On the internal market within the EU, freedom of establishment under articles 49 and 54 TEU stipulates that companies have the right to set up businesses in other Member States. On the internal market there are 27 different national tax law systems which have caused obstacles regaring taxation between Member States. These obstacles have been shown deterrent when a company enters a new market. One problem area is the lack of cross-border loss compensation for groups. This means that cross-border groups is over taxed when they are unable to set of gains against losses. Within the EU, there is a constant process trying to resolve these problems, both short and long term. Regarding short term, the Court of Justice has presented a number of case law. The result from these is that Member States must give groups the right to crossborder loss compensation when the loss of the subsidiary is final. However, the case law did not solve the problems with over taxtion, instead they created difficulties for Member States regarding the interpretation of the cases due to the absence of a uniform principle to follow. Swedish tax legislation within the area is narrowly designed and allows cross-border loss compensation in few cases. The Commission has now announced a long-term solution in the form of a directive that means that Member States can use a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base. Adoption of the directive would eliminate the obstacles whitin the internal market. Cross-border groups would be fully recognized by being provided the opportunity to set off gains against losses in the entire group regardless of the place of orgin.

This thesis aims to conclude however the 2016 proposal of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) is compliant with the principles of subsidiarity or/and proportionality in regard to the functions of consolidation and allocation therein. This is done by, in order from major to minor, presenting the overall, international context of rules and structures wherein the proposal, if adopted, will enter into. The presentation contains, as said, a contextualization containing the primarily the judicial framework that surrounds the legislative process in the European Union. The principles central for this thesis, the principle of subsidiarity and proportionality is closely examined, in order to crystallize the model of judgement in regards to the compliance with these principles. Since the court of the European Union has been reluctant to deem legislative acts incompatible with the principles, and has given the legislator a wide area of discretion in assessing legislative acts compatibility with the former mentioned principles, the proposal in regards to the mentioned functions, doesn´t constitute a breach of the principles. Even though the proposal marks, what seems to be quite the infringement on what is usually perceived as the member states own affairs, this thesis shows that the proposal of the CCCTB is most likely compliant with the principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.

Efter ett 10 årigt arbete mot att harmonisera direkt beskattning inom EU har Kommissionen lagt fram ett förslag till direktiv avseende en gemensam konsoliderad bolagsskattebas (CCCTB). Syftet med förslaget är att företag som bedriver gränsöverskridande verksamhet endast ska behöva följa en regeluppsättning samt arbeta gentemot en skattemyndighet. Tanken är att resultaten från alla koncernens bolag inom EU slås samman och sedan portioneras ut till koncernföretagen genom en fördelningsnyckel. Kommissionen har angivit att konsolideringen ska medföra att medlemsstaterna kan konkurrera på lika villkor och att fördelningen av skattebasen ska ske rättvist mellan medlemsstaterna. Det finns medlemsstater som är osäkra på förslagets konsekvenser och medlemsstaternas konkurrensmöjligheter efter förslagets antagande. Därav, är syftet med uppsatsen att utreda om fördelningsnyckeln i förslaget medför att skattebasen fördelas rättvist mellan medlemsstaterna genom att medlemsstaterna har möjlighet att konkurrera på lika villkor på den inre marknaden. Fördelningsnyckeln består av tre komponenter; arbetskraft, tillgångar och försäljning. Den gemensamma skattebasen portioneras ut till företagen i relation till företagets andel av koncernens totala andel av komponenterna. Därefter har medlemsstaterna rätt att beskatta andelen tillhörande företagen etablerade i medlemsstaten med den nationella skattesatsen. Uppsatsen innehåller en analys avseende de beståndsdelarna i fördelningsnyckelns komponenter som kan tänkas påverka medlemsstaternas möjlighet att konkurrera på lika villkor. Uppsatsen diskuterar hur beståndsdelarna påvekar konkurrensen samt i vissa fall ges förslag på förändringar som kan leda till att komponenten medför att medlemsstaterna kan konkurrera på lika villkor och därmed erhålla en rättvis fördelning av skattebasen. / After 10 years of work towards harmonization of direct taxation within EU the Commission has proposed a directive on a common consolidated corporate tax base (CCCTB). The aim of the proposal is that companies who engage in cross-border activities only need to comply with one set of rules and work towards one tax authority. The idea is that the result from all companies inside EU within the group should be pooled and then portioned out to the individual companies through an allocation formula. The Commission has stated that the consolidation shall result in that member states can compete on equal terms and that the tax base is apportioned fairly between the member states. However, there are member states that are doubtful of the consequences of the proposal and the member states competitive opportunities after the adoption. Therefore, the aim of this paper is to examine if the allocation formula in the proposal result in that the tax base are apportioned fairly between the member states through the member states possibility to compete on equal terms within the internal market. The formula for apportionment consist of three components; labor, assets and sales. The common tax base will be portioned out to the companies in relation to the share of the company compared to the total share of the group of each component. Then, the member states have the right to tax the share that belongs to the companies that are established within the member state with the national tax rate. The thesis contains an analysis of the elements in the components of the allocation formula that could affect the opportunity of the member states to compete on equal terms. The thesis discusses how the elements affect the competition and in certain cases suggestions of changes in the elements are given that could lead to that the component result in that the member states can compete on equal terms and thereby hold a fair share of the tax base.