In 1992, the Americans completed its withdrawal from the Philippines, ending almost a century of U.S. military presence. However, it was soon discovered that the U.S. left behind several contaminated sites at its former military bases in the Philippines due to inadequate hazardous waste management. It appears that the U.S. Department of Defense failed to implement clear and consistent environmental policies at Clark and Subic. The U.S. maintains that it is under no obligation to undertake further cleanup at its former installations inasmuch as the Philippines has waived its right to do so under the basing agreement. It will be argued that the Philippines made no such waiver under the Manglapus-Schultz Agreement. Thus, the U.S. remains responsible under international law for the resulting environmental damage at its former bases. States have the responsibility under customary international law to ensure that activities within their jurisdiction or control do not cause damage to the environment of other states. A state will be responsible if it breaches this international obligation. It will be argued that the U.S. breached its obligation under international law when activities within its effective control caused significant environmental damage to areas forming part of Philippine territory. Such a breach may also result in the violation of the emerging right to a healthy environment. Existing human rights, such as the right to life and health, right to food and water, right to a safe and healthy working environment and right to information, will be applied from an environmental perspective to determine whether the Filipinos' right to a healthy environment was violated. While a legal claim can be made for the remediation of the environment and compensation of the victims, it will be argued that existing mechanisms for the settlement and adjudication of international claims are inadequate. States are generally reluctant to submit to the jurisdiction of international tribunals and most of these fora do not allow non-state entities to appear before them. Thus, it would be argued that the most promising approach may well be through political and diplomatic means. / Law, Peter A. Allard School of / Graduate

Pas de résumé / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Bochum, 2006. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 298-311) and register.

Submitted by Filipe dos Santos (fsantos@pucsp.br) on 2017-12-21T11:26:05Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Cardeal de Oliveira Arneiro.pdf: 1407359 bytes, checksum: 5f398c30ff5997fedefd1e89ac0ca309 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-21T11:26:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Alexandre Cardeal de Oliveira Arneiro.pdf: 1407359 bytes, checksum: 5f398c30ff5997fedefd1e89ac0ca309 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-12-14 / Conselho Nacional de Pesquisa e Desenvolvimento Científico e Tecnológico - CNPq / This dissertation aims to analyse the responsibility of WTO Member for the so-called private standards, in the light of the State responsibility in international law for the acts of private persons. It proposes a dialogue of integration of the general international law, understood as lex generalis, with the WTO law, that is the lex generalis assuming the hypothesis that the application of States international practice supposedly gives more unity to international public law and effectiveness to WTO law. The development of the research is justified in the exploratory and hypothetic-deductive method, from the functions of the State international responsibility and the conventional and consuetudinary rules codified by the International Law Comission (ILC). The Agreements TBT and SPS foresee the Members’ duty to assure that the agreement provisions, v.g. the most favoured nation principles and the prohibition of unnecessary or excessive non-tariff barriers, should be accomplished also by the nongovernmental standardizing bodies. With that regard this study approaches the categories of State responsibility for private acts stated on the ILC Draft Articles of 2001 to the situations where Members can incur in responsibility for involvement. This assertion is valid not only for the TBT Agreement but also to SPS Agreement, thanks to the interpretative function of the lex generalis. Finally it confirms the hypothesis that application of international responsibility law, as a soft law, ought contribute to effectiveness of WTO law, as it impedes Members to use ways of damaging thirds, though mechanisms of collaboration with private parties under their control, supervision or direction / Esta dissertação tem o objetivo de analisar a responsabilidade dos Membros da OMC pelos chamados padrões privados, à luz do direito da responsabilidade internacional do Estado por atos de particulares. Realiza-se um diálogo de integração do direito internacional geral, na forma de lex generalis, com o direito da OMC, na condição de lex specialis, abordagem que se justifica tendo em vista a hipótese que a aplicação da prática internacional pode conferir maior unidade ao direito internacional público e eficácia ao direito da OMC. O desenvolvimento do trabalho se orienta por um método exploratório e hipotético-dedutivo, a partir das funções da responsabilidade internacional do Estado e da identificação das regras, convencionais e costumeiras, codificadas pela CDI. Os Acordos TBT e SPS preveem o dever dos Membros de assegurar que as disposições dos acordos – como o princípio da nação mais favorecida e a proibição de medidas não-tarifárias desnecessárias ou excessivas – sejam cumpridas também pelos órgãos padronizadores não-governamentais. Nesse mister, estudo aproxima as categorias de responsabilidade do Estado por atos de particulares do Projeto de Artigos da CDI de 2001 das situações em que pode haver responsabilidade do Membro sobre os padrões privados, encontrando-se duas categorias: responsabilidade por omissão e responsabilidade por envolvimento, operação válida não só para as violações ao Acordo TBT, mas também ao Acordo SPS, tendo em vista a função interpretativa da lex generalis. Ao fim, confirma-se a hipótese de que a aplicação do direito da responsabilidade internacional, na condição de soft law, pode contribuir para a efetividade do direito da OMC, ao impedir que Membros utilizem de artifícios para prejudicar terceiros, utilizando mecanismos de colaboração com particulares sob seu controle, supervisão ou direção

Univ., Diss.--Fribourg, 2005. / Literaturverz. S. XVII - LXXXVIII.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität, Frankfurt, 2009. / Includes bibliographical references and register.

Pas de résumé / Doctorat en droit / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

La responsabilité de protéger est un concept issu des travaux de la Commission internationale de l’intervention et de la souveraineté des États (CIISE). Établie en 2000 à l’initiative du CANADA, elle a recherché à dépasser les controverses inhérentes aux débats relatifs au « droit d’intervention humanitaire ». Aux fins d’atteindre cet objectif, la Commission a forgé un nouveau concept, la « responsabilité de protéger », qui permît de concilier, plutôt qu’opposer, les notions de souveraineté et d’intervention.<p>Depuis lors, la responsabilité de protéger a fait l’objet de vives controverses en droit international. Intégrée dans une résolution de l’Assemblée générale de l’ONU en septembre 2005, appliquée par le Conseil de sécurité lors de la crise en LIBYE de mars 2011, le concept se trouve, aujourd’hui, au centre des débats se rapportant au cadre juridique de la protection des populations civiles.<p>La présente thèse entend examiner les différentes implications juridiques de la responsabilité de protéger, en optant pour une démarche résolument positiviste. La réflexion proposée tente d’en embrasser les différents aspects, tant conceptuels qu’opérationnels, aux fins d’aboutir à une étude globale, synthétique et actualisée du concept. Partant, une interrogation commandera l’ensemble de notre réflexion: l’émergence de la responsabilité de protéger a-t-elle, en droit international, permis une amélioration de la protection des populations civiles ? / Doctorat en Sciences juridiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished

Contrairement aux autres biens meubles, les navires, les aéronefs et les objets spatiaux affectés à la navigation internationale sont rattachés à un Etat. Le lien de droit public établi entre ces engins et l’Etat est communément appelé « nationalité ». Mais ce terme n’exprime pas à leur propos une institution à tous égards identique à la nationalité des personnes. Le rattachement examiné ne repose en effet pas sur des éléments de fait (naissance, ascendance etc.), mais uniquement sur un acte administratif interne, l’immatriculation. L’étude de la pratique, notamment des conventions internationales et des législations nationales, montre clairement que – contrairement à ce qu’on soutient souvent – il n’y a pas lieu de subordonner ce rattachement à un lien effectif. Ce qui importe, compte tenu notamment du fait que ces engins évoluent dans des espaces soustraits à toute compétence territoriale, est d’identifier l’Etat qui est seul compétent à l’égard de l’« ensemble organisé » formé par le véhicule, les personnes et la cargaison à bord, et qui est responsable de ses activités. Le droit international interdit dès lors la double immatriculation, mais il laisse aux Etats le pouvoir discrétionnaire de déterminer les conditions d’attribution de leur « nationalité », sans subordonner l’opposabilité internationale de celle-ci à quelque autre exigence que ce soit. Le danger est toutefois que cela favorise un certain laxisme de l’Etat d’immatriculation, ce qui exposerait au risque que des dommages graves soient causés aux personnes impliquées dans les activités de ces engins et – surtout – aux tiers. Mais ce sont les obligations internationales imposées et les droits corrélatifs reconnus dans le chef de l’Etat d’immatriculation qui sont déterminants à cet égard et non quelque mystérieuse « effectivité » du rattachement. Autrement dit, s’il n’est pas nécessaire d’imposer à l’Etat d’immatriculation des conditions internationales limitant sa liberté dans l’attribution de sa « nationalité » aux engins, il est indispensable d’exiger que celui-ci respecte ses obligations, c’est-à-dire exerce effectivement son contrôle et sa juridiction. Cette constatation se vérifie quel que soit l’engin en cause. Le rattachement créé par l’immatriculation constitue donc une institution "sui generis", commune aux navires, aéronefs et objets spatiaux et dont le régime juridique est encadré par le droit international. / Unlike any other movable property, ships, aircraft and space objects that are engaged in international navigation are linked to a State. The legal connection established between these craft/vessels and the State is commonly referred to as “nationality”. However, in this case the term does not represent an institution identical in all respects to the nationality of persons. With regard to vessels, the legal connection to a State is not based on factual elements (such as birth, descent etc.), but merely on the internal administrative act of registration. The study of State practice, notably international conventions and national laws, clearly shows that – contrary to what is often argued – there is no need to make this connection dependent on a pre-existing effective link. What matters most, given that these craft navigate in international space beyond the territorial jurisdiction of sovereign States, is to identify the State that holds sole jurisdiction over said “organized entity” consisting of the vehicle, the persons and the cargo on board and that is responsible for its activities. Public international law therefore prohibits dual registration, but leaves States free to determine the conditions under which they will confer their “nationality”, without imposing any other requirement for the opposability of this legal bond to third States. The danger is that this situation encourages laxity on the part of the States of registry and therefore creates the potential for serious damage incurred by persons involved in these vessels’ activities and – mostly – by third persons. In this regard, it is the international obligations and corresponding rights of the States of registry which are critical, and not a mysterious “effectiveness” of the legal bond. In other words, it is not necessary to impose on the State of registry any international conditions which would limit its freedom with regard to the conferral of its “nationality” upon vessels. It is however indispensable to require that said State complies with its obligations, meaning that it has to effectively exercise its jurisdiction and control over those craft. This statement holds true regardless of the craft concerned. The legal bond created by the registration therefore constitutes a "sui generis" institution, common to ships, aircraft and space objects, and whose legal regime is governed by international law.