Les libertés universitaires sont fondamentales pour assurer la pérennité des sociétés démocratiques : sans elles, l’enseignement supérieur ne peut remplir son rôle qui est de dé-battre des connaissance acquises et d’en découvrir de nouvelles, ainsi que de les transmettre aux générations futures. Pour exercer cette double mission de recherche et d’enseignement, les universitaires doivent être libres de mener des investigations et d’en publier les résultats ; libres de choisir le contenu et la forme de leurs cours ; indépendants de tout pouvoir politique ou économique. Avec ces libertés, viennent cependant des responsabilités : les libertés universitaires ne pourraient conserver leur légitimité si elles ne s’accompagnaient pas du respect des exigences résultant de la déontologie universitaire. En France, les libertés universitaires sont singulières. Elles se distinguent de la définition qu’en proposent le droit allemand – à travers le concept de Wissenschaftsfreiheit – et le droit anglo-saxon – qui a consacré la liberté académique. Cette spécificité devrait permettre de répondre à la contradiction entre la soumission des enseignants-chercheurs français au statut général de la fonction publique – qui encadre les libertés individuelles des fonctionnaires – et la nécessité pour eux d’exercer leurs fonctions universitaires sans entraves. Cependant, les libertés universitaires telles qu’elles sont consacrées en France ne semblent pas, dans un contexte largement renouvelé, en mesure d’opérer efficacement cette conciliation : il convient, dès lors, d’étudier leur contenu et leurs sources. L’approche comparée mettant en perspective trois modèles différents – allemand, américain et britannique – permet d’envisager des possibilités d’évolution du droit universitaire français. / Academic freedom is fundamental to ensure the longevity of democratic societies: whithout it, higher education cannot play its part, which is to question acquired knowledge, to discover more and to transmit it to the next generation. To fulfil this double mission of inquiry and teaching, faculty should be free to investigate and to publish the results of their research; free to choose the contents and the form of their courses ; independant from politic and economic powers. However, with this freedom come some responsabilities: the academic freedom would not be legitimate if faculty did not respect the requirements of professional ethics.In France, academic freedom is singular. It is different from the definition stemming from the German law – at the origin of the concept of Wissenschaftsfreheit – and from English legal tradition – that created the concept of « academic freedom ». This specificity should overcome the contradiction between the compliance of the french university professors to the civil servant Act – which limits the individual freedoom of the state employees – and the need for them to exercise their academic functions freely. Nevertheless, academic freedom as defined in France does not seem able, in an innovative context, to ensure this conciliation, so that it becomes necessary to study its content and its sources. The comparative approach will allow to propose some possibility of evolution for French higher education law.

This project revisits the work of Nikolai Berdiaev, one of the first Russian Silver Age religious philosophers to be widely read in the West. The focus of this research is his thought on freedom and the ‘creative act’. We will argue that Berdiaev’s vision of freedom contains two types of freedom – a freedom understood within the created order and a freedom ‘outside’ of creation. It will be shown that in the former type, the reader finds a nuanced and insightful multi-layered conception of human freedom, which offers intriguing possibilities for exploring freedom and its implications for humanity. It will also be demonstrated that this type of freedom is closely related to his innovative view of creativity. Berdiaev conceives of freedom and creativity as distinct concepts, and yet so integrally related that they are interdependent. In the latter type of freedom, the reader will encounter a highly speculative and original metaphysical view that attempts to explain freedom as non-determination and answer the challenges of theodicy, which, this research will maintain, fails to do. This research will contend (contrary to Berdiaev’s own statements) that his thought is most comprehensible from a broadly theological perspective. This perspective will underscore the significant tension within his work that arises from his speculative metaphysics. Unlike earlier works on Berdiaev that glossed over this tension, we will attempt to ameliorate it by engaging Jürgen Moltmann’s theology of freedom. Moltmann’s theology will provide a number of ideas and concepts for an analysis, critique, and reconfiguration of Berdiaev’s vision. This reconfiguration will seek to remain faithful to Berdiaev’s core concerns, while providing a new interpretation of his thought that is relevant for a contemporary dialogue concerning the significance of freedom and creativity for the person and community in relation to God.

Este trabalho procura debater a liberdade constitucional de informação sob um viés não usual ao direito constitucional brasileiro. Seu ponto de partida é a proteção ao sigilo de fonte para jornalistas profissionais, consagrada pelo texto constitucional. Essa regra parece pressupor uma distinção possível e clara entre jornalistas e demais cidadãos. Mas como compreendê-la em um cenário atual no qual: a) as condições tecnológicas permitem que qualquer cidadão, a um custo baixo ou quase inexistente, publique informações para um número indistinto de pessoas, e; b) o Supremo Tribunal Federal tenha reconhecido que o Estado não pode exigir a obtenção de um diploma de ensino superior para diferenciar a categoria de jornalistas? Logo, o pano de fundo deste trabalho é a possibilidade de o Estado diferenciar jornalistas de demais cidadãos com relação à concessão de prerrogativas para o exercício da liberdade de informação. Nos Estados Unidos, esse é um debate relevante ao menos desde a década de 1970. São apresentados seus principais aspectos: por um lado, a jurisprudência de sua Suprema Corte, que se negou sistematicamente a diferenciar direitos próprios à liberdade de imprensa (Press Clause) em comparação com a liberdade de expressão (Speech Clause); por outro, as abordagens funcional e institucional à liberdade de imprensa, composta respectivamente por autores favoráveis e críticos àquela linha jurisprudencial. Ao final, a partir de uma perspectiva crítica e da adoção de fundamentos jurídicos, busca-se analisar a regra constitucional do sigilo de fonte e propor parâmetros interpretativos para sua aplicação. / This paper seeks to debate the constitutional freedom of information under an aspect not common to Brazilian constitutional law. The departure point is the reporters privilege, constitutionally protected for professionals by law. That rule seems assume a possible and clear distinction between journalists and other citizens. But how to understand it under a scenario where: a) the technological conditions allow any citizen, with very cheap or barely existing costs, to publish information for an indistinct number of people, and; b) the Supreme Federal Court has recognized that the State may not license journalists by a college degree diploma? Thus, the background subject of this paper is the possibility that the State differentiates journalists from other citizens in regard to the concession of prerogatives for the exercise of the freedom of information. In the United States, this has been a relevant debate at least since de 1970s. The main aspects are presented: on one hand, the Supreme Courts case law that has systematically denied to differentiate exclusive rights deriving from the Press Clause in comparison to the Speech Clause; on the other hand, the functional and institutional approaches to freedom of the press, respectively representing the authors favorable and critics to that judicial construction. Finally, taking on from a critic perspective and adopting legal fundaments, it seeks to analyze the constitutional rule of the reporters privilege and to propose interpretative standards for it.

Despite the fact that the issue has been discussed for several decades, there are still no rules in Sweden mandating political parties and candidates to disclose received donations. Because of this lack of transparency, Sweden is not fulfilling some of its international obligations and has fallen behind in the international trend to increase the transparency of election campaign finance. The lack of disclosure rules in Sweden has led to extensive criticism, most notably from the Council of Europe´s group of states against corruption, Greco, who criticized Sweden in light of the guidelines on the subject from the Council of Europe. At this writing, a new proposal for disclosure rules is being prepared at the Department of Justice, DoJ. The proposal is to be presented in spring 2013. For the time being, the only thing that exists regarding transparency of election finance in Sweden is an agreement from 2000, struck between some of the parties in parliament, to voluntarily disclose some of their received donations. In 2004 a government report proposed implementing disclosure rules. The proposal received extensive criticism from the reviewing bodies regarding its compliance with the rights protection in the Swedish Instrument of Government, RF. RF provides absolute protection against the government forcing individuals to disclose their opinions in political matters and absolute protection against the government keeping records of individuals' political opinions. Since these rights are absolute, they can be restricted only by constitutional amendment. It is uncertain if disclosure rules can be considered infringements under these absolute provisions, but even if they are considered infringements, it is likely that the disclosure provisions can be designed so as not to violate the RF absolute protections. Furthermore, RF provides relative protection of the freedom of expression and association. Disclosure rules would probably not infringe the freedom of expression but are likely to be considered infringements of the freedom of association. Restrictions of the freedom of association can only be implemented in the order specified in RF and since the order for restricting the freedom of association is very rigid, it is unlikely that such a restriction would be allowed under the current RF. The DoJ has expressed that the pending proposal will not include a proposal for a constitutional amendment. For Sweden to fulfill its international obligations in regards of transparency in campaign finance, more extensive disclosure rules must be implemented than those included in the agreement between some parties in parliament and those included in the 2004 proposal. The DoJ has expressed, however, that the pending proposal will be modeled upon both the voluntary agreement and the 2004 proposal. It is therefore not entirely unlikely that the pending proposal will be either illegal under the constitution or not far reaching enough, or both. / I Sverige saknas regler som kräver av politiska partier och kandidater att redovisa mottagna donationer (redovisningskrav). Detta trots att frågan diskuterats under flera decennier. Frånvaron av redovisningskrav innebär att Sverige inte uppfyller vissa av sina internationella åtaganden och att Sverige halkat efter i den mycket tydliga internationella trenden att öka transparensen kring valkampanjernas finansiering. Frånvaron har även lett till omfattande kritik, framförallt från Europarådets grupp mot korruption, Greco, som kritiserat bristen utifrån Europarådets riktlinjer i ämnet. I skrivande stund bereds vid Justitiedepartementet ett förslag till redovisningskrav som kommer att presenteras under våren 2013. Tills vidare är det enda som finns avseende transparens i valkampanjfinansieringen en överenskommelse från 2000, mellan några av partierna i Riksdagen om att frivilligt redovisa vissa mottagna bidrag. År 2004 föreslog en offentlig utredning införandet av redovisningskrav. Förslaget mötte omfattande kritik från remissinstanserna gällande dess förenlighet med regeringsformens, RF:s, rättighetsskydd. RF innehåller ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna tvingar en enskild att tillkännage sin politiska åskådning och ett absolut skydd mot att det allmänna registrerar en enskilds politiska åskådning. Eftersom dessa skydd är absoluta kan de endast inskränkas genom grundlags-ändring. Det är osäkert om redovisningskrav kan anses vara inskränkningar av dessa absoluta skydd. Om redovisningskrav är inskränkningar av dessa absoluta rättigheter torde det ändock vara möjligt att utforma kraven så att de är förenliga med skydden. RF innehåller även relativa skydd för yttrandefrihet och föreningsfrihet. Redovisningskrav skulle förmodligen inte vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för yttrandefriheten men troligtvis vara en inskränkning av RF:s skydd för föreningsfrihet. Detta innebär att inskränkningen endast får göras enligt i RF stadgad ordning. Eftersom möjligheterna att inskränka föreningsfriheten enligt RF är mycket små är det tveksamt om en sådan inskränkning är möjlig att införa utan grundlagsändring. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att det nya förslaget inte kommer att inkludera något förslag till grundlagsändring. För att Sverige ska uppfylla sina internationella åtaganden avseende öppenhet i valfinansieringen måste mer långtgående redovisningskrav införas än de som ingår i den frivilliga överenskommelsen och som föreslogs av utredningen 2004. Justitiedepartementet har dock uttryckt att just utredningen från 2004 och den frivilliga överenskommelsen ska ligga till grund för de nya redovisningskraven. Det är alltså inte helt osannolikt att det kommande förslaget till redovisningskrav kommer att vara antingen oförenlig med regeringsformen eller inte tillräckligt långtgående, eller både och

In this thesis I address the question of sympathetic action - action by one group of workers designed to aid another group of workers in their struggle with an employer, manifested most obviously through refusals by workers to cross a picket line - through the lens of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. As the law currently stands in Canada, undertaking sympathetic action collectively is invariably illegal as it is considered an illegal "strike" under Canadian labour legislation. Further, workers who undertake sympathetic action - whether collectively or individually - can be subject to discipline or discharge by their employer. I argue that workers who undertake sympathetic action can have numerous motivations, ranging from economic self-interest to deeply-held political or moral beliefs (the latter manifested through the concept of "solidarity"), and that when those motivations include expressive or conscientious interests, sympathetic action should be entitled to protection by the fundamental freedoms of conscience, expression, and association found in section 2 of the Charter. I further argue that a each of these freedoms represents a different aspect of the inherent dignity and worth of an individual, and that a right to sympathetic action promotes both those freedoms and Charter values. Finally, I argue that a constitutional right to sympathetic action is a free-standing right that can exist even in the absence of a constitutional right to strike. This thesis reviews the current and historical state of Canadian law (in both the statutory labour relations regimes and in common law) regarding sympathetic action, the potential application of the Charter freedoms of conscience, expression, and association to sympathetic action, and finally options for reform that reduce or eliminate restrictions on sympathetic action and therefore make our labour relations system more in keeping with Charter values.

No description available.

Este trabalho procura debater a liberdade constitucional de informação sob um viés não usual ao direito constitucional brasileiro. Seu ponto de partida é a proteção ao sigilo de fonte para jornalistas profissionais, consagrada pelo texto constitucional. Essa regra parece pressupor uma distinção possível e clara entre jornalistas e demais cidadãos. Mas como compreendê-la em um cenário atual no qual: a) as condições tecnológicas permitem que qualquer cidadão, a um custo baixo ou quase inexistente, publique informações para um número indistinto de pessoas, e; b) o Supremo Tribunal Federal tenha reconhecido que o Estado não pode exigir a obtenção de um diploma de ensino superior para diferenciar a categoria de jornalistas? Logo, o pano de fundo deste trabalho é a possibilidade de o Estado diferenciar jornalistas de demais cidadãos com relação à concessão de prerrogativas para o exercício da liberdade de informação. Nos Estados Unidos, esse é um debate relevante ao menos desde a década de 1970. São apresentados seus principais aspectos: por um lado, a jurisprudência de sua Suprema Corte, que se negou sistematicamente a diferenciar direitos próprios à liberdade de imprensa (Press Clause) em comparação com a liberdade de expressão (Speech Clause); por outro, as abordagens funcional e institucional à liberdade de imprensa, composta respectivamente por autores favoráveis e críticos àquela linha jurisprudencial. Ao final, a partir de uma perspectiva crítica e da adoção de fundamentos jurídicos, busca-se analisar a regra constitucional do sigilo de fonte e propor parâmetros interpretativos para sua aplicação. / This paper seeks to debate the constitutional freedom of information under an aspect not common to Brazilian constitutional law. The departure point is the reporters privilege, constitutionally protected for professionals by law. That rule seems assume a possible and clear distinction between journalists and other citizens. But how to understand it under a scenario where: a) the technological conditions allow any citizen, with very cheap or barely existing costs, to publish information for an indistinct number of people, and; b) the Supreme Federal Court has recognized that the State may not license journalists by a college degree diploma? Thus, the background subject of this paper is the possibility that the State differentiates journalists from other citizens in regard to the concession of prerogatives for the exercise of the freedom of information. In the United States, this has been a relevant debate at least since de 1970s. The main aspects are presented: on one hand, the Supreme Courts case law that has systematically denied to differentiate exclusive rights deriving from the Press Clause in comparison to the Speech Clause; on the other hand, the functional and institutional approaches to freedom of the press, respectively representing the authors favorable and critics to that judicial construction. Finally, taking on from a critic perspective and adopting legal fundaments, it seeks to analyze the constitutional rule of the reporters privilege and to propose interpretative standards for it.

Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering / Balasubramaniam Natarajan / Dale E. Schinstock / In this dissertation, two applications related to vision-based localization and mapping are considered: (1) improving navigation system based satellite location estimates by using on-board camera images, and (2) deriving position information from video stream and using it to aid an auto-pilot of an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV). In the first part of this dissertation, a method for analyzing a minimization process called bundle adjustment (BA) used in stereo imagery based 3D terrain reconstruction to refine estimates of camera poses (positions and orientations) is presented. In particular, imagery obtained with pushbroom cameras is of interest. This work proposes a method to identify cases in which BA does not work as intended, i.e., the cases in which the pose estimates returned by the BA are not more accurate than estimates provided by a satellite navigation systems due to the existence of degrees of freedom (DOF) in BA. Use of inaccurate pose estimates causes warping and scaling effects in the reconstructed terrain and prevents the terrain from being used in scientific analysis. Main contributions of this part of work include: 1) formulation of a method for detecting DOF in the BA; and 2) identifying that two camera geometries commonly used to obtain stereo imagery have DOF. Also, this part presents results demonstrating that avoidance of the DOF can give significant accuracy gains in aerial imagery. The second part of this dissertation proposes a vision based system for UAV navigation. This is a monocular vision based simultaneous localization and mapping (SLAM) system, which measures the position and orientation of the camera and builds a map of the environment using a video-stream from a single camera. This is different from common SLAM solutions that use sensors that measure depth, like LIDAR, stereoscopic cameras or depth cameras. The SLAM solution was built by significantly modifying and extending a recent open-source SLAM solution that is fundamentally different from a traditional approach to solving SLAM problem. The modifications made are those needed to provide the position measurements necessary for the navigation solution on a UAV while simultaneously building the map, all while maintaining control of the UAV. The main contributions of this part include: 1) extension of the map building algorithm to enable it to be used realistically while controlling a UAV and simultaneously building the map; 2) improved performance of the SLAM algorithm for lower camera frame rates; and 3) the first known demonstration of a monocular SLAM algorithm successfully controlling a UAV while simultaneously building the map. This work demonstrates that a fully autonomous UAV that uses monocular vision for navigation is feasible, and can be effective in Global Positioning System denied environments.

LD2668 .T4 1954 N45 / Master of Science