearance of state distance from said policy area. This practice problematizes the traceability of power and decision making while at the same time it co-opts and in many ways neutralizes demands from critics of the state by giving the appearance of state concession to these demands. In response to the dangers of neoliberal multiculturalism, I situate multiculturalism in a robustly political model of democratic multi-nationalism (characterized by both agonism and deliberation) in order to combat multiculturalism’s tendency simply to rationalize “privatization” and to enhance democratic accountability. My approach goes beyond dominant constructions of group autonomy through group rights by emphasizing that autonomy is a relational political practice rather than a resource distributed by a benevolent state. Building on my analysis of Indigenous autonomy and the unique challenges that it presents for traditional democratic practices, I outline a contextually sensitive, case-specific employment of what I term “democratic multi-nationalism”. This approach conceives of Indigenous issues as inherently political in nature, as opposed to culturally defined and constituted, and therefore better meets the challenges of the colonial legacy and context of deep difference in which Indigenous-state relations take place today.

This project outlines the existence of neoliberal multiculturalism and identifies the implications and limitations of its practice. Neoliberal multiculturalism involves the institutionalization of group autonomy by the state to download responsibility to jurisdictions that have historically lacked sufficient fiscal capacity and have been hampered by colonialism in the development of the political capacity necessary to fully meet the requirements entailed by the devolution. At the same time, this practice releases the formerly responsible jurisdiction from the political burden of the policy area(s) despite its continued influence and effect. As demonstrated by my analysis of the Indigenous child welfare devolution that has occurred recently in Manitoba, neoliberal multiculturalism therefore involves a certain kind of “privatization”—that is, it involves the appearance of state distance from said policy area. This practice problematizes the traceability of power and decision making while at the same time it co-opts and in many ways neutralizes demands from critics of the state by giving the appearance of state concession to these demands. In response to the dangers of neoliberal multiculturalism, I situate multiculturalism in a robustly political model of democratic multi-nationalism (characterized by both agonism and deliberation) in order to combat multiculturalism’s tendency simply to rationalize “privatization” and to enhance democratic accountability. My approach goes beyond dominant constructions of group autonomy through group rights by emphasizing that autonomy is a relational political practice rather than a resource distributed by a benevolent state. Building on my analysis of Indigenous autonomy and the unique challenges that it presents for traditional democratic practices, I outline a contextually sensitive, case-specific employment of what I term “democratic multi-nationalism”. This approach conceives of Indigenous issues as inherently political in nature, as opposed to culturally defined and constituted, and therefore better meets the challenges of the colonial legacy and context of deep difference in which Indigenous-state relations take place today. / Arts, Faculty of / Political Science, Department of / Graduate

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

I address claims of offence of feelings, religious freedom and language rights, which are all ‎justified by the intrinsic interest individuals attach to their culture. I call them ‘claims from ‎cultural identity’. I develop a conception of substantive equality, understood as distributive ‎justice and underpinned by dignity, for regulating claims from cultural identity in the legal ‎system of multicultural states. I call it Equality of Cultural Identity. ‎ It is a ‘complex equality’ model, which takes cultural identity to be a sphere in ‎peoples’ lives. Unlike majority members, cultural minority members are usually under ‎constant pressure to compromise their cultural identity and assimilate in the majority ‎culture to succeed in other spheres of their lives like education and career. In accordance ‎with Walzer’s theory of Spheres of Justice, I propose a regulative principle to determine ‎the extent of cultural protection minority members deserve, according to which the ‎influence of other spheres of their lives on their sphere of cultural identity should as ‎minimal as possible. ‎ I apply this principle to claims of offence to feeling, which I re-conceptualize as ‎claims from integrity of cultural identity. I suggest the vulnerable identity principle: The ‎more vulnerable a person’s cultural identity, the stronger her claim from integrity of ‎cultural identity. This principle enhances a just distribution of symbolic goods between ‎majority and minority members, is based on objective evaluation standards, and avoids ‎legal moralism. Thus, it overcomes the major liberal worries about regulating speech. ‎ With respect to the language rights and religious freedom, I comparatively analyze ‎them qua cultural rights. I argue that the right to religious freedom, which is generously ‎interpreted by courts, bears all of the allegedly unique features of language rights that are ‎used to support their restrained judicial interpretation. Thus, the existing arguments for ‎their restrained interpretation are not valid. I identify a novel argument for their restrained ‎interpretation, which is that they impose a cultural burden on majority members, but ‎drawing on my conception of equality, I argue that it is not sound as the burden they ‎impose is not great.‎

Will Kymlicka’s seminal work on Multicultural Citizenship has done much to advance the case for minority rights worldwide. Agreeing with communitarians that culture is important, yet unwilling to relinquish liberal equality and fairness, Kymlicka builds on John Rawls’s monumental Theory of Justice to show group rights are not only accord with liberalism, but are its true fulfilment. Yet, while Kymlicka’s theory has received accolades for elegantly tying liberalism and culturalism together theoretically, it has been met with equal scepticism over the tenability of its praxis. In this book, I argue that much of the criticism wielded against Kymlicka’s theory results from his crucial reliance on the definition of societal cultures and the contradictions embedded therein. This is further compounded by the tendency of Kymlicka to neglect his commitment to dynamic culture and liberalism in favour of a monolithic treatment of culture, leading us down the path to illiberal conclusions. I suggest that for Kymlicka’s theory of “Multicultural Citizenship” to embrace a truly vibrant multiculturalism, the theory must overcome its internal contradictions and reaffirm its commitment to a multi-layered and recursive approach to group rights. I shall review the strengths and weaknesses of Kymlicka’s theory set against contemporary debates on the topics of nationalism and minority rights and will suggest how the theory can reduce its inner tensions to embolden its critical support for multiculturalism in Canada and worldwide.

Made available in DSpace on 2015-05-07T14:27:02Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivototal.pdf: 948253 bytes, checksum: 3c0d9b247b71a373519a1d1ec0764e94 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-04-18 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / Cultural pluralism, as an inescapable social condition, throws the liberal democratic society in the challenge of dealing with diversity. There are many concepts of politics and ideology, many values, religions and ethnicities, but there is no axiological criteria that indicates which of them is the right choose. Before the impossibility of granting a steady and homogeneous social totality, it is necessary to search for a way to harmonize the diverse sectors and social groups in an inclusive manner. The object of this dissertation was to propose that one of these ways is the adoption of a political concept of toleration as recognition. From a critical interpretation of the liberal tradition of tolerance, represented by Locke, Mill and Rawls, this notion appears from the approximation between the theories of toleration and theories of recognition, in a way that to tolerate means the reciprocal action of recognizing the other as a right‟s subject. These rights, however, constitutes themselves as rights for minority groups, that seek to integrate the society through the recognition of their specific identities. During this research, the deductive methodology approach was used, from the general theories of philosophy and ethics to their practical application on the juridical and social problems derived from pluralism. Afterwards, the historical and functionalist methods were used to analyze the development of the concept of toleration and its theoretical implications. It was concluded that this conception of toleration as recognition is not only possible, but it is also what legitimates the formulation of the group rights as an instrument of social justice. / O pluralismo cultural, como condição social insuperável, lança, às sociedades democráticas liberais, o desafio de lidar com a diversidade. Existem diversos conceitos de política e ideologia, diversos valores, religiões e etnias, mas não existe qualquer critério valorativo que indique qual é a escolha mais acertada entre eles. Perante a impossibilidade de se garantir qualquer totalidade social homogênea e estável, é preciso buscar uma forma de harmonizar os diversos setores e grupos sociais de forma inclusiva. O objetivo dessa dissertação foi propor que uma dessas alternativas se traduz na adoção de uma concepção política de tolerância como reconhecimento. Partindo de uma interpretação crítica da tradição liberal da tolerância, representada por Locke, Mill e Rawls, essa noção surge da aproximação entre as teorias de tolerância e as teorias de reconhecimento, de modo que tolerar passa a significar a ação recíproca de reconhecer o outro como sujeito de direitos. Esses direitos, entretanto, constituem-se como os direitos de grupos cultuais minoritários, que buscam se integrar na sociedade através do reconhecimento de suas identidades específicas. No decorrer da pesquisa, foi utilizado o método de abordagem dedutivo, partindo de teorias gerais da filosofia e da ética, até sua aplicação prática nos problemas jurídico-sociais decorrentes do pluralismo. Depois, os métodos de procedimento histórico e funcionalista foram utilizados para analisar o desenvolvimento do conceito de tolerância e suas implicações teóricas. Concluiu-se que essa concepção de tolerância como reconhecimento não só é possível, mas também é o que legitima a formulação dos direitos de grupo como um instrumento de justiça social.

This thesis demonstrates a comparative and analytic discussion of citizenship idea based on two distinct liberal doctrines of two contemporary political philosophers: Brian Barry and William Galston. Barry's egalitarian liberalism argues for 'common citizenship' notion in order to promote liberty and equal treatment of all individuals irrespective of any social differences. On the other hand, 'liberal pluralist citizenship' of William Galston's signifies his liberal pluralism to mitigate cultural and religious conflicts of liberal democratic society. The fundamental disagreements among these liberal approaches over the issues of public recognition of group rights and restricted state authority are analysed in this study. Finally, by analysing both the liberal positions under the challenge of multicultural issues the author defends Galston's liberal idea and judges it as more convincing than Barry's liberal approach.