Global capital is transforming the spaces in which we live, thereby transforming culture: this thesis challenges a set of liberal assumptions about culture and cultural transformation by elaborating upon this very hypothesis. Specifically, it argues that cultural identities are being formed in global cities, where disjunctive global flows of cultural, financial, technological, ideological, and human capital intersect. These global flows are creating cultural contexts of choice that can be as central to individual and group identities as national institutions or inherited or native cultural norms. And as these modern contexts of choice emancipate the imagination from the influence of national institutions, they enable peculiar new forms of agency. I use Arjun Appadurai’s notion of imagination and his model of “scapes”—cultural landscapes formed by intersecting flows of capital—to explain how the global is becoming the decisive framework for social life. In contrast, I use Will Kymlicka’s model of multicultural citizenship and Jeremy Waldron’s model of cosmopolitanism primarily to demonstrate the limits of a class of liberal theories of cultural accommodation that oversimplify the relationship of the individual to culture, and of culture to modernity, and which ignore the role of “scapes” in constituting cultural identities. To conclude, I propose an alternative, three- dimensional and ultimately non-comparative treatment of culture inspired by Henri Lefebvre’s concept of the right to the city. / Graduate

A tutela dos interesses metaindividuais em juízo e a busca de mecanismos que assegurem que o processo seja instrumento para o acesso substancial à justiça inserem-se no contexto das ondas renovatórias do processo civil. Embora o movimento em questão situe-se cronologicamente na década de 1960, o ordenamento jurídico pátrio ainda não fez fluir simultaneamente as três ondas. Os denominados interesses metaindividuais abrangem tanto os interesses essencialmente coletivos, nos quais se incluem os difusos e coletivos, quanto os interesses doutrinariamente denominados de acidentalmente coletivos, correspondentes, nos termos do microssistema processual coletivo, ao conceito de interesse individual homogêneo. No Brasil, a tutela jurisdicional de interesses metaindividuais pode se dar através do processo coletivo e, também, por meio do processo civil tradicional, caso apresentem viés estritamente individual. A dificuldade de enquadramento de determinados interesses dentro dos conceitos legais dados pelo microssistema processual coletivo é recorrente no cotidiano jurisprudencial. O processo civil vigente não apresenta mecanismo normativo apto a evitar a concomitância entre ações individuais e coletivas sobre uma mesma questão jurídica, razão pela qual o sistema convive com demandas de massa repetitivamente levadas ao Poder Judiciário. O processo coletivo, no entanto, não é a única alternativa processual existente para o manejo racional de processos repetitivos: as denominadas ações de grupo prestam-se à resolução isonômica de tais demandas sem que, para tanto, sejam necessárias ficções representativas e grandes debates acerca da legitimidade. O presente trabalho presta-se à análise de tais possibilidades, tendo por norte a otimização do alcance subjetivo da decisão judicial que trate de interesse metaindividual. Encontra-se em trâmite na Câmara dos Deputados o projeto do Novo Código de Processo Civil, que traz, dentre as inovações destinadas ao tratamento de demandas de massa, o incidente de resolução de demandas repetitivas, a centralização de processos repetitivos e a conversão da ação individual em coletiva, mecanismos estes que integrarão o objeto do presente estudo. / The judicial protection of group rights and the search for mechanisms that ensure that civil procedure is actually an instrument for substantial access to justice fall into the context of the waves of reform. Although such motion is chronologically situated in the 1960s, Brazilian Law has not yet fulfilled the task of simultaneously flowing the three waves. The so called group rights refer, in Brazilian Law, both essencially and occasionally group rights. The latter refers, in Brazilian Civil Procedure, to the concept of homogeneous individual rights. In Brazil, the judicial protection of group rights can be led through class actions or individual suits, as long as the right involved has a strictly individual aspect. The difficulty of framing some rights into the legal concepts is iterant in Brazilian Courts daily routine. The current Civil Procedure does not have tools able to avoid the concomitance between individual suits and class actions that refer to the same legal issue. For that reason, the judiciary deals with repetitive suits. Class actions, however, are not the only procedural alternative to rationally dealing with repetitive suits: group actions also aim to adequately resolving suits, but without involving issues as adequacy of representation or further concerns related to standing to sue. This research is dedicated to the analysis of such possibilities, having in mind the optimization of the subjective range of judicial decisions that refer to group rights. The Project of the new Brazilian Civil Procedure Code, currently at the Brazilian Chamber of Deputies, brings, among the innovations that intend to deal with repetitive suits, the incident of resolution of repetitive suits, the centralization of repetitive suits and the possibility of convertion of individual suits into class actions. All of these innovations will also be analised.

Will Kymlicka’s seminal work on Multicultural Citizenship has done much to advance the case for minority rights worldwide. Agreeing with communitarians that culture is important, yet unwilling to relinquish liberal equality and fairness, Kymlicka builds on John Rawls’s monumental Theory of Justice to show group rights are not only accord with liberalism, but are its true fulfilment. Yet, while Kymlicka’s theory has received accolades for elegantly tying liberalism and culturalism together theoretically, it has been met with equal scepticism over the tenability of its praxis. In this book, I argue that much of the criticism wielded against Kymlicka’s theory results from his crucial reliance on the definition of societal cultures and the contradictions embedded therein. This is further compounded by the tendency of Kymlicka to neglect his commitment to dynamic culture and liberalism in favour of a monolithic treatment of culture, leading us down the path to illiberal conclusions. I suggest that for Kymlicka’s theory of “Multicultural Citizenship” to embrace a truly vibrant multiculturalism, the theory must overcome its internal contradictions and reaffirm its commitment to a multi-layered and recursive approach to group rights. I shall review the strengths and weaknesses of Kymlicka’s theory set against contemporary debates on the topics of nationalism and minority rights and will suggest how the theory can reduce its inner tensions to embolden its critical support for multiculturalism in Canada and worldwide.

La doctrine internationaliste a accordé une attention notable au dommage depuis l'apparition de la responsabilité internationale en tant que discipline au sein du droit des gens. Toutefois, depuis plusieurs décennies, elle a délaissé les analyses transversales pour se concentrer sur des dommages précis subis soit par l’État, soit par les particuliers. Ce clivage a laissé subsister un angle mort dans l'analyse de la pratique internationale : l'étude des lésions dont la victime n'est ni une personne publique ni une personne privée, mais une entité collective composée par les unes et/ou par les autres et qui ne peut être réduite à l'addition de ses composantes. La prise en compte des lésions dont peuvent être victimes des entités comme la famille, les peuples, l'humanité ou la communauté internationale est l'un des principaux défis auxquels sera confrontée la responsabilité internationale à l'avenir. Afin de proposer une catégorie qui rende possible une analyse d'ensemble de ces atteintes, il est indispensable de clarifier le cadre conceptuel des lésions prises en compte par la responsabilité internationale. Cette réflexion conduit à constater qu'en plus du dommage, celle-ci tient compte d'une deuxième forme de lésion, purement juridique et inhérente au fait internationalement illicite. Les dommages et lésions juridiques peuvent être regroupés dans la catégorie des «lésions collectives» lorsqu'ils portent atteinte à des droits, des intérêts ou des biens collectifs. Des conséquences particulières découlent des lésions collectives ainsi définies dans le cadre de la responsabilité internationale. Elles se manifestent notamment au regard de son invocation et de son contenu. / The emergence of international responsibility as an autonomous field of study in International Law has compelled the international legal doctrine to devote considerable attention to damage and injury. However, during the last decades, scholars have progressively abandoned the cross-sectional analysis of these concepts in order to further focus on specific injuries and damages suffered by States or individuals. This rift has thus Ieft a blind spot in the analysis of international practice: the study of injury and damage whose victim is neither a public nor a private person, but rather a "collective entity" integrated by either, or both, public and private actors; an entity which cannot be simply reduced to the addition of its components. To take into account the injury and the damage -suffered by entities such as the family, peoples, humanity or the international community - is indeed one of the main challenges that faces international responsibility in the near future. In order to suggest a new category which allows for an overall analysis of such injuries and damages, it is necessary to clarify the conceptual framework of both, injury and damage, within the framework of international responsibility. This clarification leads to the conclusion that, in addition to damage, international responsibility also takes into consideration a purely legal injury which is inherent to the internationally wrongful act. Damage and legal injury can be qualified as "collective whenever they infringe collective rights, interests or goods. Specific effects result from this kind of injuries and damages in particular with regard to the invocation as well as to the legal consequences which arises from international responsibility.

Minority protection mechanisms in international law aim to guarantee certain individual rights to persons belonging to ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities, such as freedom of culture, religion and language. These rights can be considered to be of collective interest for minority group identity and therefore often require the possibility of collective enjoyment. In addition to general human rights and principles of non-discrimination, minority protection can alternately be ensured through minority specific rights. However, minority specific rights would not operate effectively without evolving a concept of collective (or group) rights in international law. Hence, while this kind of approach can provide legal methods for balancing the interests of individuals, groups and the state, it creates the possibility of conflicts with the international framework of individual rights. The ottoman millet system sets a historical example of minority protection instruments based on a collective concept of human rights. Furthermore, the ottoman history offers an illustration of what could go terribly wrong with a collective rights model. By analyzing the millet system and the ottoman legal reforms in the nineteenth century I will discuss reoccurring issues with collective rights. I will argue that incorporating collective rights within a structure founded on individual rights is a problematic way of protecting individuals belonging to minorities and other vulnerably ethnic groups. Looking through the historical development of universal human rights some important aspects of its main principles will be brought up in this paper.

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, & International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)

The study sought to determine, first, what the rules of the Hananwa family law were and, second, whether those rules were compatible with the Constitution. First, it documented the rules of the official family law. The problem that the study countenanced is that customary law is "corrupted, inauthentic and lacking authority".1 Second, it established and documented the rules of the Hananwa family law. The problem that the study countenanced in respect of Hananwa law was that it was difficult to ascertain the content of the rules of the "living" Hananwa law in order to determine their compatibility with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. Moreover, the traditional Hananwa community is inegalitarian and patriarchal. Section 9 of the Constitution provides that everyone is equal before the law and enjoys equal and full protection and benefit of the law. The study found that the Hananwas still observe their system of customary law. However, there are visible changes. For instance, nowadays the spousal consent is a validity requirement for all customary marriages. A parent or legal guardian must consent to a customary marriage of a minor. The individual spouses, not their families, are parties to their own customary marriages. African women enjoy equal status. This development is consistent with section 9 of the Constitution read with section 6 of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998. According to the Constitutional Court, in MM v MN and Another 2013 4 SA 415 (CC), the first wife must consent to her husband's customary marriage to another woman in addition to her customary marriage to him. However, some rules of the Hananwa law do not comply with the provisions of the Bill of Rights. For instance, according to the Hananwa law, extramarital children do not enjoy equal inheritance rights and maintenance rights yet. This discrimination is inconsistent with the constitutional right to equality and the provisions of the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009.The Constitution puts common law and customary law on a par. However, the courts have often replaced customary law dispute resolution rules with the common law rules. For instance, the Constitutional Court in Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others; Shibi v Sithole and South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) and the High Court in Maluleke v Minister of Home Affairs 2008 JDR 0426 (W) substituted the rules of common law for those of customary law in order to resolve customary law disputes. The legislature could not be outdone. A meticulous study of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998 and the Reform of Customary Laws of Succession and Regulations of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 reveals that their provisions almost appropriately reflect the common law marriage and intestate succession rules respectively. The Recognition of Customary Marriages Act has, furthermore, adopted the provisions of the Divorce Act of 1979. Section 28 of the Constitution read with the Children's Act 38 of 2005 has generally substituted the fundamental human rights for the unequal rights provided by the customary law of parent and child. The Maintenance Act 99 of 1998 has substituted the communal form of maintenance under customary law. / Public, Constitutional, and International Law / LLD (International and Constitutional Law)