我國政府採購法第85條第3項規定，針對招標申訴審議判斷指明機關違反法令時，廠商得請求償付其準備投標、異議，申訴之必要費用，該請求權係根據「政府採購協定」所定。但由於政府採購法及相關法規均未規定該條項所定之請求權之法律定性為何，以及何謂必要費用等，而本法主管機關亦不做解釋，加上備標費用證明不易，使法院見解只能趨於保守，並產生許多爭議。 目前國內探討本條項規定之文獻數量極少，相關判決亦不多，因此筆者認為，除了從我國學說及實務見解出發之外，本條項既根據政府採購協定而訂定，則其他協定締約國法院對相似案例之見解，應亦可供我國法院參考。因此本文選擇同為政府採購協定締約國，且政府採購金額於世界名列前茅的美國、歐盟，以及英國作為選擇比較研究之對象，並採取實務判決見解分析、文獻研究，以及比較研究之研究方法。 第一章為序論，說明本研究之動機、目的、範圍以及方法。第二、三、四、五章則分別討論我國、美國、歐盟，以及英國之公共採購相關法規，並分析各國司法實務審理參與政府採購之廠商主張採購機關違反採購法規致其未得標，而請求投標、備標及申訴異議等費用，甚至請求其他賠償時，所可能肯認之請求權基礎、應否賠償之判斷標準、應得賠償之範圍，以及得賠償金額之審酌標準，並於各章提出各國較具代表性之具體案例，以了解各判斷標準之實際操作。第六章則參酌各國實務見解及判決，與我國採購法相關法條及實務見解加以分析比較，以提出筆者認為值得參考的審查標準，並提出修法建議，以為本文結論。 筆者於研究後認為，在程序部份，應放寬政府採購法第75條可提起異議申訴之當事人適格認定，並將同法第85條第1項明定為：「審議判斷或法院確定判決指明原採購行為違反法令者，招標機關應另為適法之處置。」而使第3項所稱之「第一項情形」包含司法判決確定時。關於實體部份，筆者認為政府採購法第85條第3項所規定之請求權似乎可定義為行政法上債務關係之締約過失賠償請求權，而建議將此條項修改為：「第一項情形，廠商得向招標機關請求賠償其準備投標、異議及申訴所支出之合理費用。」以釐清此請求權應屬廣義之國家對人民之賠償，並將賠償範圍由「必要」改為「合理」，以免實務見解過度限縮。此外，筆者並認為，此請求權為違反已經存在之債務關係義務而生之責任，與國家賠償法之賠償係不法行為所生之侵權賠償責任性質應屬不同而可能併存。因此，廠商若因機關違法而受有其他損害，並符合國家賠償法所定之要件，似乎亦可循國家賠償法請求賠償。 / In accordance with Article 85.3 of the Government Procurement Act of Taiwan, an unsuccessful tenderer of public procurement is entitled to recover the “necessary” costs he has incurred in his bid/proposal preparation and protest/complaint process if he has challenged the procuring agency’s relevant decision in time and the decision has been declared to be in breach of statutes and regulations by the review authority, the Public Construction Commission. This article is legislated according to the principle laid down by the Government Procurement Agreement that stipulates challenge procedures reviewing procuring agency’s decision shall provide compensation for the loss or damage suffered by the complaining tenderer. However, there have been a lot of disputes concerning the legal status of the basis of action stipulated in this article and the exact extent of the compensable costs since they have never been defined clearly by any statute or explained by the authority. Along with the difficulties in proving the relevancy and “necessity” of the expenses and costs, these disputes have driven the Administrative Court to take a very restrictive view in deciding the recoverable costs which in many cases may not be appropriate remedies for the complaining tenderers. With very limited literature focusing on the disputes arising from this article and a very small number of judgments of such cases in Taiwan, I attempt to explore the opinions expressed not only by Taiwan’s court and scholars but also by the courts of the other countries that are also parties to the GPA and have similar articles in their statutory law in order to offer a comparative perspective that will help resolving the differences concerning the interpretation of this article. Besides Taiwan, I have chosen to examine the judicial review of such cases in the USA, the UK and the EU since their public procurement budgets are on the top list of the world and they are all members of the GPA. The first chapter states the purpose, the extent and the method of this study. The second, third, fourth and fifth chapters respectively discuss the main public procurement regulations and analyze the judicial review standards concerning the basis of actions, the possible remedies and the extent of damages allowed in Taiwan, the USA, the EU and the UK (including the judicial system of England, Wales and the North Ireland and the judicial system of Scotland). In the final chapter, I try to offer a comparative view and to suggest possible changes to the relevant statues and review standards in Taiwan. After completing the research, I suggest that a prospected bidder should also be recognized as an interested party that has standing in making claims against procuring authority for damages in order to ensure judicial review of important procuring decisions. Besides, Article 85.1 of the Government Procurement Act of Taiwan should be revised as “where a review decision or an unappealable court judgment specifies that the procuring entity is in breach of Acts and Regulations, the procuring entity shall proceed with a lawful alternative,” so that the protesting bidder will have the right for damages endowed by Article 85.3 of the same act if the procuring decision in question has been declared in breach of law only by the court but not by the Public Construction Commission. The right for compensation of tender preparation and protest costs stipulated by article 85.3 of the Government Procurement Act should be defined as a right arising from the procuring authority’s liability based on culpa in contrahendo in administrative law. Therefore, this article should be revised as “where the circumstance set forth in paragraph 1 occurs, the supplier may request the procuring entity to reimburse the reasonable expenses incurred by the supplier for the preparation of tender and the filing of protest and complaint.” Besides, just as the liability based on culpa in contrahendo is different from the liability arising from tort and the former does not substitute for the later, an unsuccessful tenderer’s claim for compensation based on Article 85.3 of the Government Procurement Act should not exclude his right in making other claims for other loss or damage according to the State Compensation Law.

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

La responsabilité de protéger est un concept issu des travaux de la Commission internationale de l’intervention et de la souveraineté des États (CIISE). Établie en 2000 à l’initiative du CANADA, elle a recherché à dépasser les controverses inhérentes aux débats relatifs au « droit d’intervention humanitaire ». Aux fins d’atteindre cet objectif, la Commission a forgé un nouveau concept, la « responsabilité de protéger », qui permît de concilier, plutôt qu’opposer, les notions de souveraineté et d’intervention.<p>Depuis lors, la responsabilité de protéger a fait l’objet de vives controverses en droit international. Intégrée dans une résolution de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU en septembre 2005, appliquée par le Conseil de sécurité lors de la crise en LIBYE de mars 2011, le concept se trouve, aujourd’hui, au centre des débats se rapportant au cadre juridique de la protection des populations civiles.<p>La présente thèse entend examiner les différentes implications juridiques de la responsabilité de protéger, en optant pour une démarche résolument positiviste. La réflexion proposée tente d’en embrasser les différents aspects, tant conceptuels qu’opérationnels, aux fins d’aboutir à une étude globale, synthétique et actualisée du concept. Partant, une interrogation commandera l’ensemble de notre réflexion: l’émergence de la responsabilité de protéger a-t-elle, en droit international, permis une amélioration de la protection des populations civiles ? / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

University of Macau / Faculty of Law

Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Contrairement aux autres biens meubles, les navires, les aéronefs et les objets spatiaux affectés à la navigation internationale sont rattachés à un Etat. Le lien de droit public établi entre ces engins et l’Etat est communément appelé « nationalité ». Mais ce terme n’exprime pas à leur propos une institution à tous égards identique à la nationalité des personnes. Le rattachement examiné ne repose en effet pas sur des éléments de fait (naissance, ascendance etc.), mais uniquement sur un acte administratif interne, l’immatriculation. L’étude de la pratique, notamment des conventions internationales et des législations nationales, montre clairement que – contrairement à ce qu’on soutient souvent – il n’y a pas lieu de subordonner ce rattachement à un lien effectif. Ce qui importe, compte tenu notamment du fait que ces engins évoluent dans des espaces soustraits à toute compétence territoriale, est d’identifier l’Etat qui est seul compétent à l’égard de l’« ensemble organisé » formé par le véhicule, les personnes et la cargaison à bord, et qui est responsable de ses activités. Le droit international interdit dès lors la double immatriculation, mais il laisse aux Etats le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déterminer les conditions d’attribution de leur « nationalité », sans subordonner l’opposabilité internationale de celle-ci à quelque autre exigence que ce soit. Le danger est toutefois que cela favorise un certain laxisme de l’Etat d’immatriculation, ce qui exposerait au risque que des dommages graves soient causés aux personnes impliquées dans les activités de ces engins et – surtout – aux tiers. Mais ce sont les obligations internationales imposées et les droits corrélatifs reconnus dans le chef de l’Etat d’immatriculation qui sont déterminants à cet égard et non quelque mystérieuse « effectivité » du rattachement. Autrement dit, s’il n’est pas nécessaire d’imposer à l’Etat d’immatriculation des conditions internationales limitant sa liberté dans l’attribution de sa « nationalité » aux engins, il est indispensable d’exiger que celui-ci respecte ses obligations, c’est-à-dire exerce effectivement son contrôle et sa juridiction. Cette constatation se vérifie quel que soit l’engin en cause. Le rattachement créé par l’immatriculation constitue donc une institution "sui generis", commune aux navires, aéronefs et objets spatiaux et dont le régime juridique est encadré par le droit international. / Unlike any other movable property, ships, aircraft and space objects that are engaged in international navigation are linked to a State. The legal connection established between these craft/vessels and the State is commonly referred to as “nationality”. However, in this case the term does not represent an institution identical in all respects to the nationality of persons. With regard to vessels, the legal connection to a State is not based on factual elements (such as birth, descent etc.), but merely on the internal administrative act of registration. The study of State practice, notably international conventions and national laws, clearly shows that – contrary to what is often argued – there is no need to make this connection dependent on a pre-existing effective link. What matters most, given that these craft navigate in international space beyond the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign States, is to identify the State that holds sole jurisdiction over said “organized entity” consisting of the vehicle, the persons and the cargo on board and that is responsible for its activities. Public international law therefore prohibits dual registration, but leaves States free to determine the conditions under which they will confer their “nationality”, without imposing any other requirement for the opposability of this legal bond to third States. The danger is that this situation encourages laxity on the part of the States of registry and therefore creates the potential for serious damage incurred by persons involved in these vessels’ activities and – mostly – by third persons. In this regard, it is the international obligations and corresponding rights of the States of registry which are critical, and not a mysterious “effectiveness” of the legal bond. In other words, it is not necessary to impose on the State of registry any international conditions which would limit its freedom with regard to the conferral of its “nationality” upon vessels. It is however indispensable to require that said State complies with its obligations, meaning that it has to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control over those craft. This statement holds true regardless of the craft concerned. The legal bond created by the registration therefore constitutes a "sui generis" institution, common to ships, aircraft and space objects, and whose legal regime is governed by international law.