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1	MODELS, PERSPECTIVES, AND SCIENTIFIC REALISM: ON RONALD GIERE’S PERSPECTIVAL REALISM Huth, Brian R. 24 April 2014 (has links) No description available. Philosophy of Science Ronald Giere scientific realism relativism philosophy of science
2	Thomas Kuhn and Perspectival Realism O'Loughlin, Ryan J. 16 June 2017 (has links) No description available. Philosophy of Science Thomas Kuhn perspectivism perspectival realism scientific realism Giere incommensurability lexicon perspective
3	Naturalism & Objectivity: Methods and Meta-methods Miller, Jean Anne 19 August 2011 (has links) The error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies. / Ph. D. epistemology error statistics Giere Hurlbert micro-sociology of science minimal a priorism meta-methods methods Mayo Kitcher Latour Longino Collins relativism reflexivity replication social epistemologies relativism pseudo-replication philosophy of statistics misspecification testing naturalism new experimentalism normative naturalism objectivity philosophy of experiment philosophy of science

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