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Reputational interests are protected against defamatory and injurious statements by the common law o f defamation, which permits the targeted individual to recover damages for the injury to his reputation. At the same time, this body of common law sets limits to the constitutional right to free expression of the person who made the penalized communication. However, since s.32(l) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms - according to the Supreme Court of Canada - restricts the Charter's application to the actions of legislative, executive and administrative branches of government, the Charter will be at best a bit player in defamation litigation governed by common law rule. This thesis deals with the tension between promoting free speech and protecting a person's reputation, i.e. with the questions whether the common law of defamation has achieved the correct balance between the protection of the individual's reputation and freedom of expression, or whether it needs to be modified in order to better accord with the Charter. A n important component of this thesis is its review of the decision of Hill v. Church of Scientology, where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of whether defamation law needs to be reconsidered in light o f the Charter protection of free expression, and found the balance struck by the current law to be appropriate. A critical look at this decision, and more generally at the law of defamation itself, particularly its presumptions of falsity, malice and damages, will reveal the problems with the common law's resistance to making any major allowance for free expression. The author will argue that the Charter should apply to the common law in the same way as it applies to statutory law and that defamation law in particular would, in all probability, not survive the test under s.l of the Charter, concerning the justification of a limitation to a fundamental right. It will be concluded that the common law of defamation needs to be modified, i.e. that it must accord significantly more weight to freedom of expression in order to be consistent with the Charter. Insofar as the extent of such modification is concerned, the author will propose first of all to give the element of fault a more significant role in the common law of defamation. In addition, she will argue that the common law presumptions should be abolished. In sum, the author's reform proposal requires the plaintiff to prove not only that the words he complains of are defamatory, identify him and are published to a third person, but also that they are false, did indeed cause damage to his reputation and that the defendant acted with fault, i.e. intentionally or negligently, when publishing the defamatory falsehoods.

In 1989, the United States Supreme Court formulated the central purposes doctrine of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) by ruling that the law was designed to grant citizens a right of access to records reflecting on the activities of government officials. This decision immediately generated controversy. The majority of parties interested in FOIA jurisprudence claimed that the judgement misconstrued the congressional intent by denying that legislators had hoped to create a right of access to all government-held information, regardless of its content. The contrast between the Court's doctrine and the majority interpretation, or the free-flow-of-information view, is the main topic of this thesis. In exploring this matter, it becomes evident that the intellectual history of access legislation in the United States is marked by considerable diversity: from the 1920s through to the present era, various FOIA constituencies have espoused distinctive views on how an access-torecords statute should be understood. Most of these interpretations have focussed on the need for access as a measure to help citizens oversee the conduct of government personnel, and only the free-flow supporters have broken from this pattern. The philosophy they offer in its place suggests that oversight interpretations, particularly the central purposes doctrine, are illegitimate. These orthodox commentators argue instead that because the FOIA was designed to serve the same goals as the First Amendment, it must be read as mandating disclosure as "an end for its own sake." The principal contention here is that free-flow supporters have dismissed the government-oversight views far too quickly. To illustrate this point, the thesis focuses on the central purposes doctrine, and articulates it in the form of an "accountability view" to establish that the Court's decision was not as arbitrary as is often claimed. Second, the argument inquires whether one of these two predominant views can be said to have a stronger rationale than the other. The ultimate conclusion of this line of inquiry is that, because of serious logical flaws in the first-amendment argument supporting the free-flow theory, the central purposes doctrine actually represents the more reasonable interpretation of the statutory purpose of the act.

My topic is an analysis of the various theories of multiculturalism and how they would respond to controversial issues concerning freedom of speech with regard to religious sensitivities. While Western nations have often concentrated on 'nation building', or the integration of citizens into public institutions, there has been the emerging trend of minority rights and 'multiculturalism' (Kymlicka, 2001, pp. 2-3). Groups with diverse interests and political agendas are resisting assimilation into wider society and are struggling for acceptence, respect and public affirmation of their differences (Parekh, 2000, p. 1). While the nation state has not become obselete, many of its traditional functions have lost their relevance and value and we therefore need to reconceptualize its nature and role (Parekh, 2000, pp. 193-194). Many nations have a new found interest in multicultural policies and Australia has declared itself multicultural in the early 1970's as did Canada; and the debate around multicultural policies has raged on in Britain, Germany and Israel since the 1960's (Parekh, 2000, p. 5). In Kymlicka's view, public opinion has shifted from seeing minority rights as a pragmatic compromise to a matter of fundamental justice (Kymlicka, 2001, p. 6). One controversy that multiculturalist policies have raised is issues of tolerance of cultural difference, including group rights. This is evident on a daily basis, from the storm around Muslim girls wearing headscarves in France, to the debate surrounding the use of French as a first language in Quebec; multiculturalism has been asked, what should be tolerated? In my dissertation I will look at the controversial topic of freedom of speech within liberal democratic systems. Freedom of speech is an integral part of a democratic system, and in democratic systems discussion is often cited as a means of reaching consensus and compromise. Free speech is also intended to explore new ways of thinking and to criticize ways of thinking and living. The difficulty comes when there are certain topics, such as the lampooning of Islam and the Prophet and denying the Holocaust, which are deemed to be off limits by certain groups. Different liberal philosophies however have differing views on what the limits of free speech are. I will be looking into these philosophies and whether the limits they set apply to the Danish cartoon controversy and to the David Irving case of Holocaust denialism. There are three broad theories of how liberal systems ought to deal with the demands of a plural society. These are 'classical liberalism', 'liberal nationalism' and 'multiculturalism'. In broad terms, classical liberal theory is intolerant of special group rights, liberal-nationalism affirms certain kinds of group rights within a liberal framework, and multiculturalism asserts the equality of cultures, and questions the primacy of liberalism. The question that I will be answering is how these theories deal with group rights when those groups ask for the limiting of speech that is deemed offensive to group culture or religion. In a more global society, different cultural and religious groups have differing levels of tolerance toward certain kinds of speech. Certain groups value freedom of speech with very few constraints, whilst others believe that that some speech is harmful and disrespectful to their culture or religion. Questions about the viability of these different cultural and religious groups co-existing have been highlighted by recent events. The two cases to be explored in my analysis will be, firstly, the outcry following the publication of cartoons of the Prophet Muhammed in Denmark. Many of these cartoons were seen to be derogatory to Muslims and the depiction of the Prophet is also not allowed in many Islamic traditions. Much of Danish society felt that although these cartoons were offensive and in bad taste, they had to protect their right to freedom even though it may be offensive to others. This pits the Islamic culture against that of the Danish 'liberal' culture and asks the question of whether 'liberal' culture or 'multiculturalism' can assure religious tolerance? My second example is the controversial case involving the historian David Irving and his questioning of the Holocaust. This questioning led to his imprisonment in Austria for the crimes of Holocaust denial. This case involves someone expressing his freedom of speech, yet many liberal-democratic countries have laws expressly prohibiting this kind of Holocaust denial. The reasoning behind such laws is to protect the sentiments of Jewish community and the suffering they endured under the Holocaust. In both cases, the interests of religious groups are invoked as being sufficiently harmed, and the liberal right to free speech should therefore be limited. Hence the thesis looks to explore religious tolerance available in classical liberal, liberal-nationalist and multiculturalist systems at a theoretical level. I will also argue that certain kinds and manner of speech, such as speech that lampoons and offends group sensibilities, should be limited in certain cases and that liberal-nationalism provides the most fair way of adjudicating disputes. / Thesis (M.Soc.Sc.)-University of KwaZulu-natal, Pietermaritzburg, 2008.

In the mid 1920's Muncie, Indiana, was exposed to the penetrating scrutiny of Robert S. Lynd and Helen M. Lynd, which resulted in the sociological treatise, Middletown. In the mid 1930's the sociological team once again descended upon "Middletown" to see what, if any, changes had taken place in the intervening ten years. The results of this survey were embodied in an equally famous treatise, Middletown In Transition. Figuring prominently in both surveys was George R. Dale, the crusading editor of the Muncie Post-Democrat of Middletown and the controversial mayor-editor of Muncie in Middletown In Transition.The purpose of this study is to present the story of Dale's battle with political corruption, Klan bigotry, and most of all, his fight for freedom of speech and a free press. The copies of the Muncie Post-Democrat and other pertinent sources which the writer deemed necessary for a proper evaluation of the study have been utilized.

Abstract Many opinions are divided on what religious freedom should protect and the area is unexploredin preschool. Is it the parents, the child or preschool teacher right? The aim of the studywas to investigate Maria klasson Sundin´s concept and theoretical models of religious freedomfor children through three Swedish preschool settings and also how three teachers interpretsand expresses children's freedom of religion. Through a qualitative interview study theaim was to investigate how the concepts of religion, autonomy and freedom is interpreted andexpressed by the teachers so a picture through this three concepts can categorise the teachersin a model; freedom of thought, tradition and life interpretation model so a broader picturecan be made to understand how the children's freedom of religion is expressed in the preschoolsetting and how the teachers work. The Result showed through the analysis that themodels fail to categorise the teachers in any theoretical model but on the other hand the understandingof preschool teacher’s expression and interpretation of the concept of religion,autonomy and freedom showed both diversity and lack of knowledge on the subject mattersreligious freedom which fall within the child rights issues. Furthermore the analysis showsthat children in preschool lack religious freedom, it can be interpreted rather in terms of afreedom of parents and preschool teachers. Further research is needed in the area of children'srights and religious freedom for preschool children and their teachers in (e.g.) investigate differenceof public municipal and private preschools, religious, and non-religious.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Sydney, 2004. / Title from title screen (viewed 8 May 2008). Submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy to the Faculty of Economics and Business. Degree awarded 2004; thesis submitted 2003. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in print form.

Thesis (M.A.) - Carleton University, 2002. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 107-111). Also available in electronic format on the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Missouri-Columbia, 2006. / The entire dissertation/thesis text is included in the research.pdf file; the official abstract appears in the short.pdf file (which also appears in the research.pdf); a non-technical general description, or public abstract, appears in the public.pdf file. Title from title screen of research.pdf file (viewed on July 18, 2008) Vita. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 1996. / Includes bibliographical references (leaf 101-107).