This dissertation examines Matthew Arnold's belief in the role the State must play in actualizing the ideals of the French Revolution in Victorian England by exploring parallels between Arnold's development and implementation of this belief and similar elements present in G.W.F. Hegel's philosophy. Beginning with Arnold's early engagement with the Bhagavad-Gita, moving into the preface to his 1853 volume of poems, and finally ending with his more mature religious, political, and social works, this dissertation traces the sources and development of Arnold's criticism of what he perceives as a widely held and dangerous antipathy towards State interference in the civil sphere in Victorian England. Believing this trajectory wrongheaded, Arnold asserts his belief in the connection between a strong State power and the emergence of true subjective freedom within a polity. By placing Arnold's texts and ideas alongside selections from Hegel's work, including On the Episode of the Mahabharata Known as the Bhagavad-Gita by Wilhelm von Humboldt, the preface to The Philosophy of Right, and some of Hegel's early theological writings, one realizes that Arnold's belief in both subjective freedom and a strong State power demonstrates a sustained and parallel engagement with Hegel's own commitment to both the ideals of the French Revolution and the role that a strong State power plays in actualizing those ideals.

Franz Rosenzweig (1886-1929) is known today as one of the most influential German Jewish intellectuals of the twentieth century. His most celebrated work, The Star of Redemption, has earned him a reputation as a challenging religious thinker with increasing relevance for contemporary religious, philosophical and historical debates. However, this legacy has largely ignored his first published book, Hegel and the State (1920). My dissertation is the first English-language monograph to fully explore Rosenzweig's intellectual biography of Hegel, making a contribution to contemporary Hegel and Rosenzweig scholarship alike. I offer an analysis that draws on the formal characteristics of the work--such as the epigraph, the narrative and biographical structure, as well as the historical presuppositions of the foreword and the conclusion--to show how Rosenzweig's interpretation of Hegel's key texts, culminating in the Philosophy of Right, is informed by his own biographical development and the influence of thinkers such as Wilhelm Dilthey and Friedrich Meinecke. By recasting his critique of Hegel's political thinking into biographical and historical terms, I ultimately argue that Rosenzweig's narrative in Hegel and the State is a tragic foil for his own development as a German historian. In Rosenzweig's interpretation, the relationship between the individual and the state championed by Hegel ends in the tragic separation of the individual from the reconciliatory promise of Idealist thought. By unearthing Rosenzweig's latent theory of tragedy in Hegel and the State--evidenced most clearly in how he situates the figures of Friedrich Hölderlin and Napoleon--I argue that the historical and philosophical crisis that marked the beginning of the twentieth century, and particularly Rosenzweig's own biographical crisis, shapes his work as the author of Hegel and the State. In addition to providing a critical commentary on the cultural, philosophical and literary history of the German nation, as well as providing the first English translation of many passages from Hegel and the State, my dissertation lays the necessary groundwork for a reinterpretation of Rosenzweig's critique of German Idealism in The Star of Redemption.

Recent work on the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel has emphasized his interest in skeptical concerns. These contemporary scholars argue that, despite common opinions to the contrary, Hegel actually had a very keen interest in skepticism, one that informed and motivated much of his overall project. While I welcome this recent literature, I argue here that contemporary scholars have overemphasized the importance of skepticism for Hegel. By looking closely at Hegel’s arguments against skepticism in the Phenomenology of Spirit, I argue that Hegel’s anti-skeptical arguments are in fact major failures. Hegel’s failure is at odds with the emphasis that contemporary literature places on Hegel’s interests in skepticism. For a philosopher who was supposedly centrally concerned with skeptical issues, Hegel sure does not act like it. I conclude that the tension here is the result of contemporary scholars’ overemphasis of the role that skepticism plays in Hegel’s project.

Cette thèse s’intéresse au traitement de la notion de vie au sein du système hégélien. Que ce soit comme vie logique, organique ou comme vie de l’esprit, cette notion représente un élément structurant dans le discours philosophique de Hegel. À un point tel que l’on peut, à partir de la systématicité dynamique de la vie et du vivant tel qu’ils sont thématisés chez Hegel, penser le caractère dynamique et vivant du système hégélien. Ce faisant, nous sommes en mesure de situer l’entreprise hégélienne dans le contexte de la philosophie postkantienne visant à un renouvellement de la pratique philosophique comme philosophie vivante capable d’articuler raison spéculative et vie pratique. Cela permet également de mieux situer l’entreprise hégélienne vis-à-vis des critiques tendant à faire de son système un système clos et ossifié. Partant du système hégélien tel qu’il se présente au cours de la période berlinoise au sein de l’Encyclopédie des sciences philosophiques, nous retraçons ainsi l’entreprise hégélienne dans sa volonté de penser à la fois la vie de la pensée et la rationalité du vivant.

Kierkegaard is generally regarded as a quintessential individualist who leaves no room for social or political engagement. This interpretation is the dominant lens through which many scholars view Kierkegaard, and it also shapes the way Kierkegaard’s thought has been received by his followers and critics. Many recent works have significantly challenged the traditional interpretation of Kierkegaard, but they have not examined the topic systematically. In order to remedy this deficit, this study provides a holistic account of Kierkegaard’s social thought. First, it challenges the dominant view that society as represented by the crowd is simply a foil for Kierkegaard’s individual by: (a) articulating a general approach for understanding how Kierkegaard’s negative comments about society and community do not constitute a rejection of sociality as such, and (b) demonstrating that Kierkegaard’s well-developed ideas on faith and religiosity are compatible with an account that emphasizes a broader social dimension in his thought. Second, I present a framework that outlines a positive theory of community, a ‘Dialectic of Community,’ which explains the importance of the Kierkegaardian single individual in the formation and development of community. This framework provides an interpretation of the social period of Kierkegaard’s authorship and its importance for the entirely of the authorship. Even though the interpretation is helpful for understanding Kierkegaard and his relationship to 19th and 20th century European moral, social, and political thought, Kierkegaard never explicitly describes how his conception of the self is consistent with his social thought. I address this problem by developing a narrative model of selfhood that illustrates the importance of subjectivity and the single individual for an adequate account of intersubjective selfhood. More specifically, I argue that narratives are important intersubjectively for becoming a person and a moral agent, but the concept of self is not exhausted in narrative. That is, having a self-narrative presupposes that the person is a subject who has a set of principles that organize one’s experiences and activities. This framework not only shows how Kierkegaard’s concept of subjectivity can be understood in a social context, but it also addresses a significant problem in narrative identity theory.

O sujeito de direito é uma forma social específica do capitalismo. O seu desenvolvimento completo pode ser verificado apenas em vista do advento de relações de produção que determinam a redução da força de trabalho à forma de mercadoria. A sua universalização é a universalização de sujeitos proprietários de si, que se realizam como sujeitos de direito na medida em que dispõe de si mesmos como mercadorias. Em Kant, pode-se verificar uma concepção imperfeita deste sujeito: o ius realiter personale, que guarda resquícios da produção feudal, permite a posse de um trabalhador como se fosse uma coisa e, assim, implica sacrifício da universalidade da personalidade jurídica. Em Hegel, o sujeito de direito encontra o seu conceito mais desenvolvido, aparece como sujeito capaz de realizar plenamente a sua liberdade pela coisificação e alienação de si mesmo, em sintonia com uma sociedade capitalista já consolidada. Em Marx, por fim, o sujeito de direito pode ter desvelada a sua determinação histórica real e encontra a sua crítica mais contundente no conjunto da crítica da economia política. / The legal subject is a specific social form of capitalism. Its complete development can be achieved only with the advent of relations of productions that require the reduction of labor power to the form of commodity. Its universalization is the universalization of proprietors of themselves that act as legal subjects in so far as dispose of themselves as commodities. In Kant, it is found an imperfect concept of this subject: the ius realiter personale, which retains some remnants of the feudal production, allows the possession of a laborer as if he was a thing and so implies the sacrifice of the universality of the legal personality. In Hegel, the legal subject finds its most developed concept, appearing as a subject able to fully accomplish his freedom through the reification and alienation of himself, in accordance with an already consolidated capitalist society. In Marx, finally, can be unveiled the real historical determination of the legal subject and this form can find its sharpest critic within the overall of the critique of political economy.

In this paper, I discuss the connection between happiness and reason in the work of Herder, Kant, and Hegel. First, I consider Herder’s integration of satisfaction and rationality and Kant’s complete separation of rational imperatives from particular experience. I discuss (and partially endorse) Kant’s critique of Herder as arbitrary and overly reliant on analogy. I then turn to Hegel’s response to this debate. I argue that Hegel’s Phenomenology provides an integration of happiness (in the broad, Aristotelian sense) and reason that is not subject to the same pitfalls as Herder’s solution. I examine two examples of rational critique in the Phenomenology and conclude with brief remarks about happiness and the rational society in Hegel’s work.

O sujeito de direito é uma forma social específica do capitalismo. O seu desenvolvimento completo pode ser verificado apenas em vista do advento de relações de produção que determinam a redução da força de trabalho à forma de mercadoria. A sua universalização é a universalização de sujeitos proprietários de si, que se realizam como sujeitos de direito na medida em que dispõe de si mesmos como mercadorias. Em Kant, pode-se verificar uma concepção imperfeita deste sujeito: o ius realiter personale, que guarda resquícios da produção feudal, permite a posse de um trabalhador como se fosse uma coisa e, assim, implica sacrifício da universalidade da personalidade jurídica. Em Hegel, o sujeito de direito encontra o seu conceito mais desenvolvido, aparece como sujeito capaz de realizar plenamente a sua liberdade pela coisificação e alienação de si mesmo, em sintonia com uma sociedade capitalista já consolidada. Em Marx, por fim, o sujeito de direito pode ter desvelada a sua determinação histórica real e encontra a sua crítica mais contundente no conjunto da crítica da economia política. / The legal subject is a specific social form of capitalism. Its complete development can be achieved only with the advent of relations of productions that require the reduction of labor power to the form of commodity. Its universalization is the universalization of proprietors of themselves that act as legal subjects in so far as dispose of themselves as commodities. In Kant, it is found an imperfect concept of this subject: the ius realiter personale, which retains some remnants of the feudal production, allows the possession of a laborer as if he was a thing and so implies the sacrifice of the universality of the legal personality. In Hegel, the legal subject finds its most developed concept, appearing as a subject able to fully accomplish his freedom through the reification and alienation of himself, in accordance with an already consolidated capitalist society. In Marx, finally, can be unveiled the real historical determination of the legal subject and this form can find its sharpest critic within the overall of the critique of political economy.

No description available.

Dans le cadre de cette thèse, nous nous proposons d’explorer la patiente explication que Heidegger a poursuivie avec Hegel à propos de l’origine de la négativité – problème qui s’impose de fait à titre d’« unique pensée d’une pensée qui pose la question de l’être ». Partant du constat d’une affinité insoupçonnée entre les deux penseurs quant au rôle insigne qui doit revenir à la négation en philosophie, nous entendons percer à jour les motifs de la constante fin de non-recevoir que Heidegger oppose néanmoins à la méthode dialectique de son plus coriace adversaire. Afin de rendre justice aux différents rebondissements d’une explication en constante mutation, et qui, de surcroît, traverse l’ensemble de l’œuvre de Heidegger, nous procédons à une division chronologique qui en circonscrit les quatre principaux moments. I. En un premier temps, notre regard se porte ainsi sur l’opposition résolue que le jeune Heidegger manifeste à l’égard de la montée du néo-hégélianisme, au nom d’une appropriation toute personnelle de l’intuitionnisme husserlien. Les transformations auxquelles il soumet la méthode phénoménologique de son maître doivent néanmoins laisser transparaître un furtif emprunt à la dialectique hégélienne, dont le principal mérite serait d’avoir conféré une fonction productrice à la négation. II. Le propos d’Être et temps demeure toutefois bien discret quant à cette dette méthodologique, bien que ses vestiges se laissent exhumer, notamment sous la forme d’une négation contre-déchéante dont l’intervention essentielle ponctue l’analytique existentiale. C’est qu’un désaccord subsiste entre Heidegger et son prédécesseur quant à l’origine ontologique de la néantité, qui semble devoir se dérober à toute forme de sursomption dialectique. III. Loin d’être alors définitivement réglé, le problème de l’origine du négatif rejaillit au cœur d’une nouvelle mouture métaphysique du projet heideggérien, la minant peut-être même en son fond. Il s’agit en l’occurrence de disputer à Hegel une compréhension plus originaire du néant, comprise comme témoignage de la finitude de l’être lui-même et s’inscrivant en faux face à l’accomplissement spécifiquement hégélien de la métaphysique. IV. Des tensions qui ne sont pas étrangères à cette délicate entreprise entraînent toutefois Heidegger sur la voie d’un dépassement de l’onto-théo-logie et de l’achèvement technique que Hegel lui a préparé. Il s’agit dès lors de situer l’origine abyssale du négatif auprès d’un irréductible retrait de l’estre, à l’encontre de l’oubli nihiliste auquel Hegel l’aurait confinée en la résorbant au sein de l’absolue positivité de la présence. Par là même, Heidegger propose un concept de négation qu’il juge plus originaire que son contrepoids dialectique, négation à laquelle il attribue la forme d’une réponse interrogative, patiente et attentive à la réticence hésitante de l’événement appropriant. Mais est-ce suffisant pour soutenir qu’il parvient, en définitive, à se libérer de l’embarras dialectique qui semble coller à sa pensée et qui exige de lui un constant effort de distanciation ? Cette thèse entend contribuer à établir les conditions d’une décision à cet égard. / In this thesis we explore Heidegger’s patient engagement (Auseinandersetzung) with Hegel about the origin of negativity – an inescapable problem insofar as it is “the sole thought of a thinking that asks the question of Being”. We begin by noting an unsuspected affinity between the two thinkers with respect to the privileged role that negation must play in philosophy, and from there we elucidate the motives for why Heidegger nevertheless rejects the dialectical method of his toughest adversary. Heidegger’s engagement with Hegel evolved constantly over his entire oeuvre; in order to do it justice we therefore propose a chronology that delimits its four principal stages. I. Firstly, we examine the young Heidegger’s resolute opposition to the rise of Neo-Hegelianism in the name of a very personal appropriation of Husserl’s intuitionism. The modifications that Heidegger made to his master’s phenomenological method nevertheless reveal that he also surreptitiously borrowed from Hegelian dialectic, the principal merit of which was to have granted negation a positive function. II. Being and Time does not openly declare this methodological debt, yet traces of it can be found, notably in the form of a counter-falling negation that plays a marked and essential role in the existential analytic. A disagreement remained between Heidegger and his predecessor as to the ontological origin of nothingness, which seemed to elude any form of dialectical sublation. III. The problem of the origin of the negative, far from having been definitively settled, then resurged at the heart of a new conception of metaphysics within the Heideggerian project, perhaps even undermining its very foundations. Heidegger vied with Hegel for a more originary understanding of nothingness, one which he conceived as a testament to the finitude of Being itself and as opposed to the specifically Hegelian accomplishment of metaphysics. IV. However, the tensions inherent to this delicate enterprise led him to go beyond onto-theo-logy together with the technical completion that Hegel had envisioned for it. From then on, Heidegger sought to situate the abyssal origin of the negative in an irreducible refusal of Being – over against the nihilistic forgetfulness to which Hegel had confined it by having resorbed it into the absolute positivity of presence. In so doing Heidegger proposed a concept of negation that he deemed more originary than its dialectical counterpart, construing negation as an interrogative answer, patient and attentive to the hesitant refusal of the event (Ereignis). But can it ultimately be maintained that Heidegger thereby succeeded in freeing himself, once and for all, from the dialectical troubles that seemingly clung to his thought and from which he constantly strove to distance himself? The present thesis will contribute to settling this very question.