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In the following study, the writer has considered the figure of the knight as it appears in Eichendorff'a narrative prose works, particularly the two novels, "Ahnung und Gegenwart" and "Dichter und ihre Gesellen", and two Märchennovellen, "Die Zauberei im Herbste" and "Das Marmorbild". The knight is not necessarily good: he may embody evil principles, or, through weakness, succumb to the daemonic forces in nature. Generally, however, the knight possesses strong religious faith and its attendant virtues of loyalty, patriotism, and service to others. Whereas Eichendorff's strong religious stand varies from the usual Romantic pattern, his association of art and metaphysics is typically Romantic: the knight may also be a poet or become a priest. The knights of the Napoleonic era, that is, those in "Ahnung und Gegenwart", turn away from society, but those in the later works participate actively in mundane affairs. Indeed, in the end, Eichendorff comes to acknowledge the incidence of chivalrous behaviour in persons not born to knightly estate. / Arts, Faculty of / Central Eastern Northern European Studies, Department of / Graduate

Leibniz's 'Von der Allmacht and Allwissenheit Gottes and der Freiheit des Mensched is obscure and misunderstood. First I do a close reading of the work. Then I will discuss some scholarly interpretations, as well as VdA's place in Leibniz's thought. I challenge two scholarly assumptions--the first being that Leibniz rejected then accepted privation theory. I argue that there are two types of privation theories, using illustrative historical examples, and that Leibniz objected to one and adopted the other. Secondly, many scholars opine that the Confessio is a juvenile Theodicy. I take VdA to be an important predecessor to the Theodicy due to similarities in style, content and method. Finally, I link Leibniz's definition of possibility in VdA with an important connection between truth and existence. In this respect, Leibniz's ideas of possibility and conceivability are the forerunners of a current topic in philosophy.

Also published as inaugural dissertation, Marburg. / "Literatur": 3d prelim. leaf.

Dissertação (mestrado)—Universidade de Brasília, Instituto de Ciências Humanas, Departamento de Filosofia, Programa de Pós-Graduação em Filosofia, 2014. / Submitted by Jaqueline Ferreira de Souza (jaquefs.braz@gmail.com) on 2014-12-30T10:49:18Z No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Guimaraes Jacqueline(jacqueline.guimaraes@bce.unb.br) on 2014-12-30T11:45:51Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2014-12-30T11:45:51Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 2014_JadsonAlvesdeFreitas.pdf: 1376905 bytes, checksum: 992a6d81a61086acacdd6595e8b309da (MD5) / A questão sobre o que torna um sistema filosófico uma monadologia é esclarecedora e importante, uma vez que ajuda a entender algumas ideias e abre caminhos para maneiras alternativas de pensar a substancialidade, distinta das rotas norteadoras do pensamento ocidental, oriundas de Aristóteles e Descartes. Essa é a proposta deste trabalho: analisar as bases da monadologia de Leibniz como intuição para a formação de uma ideia geral sobre sistemas compostos por mônadas. Nesse âmbito, a concepção leibniziana das mônadas expressa uma rota específica na qual relações são anteriores às substâncias e tudo está conectado em um mundo onde a modalidade fundamental é a compossibilidade. Leibniz pensa suas mônadas organizadas de modo que cada uma, de certa maneira, prefigura todas as outras. No contraste com ele, as ideias de pensadores como Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer e Quine, provam reter importantes elementos de uma monadologia enquanto rejeitam algumas dessas assunções específicas a Leibniz. Desse modo, elas permitem um diálogo conceitual com Leibniz, ao mesmo tempo indicando um outro caminho para a articulação dos pressupostos centrais de uma monadologia. O que emerge é uma monadologia em um sentido amplo que seria independente da maneira específica que Leibniz entendia suas mônadas. Cinco características fundamentais para a ideia de uma monadologia em geral são apresentadas e discutidas. Essas podem ser usadas para comparar diferentes sistemas de mônadas e posteriormente, entender melhor as opções concebidas por Leibniz. ______________________________________________________________________________ ABSTRACT / The issue concerning what makes a philosophical system a monadology is both enlightening and important, for it sheds new light into some ideas and paves the way for alternative ways to think of substantiality, different from the Western thought guiding ways of Aristotle and Descartes. That is the aim of this work: to analyze the foundations of Leibniz’s monadology as intuition for the development of a general idea about systems composed of monads. In that respect, the Leibnizian conception of monads show a specific way in which relations are prior to substances and everything is connected together in a world where the fundamental modality is that of compossibility. Leibniz thinks of his monads as concerted, in a way that each one somehow prefigures all the others. In contrast to Leibniz, the ideas of thinkers such as Tarde, Whitehead, Latour, Schaffer, and Quine prove to retain important elements of a monadology while rejecting some of these assumptions specific to Leibniz. As such, they allow a conceptual dialogue with Leibniz, at the same time indicating another way for the articulation of the central tenets of a monadology. What emerges is a monadology in a broad sense that would be independent from the specific manner Leibniz understood his monads. Five characteristics, imperative to the idea of a monadology in general, are presented and discussed. These characteristics can be used to compare different systems of monads and, in turn, to further understand the options devised by Leibniz.

In Ahnung und Gegenwart Eichendorff makes no specific reference to the subject of happiness. Because of this, this theme must be explored indirectly through an analysis of the society and characters depicted in the novel. By abstracting those characteristics which Eichendorff describes as creating happiness in the society and the individual one can construct a thesis representing his views in this regard. In this novel Eichendorff contrasts two societies— the artificial permissive society of the court, whose attitudes he satirizes, and the wholesome rural society, whose attitudes he condones. The latter conserves the traditional Christian-Germanic virtues of "treue Sitte und Frömmigkeit" and, as such, one assumes, represents the author's ideal of the truly happy society. Eichendorff recognizes individual differences and realises that human beings seek happiness in many different ways. He realizes that men and women differ radically in this respect. Men seek happiness primarily through a career. Women seek it in love. Eichendorff also realizes the variation in human temperament which transcends sexual differences. He realizes that extroverts seek happiness actively in the world— possibly in some political commitment—and are likely to seek fulfillment through marriage. (This is true of Leontin.) Introverts, on the other hand, tend to seek fulfillment through their own inner resources—through the practice of art or religion. They are also more apt to sublimate their desire for human love into some aesthetic or spiritual ideal. (This is true of Friedrich.) But although Eichendorff does not prescribe any particular form of human fulfillment, he does prescribe the conditions under which happiness is to be sought. He is convinced that there are certain inner qualities which the individual must possess if he is to achieve it. These are the same qualities which motivate the ideal rural society, "treue Sitte und Frömmigkeit," morality and religion. Only by subjecting himself to these ordering influences can the individual attain peace and harmony, the fruits of happiness. If the individual does not subject himself to them, his life becomes disordered and he shatters on life. Morality is necessary to protect the individual from disturbing emotional experiences which may disrupt his life. Spirituality is necessary to ensure the inner equilibrium which is conducive to happiness. Eichendorff, however, does not present a facile, Victorian view of life. Although he stresses the necessity of morality and religion as bases of an ordered and happy life, he nowhere promulgates the naive view that all individuals are capable of exercising these virtues. He realizes that all individuals are limited by heredity and environment and that, consequently, "will-power" itself is an inherited, or acquired, characteristic. Not all individuals, when frustrated in their search for happiness have the capacity to restrain themselves by morality or sublimate themselves in religion. (Thus, Romana commits suicide, Erwin dies of a broken heart, and Rudolf escapes into a life of magic.) Eichendorff does not give preference to any particular form of human fulfillment. Nevertheless it is not unreasonable to assume that Friedrich, from whose viewpoint the novel is written, represents Eichendorff1s ideal of human development. Friedrich is a contemplative, a self-contained personality able to attain fulfillment through his own inner resources. He is able to experience the joy of creativity and that of an intimate relationship with God, profound human experiences unrelated to the vicissitudes of the external world. His happiness is thus more enduring than- that of those who seek it outside of themselves. And yet, although he is physically isolated from the world, he has the assurance of serving it in the most meaningful manner. Through his prayers as a religious he hopes to reawaken those forces of morality and religion which alone will restore happiness to his society. / Arts, Faculty of / Central Eastern Northern European Studies, Department of / Graduate

M.A. ( German Language) / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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It is now taken for granted that the globe is divided into mutually exclusive territories, each of which belong to a particular community. To be a political community, it is thought, means to have sole possession of a piece of the Earth’s surface and to have complete authority over that land. Yet the history of political thought has little to tell us about when and how this conception arose. I argue that the first complete statement of this doctrine of the territorial state emerged with Emer de Vattel’s The Law of Nations in 1758. Vattel’s doctrine synthesized three ideas which had been developing in the genres of natural law and the law of nations since the Peace of Westphalia: the state was supreme over its territory; it possessed independent moral personality; and it was tied to a permanent human community. This dissertation recovers the ideological resources of territorial state formation by tracing the philosophical roots of these ideas in Samuel von Pufendorf, John Locke, and Christian Wolff. I argue that although Vattel’s doctrine would appear as an ideal type, it was in fact provincially rooted in the narrow context of former dynastic fiefdoms in the Holy Roman Empire. I reach this conclusion through a spatial contextualist method of reading canonical texts in the natural law and law of nations traditions. I find that the shared linguistic practices that emerged to conceptualize and defend territorial states often relied upon assuming preexisting communities who laid claim to the land as their ‘native country.’

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