Thesis advisor: Richard Cobb-Stevens / In this dissertation, I develop an engaged understanding of objectivity, or good knowledge practices. I argue that for knowledge practices to be good, they must both be truth-conducive and engaged, that is, explicitly implicated in the critical appraisal of background values and assumptions. I pursue this argument in six stages. First, I consider work in epistemology that countenances a place for values in objectivity. I conclude from this that truth-conduciveness is not sufficient for objectivity, and that a social approach to knowledge is called for. Second, I consider standpoint theory, a prominent feminist approach to objectivity. This allows me to show the possible insights available to marginalized perspectives, while indicating that this will be a component of rather than itself offering an account of objectivity. Third, I consider a more comprehensive approach in Helen Longino's critical contextual empiricism, which locates objectivity in the social features of inquiry. Her approach is promising, but requires the insights of early phenomenology in order to develop that potential. I develop the phenomenological framework in Chapter 4, where I consider Husserlian phenomenology. Fifth, I bring the insights of phenomenology to the challenges presented by critical contextual empiricism, and develop my positive view, critical phenomenological objectivity. On this view, inquiry is objective when individuals and communities foster critical perspectives, seek transformative epistemic experiences, build coalitions, foster diversity, and pursue empirical adequacy. In the final chapter, I consider a case study that enables me to defend the merit and warrant of these features of objectivity. / Thesis (PhD) — Boston College, 2009. / Submitted to: Boston College. Graduate School of Arts and Sciences. / Discipline: Philosophy.

Qualquer um que leia tragédias gregas encontra momentos de elevação especial, de grandeza ou transcendência nos quais o texto parece transportar o leitor/espectador para fora de si mesmo, a uma esfera de emoção e significação extremas. Geralmente, como resultado de uma série de fatores, inclusive cênicos, esses momentos da ação dramática criam um efeito de assombro, surpresa e medo. Os personagens no palco e a platéia compartilham uma sensação do que pode ser chamado de sublimidade. São momentos em que sofrimento, prazer, inspiração ou insight parecem associados para criar um efeito através do qual o espectador é tomado pela emoção ou pelo entendimento, pelo envolvimento ou pelo distanciamento ou, melhor, por uma combinação desses estados. O efeito parece evidente em cenas do drama trágico, em particular das tragédias gregas e dos dramas trágicos shakespeareanos. Na tragédia grega, podem-se considerar sublimes a cena do tapete no Agamêmnon, de Ésquilo, a fala do disfarce do Ájax, de Sófocles, ou o grande discurso do segundo mensageiro, nas Bacantes, de Eurípides. A intenção deste trabalho é examinar algumas cenas passagens especialmente relevantes da tragédia grega e tentar traçar elementos estruturais que possam concorrer para a criação dessa sensação de elevação. É evidente que refiro-me ao sublime em termos até aqui subjetivos. É objetivo do trabalho fornecer algumas bases objetivas sobre as quais apoiar aquilo que chamo de momentos de elevação, grandeza e emoção extrema. / Anyone who reads Greek tragedy encounters moments of special elevation, greatness or transcendence in which the text seems to transport the reader/spectator out of himself to an sphere of heightened emotion and significance. Generally, as the result of a series of reasons, these moments in the action of the play create an effect of amazement, wonder and awe. During these moments, the characters on stage and the audience share a sensation of what may be called sublimity. It is the sort of moment in which either suffering, pleasure, inspiration or insight seem to associate to create an effect through which the spectator is taken by emotion or by understanding, by involvement or detachment, or better by a combination of these. The effect appears evident to me in scenes of tragic drama, particularly of Greek and Shakespearean tragedies. In Greek tragedy, one may consider as sublime some parts of the carpet scene in Aeschylus Agamemnon, the deception speech of Sophocles Ajax, or the second messenger speech in Euripides Bacchae. In Shakespeare, the apparition of the fathers ghost to Hamlet is stunning, and unleashes intense emotion and insight. The intention of this work is to examine some especially relevant passages of Greek tragedy and to try to trace structural elements that may concur to the creation of this sensation of elevation. It is evident that I refer to the sublime in subjective terms and, therefore, it is my aim to provide some objective ground upon which to support what I shall be identifying as moments of elevation, greatness and extreme emotion.

Qualquer um que leia tragédias gregas encontra momentos de elevação especial, de grandeza ou transcendência nos quais o texto parece transportar o leitor/espectador para fora de si mesmo, a uma esfera de emoção e significação extremas. Geralmente, como resultado de uma série de fatores, inclusive cênicos, esses momentos da ação dramática criam um efeito de assombro, surpresa e medo. Os personagens no palco e a platéia compartilham uma sensação do que pode ser chamado de sublimidade. São momentos em que sofrimento, prazer, inspiração ou insight parecem associados para criar um efeito através do qual o espectador é tomado pela emoção ou pelo entendimento, pelo envolvimento ou pelo distanciamento ou, melhor, por uma combinação desses estados. O efeito parece evidente em cenas do drama trágico, em particular das tragédias gregas e dos dramas trágicos shakespeareanos. Na tragédia grega, podem-se considerar sublimes a cena do tapete no Agamêmnon, de Ésquilo, a fala do disfarce do Ájax, de Sófocles, ou o grande discurso do segundo mensageiro, nas Bacantes, de Eurípides. A intenção deste trabalho é examinar algumas cenas passagens especialmente relevantes da tragédia grega e tentar traçar elementos estruturais que possam concorrer para a criação dessa sensação de elevação. É evidente que refiro-me ao sublime em termos até aqui subjetivos. É objetivo do trabalho fornecer algumas bases objetivas sobre as quais apoiar aquilo que chamo de momentos de elevação, grandeza e emoção extrema. / Anyone who reads Greek tragedy encounters moments of special elevation, greatness or transcendence in which the text seems to transport the reader/spectator out of himself to an sphere of heightened emotion and significance. Generally, as the result of a series of reasons, these moments in the action of the play create an effect of amazement, wonder and awe. During these moments, the characters on stage and the audience share a sensation of what may be called sublimity. It is the sort of moment in which either suffering, pleasure, inspiration or insight seem to associate to create an effect through which the spectator is taken by emotion or by understanding, by involvement or detachment, or better by a combination of these. The effect appears evident to me in scenes of tragic drama, particularly of Greek and Shakespearean tragedies. In Greek tragedy, one may consider as sublime some parts of the carpet scene in Aeschylus Agamemnon, the deception speech of Sophocles Ajax, or the second messenger speech in Euripides Bacchae. In Shakespeare, the apparition of the fathers ghost to Hamlet is stunning, and unleashes intense emotion and insight. The intention of this work is to examine some especially relevant passages of Greek tragedy and to try to trace structural elements that may concur to the creation of this sensation of elevation. It is evident that I refer to the sublime in subjective terms and, therefore, it is my aim to provide some objective ground upon which to support what I shall be identifying as moments of elevation, greatness and extreme emotion.

Feminist philosophy of science has long been considered a fringe element of philosophy of science as a whole. A careful consideration of the treatment of the key concept of objectivity by such philosophical heavyweights as Thomas Kuhn and Karl Popper, followed by an analysis of the concept of objectivity with the work of such feminist philosophers of science as Donna Haraway, Lynn Hankinson Nelson, and Sandra Harding, reveals that feminist philosophers of science are not members of some fringe movement of philosophy of science, but rather are doing philosophical work which is both crucial and connected to the work of other, "mainstream" philosophers of science. / Master of Arts

Vilken grundläggande idé utgår vi ifrån när vi talar om förnuft och rationalitet och vilka konsekvenser får detta för synen på individen, individen i samhället samt individen i datasystemet? Uppsaten belyser problematik rörande den icke-situerade individen, vilken inte är en individ utan snarare en skenbar produkt utav homogena värderingar.

The error statistical account provides a basic account of evidence and inference. Formally, the approach is a re-interpretation of standard frequentist (Fisherian, Neyman-Pearson) statistics. Informally, it gives an account of inductive inference based on arguing from error, an analog of frequentist statistics, which keeps the concept of error probabilities central to the evaluation of inferences and evidence. Error statistical work at present tends to remain distinct from other approaches of naturalism and social epistemology in philosophy of science and, more generally, Science and Technology Studies (STS). My goal is to employ the error statistical program in order to address a number of problems to approaches in philosophy of science, which fall under two broad headings: (1) naturalistic philosophy of science and (2) social epistemology. The naturalistic approaches that I am interested in looking at seek to provide us with an account of scientific and meta-scientific methodologies that will avoid extreme skepticism, relativism and subjectivity and claim to teach us something about scientific inferences and evidence produced by experiments (broadly construed). I argue that these accounts fail to identify a satisfactory program for achieving those goals and; moreover, to the extent that they succeed it is by latching on to the more general principles and arguments from error statistics. In sum, I will apply the basic ideas from error statistics and use them to examine (and improve upon) an area to which they have not yet been applied, namely in assessing and pushing forward these interdisciplinary pursuits involving naturalistic philosophies of science that appeal to cognitive science, psychology, the scientific record and a variety of social epistemologies. / Ph. D.