This dissertation investigates the relationship between elections and authoritarian rule with a focus on the case of China's adoption of elections at the grassroots level. In this dissertation, I look at the incentives facing Chinese local governments in choosing between holding competitive elections or state-controlled elections, and how the selection of electoral rules shapes the public's preferences over political institutions and influences the citizens' political behaviors, especially voting in elections and participation in contentious activities. The overarching theme in this dissertation proposes that the sources and consequences of Chinese local elections are conditioned on the state-owned resources and the governing costs. When the amount of state-owned resources to rule the local society is limited, the paucity of resources will incentivize authoritarian governments to liberalize grassroots elections to offset the governance costs. The various levels of election liberalization will lead to different consequences in the public's political behavior. An abundance of state-owned resources not only discourages rulers from sharing power with the local society, but also supplies the rulers with strong capacity to obtain loyalty from voters when elections are adopted. As a result, elections under authoritarian governments with an abundance of state-owned resources will see more loyalist voters than elections with authoritarian governments with fewer state-owned resources. In addition, the varieties of election practices will exert impacts on public opinion toward the authoritarian government: awareness of elections will enhance public trust in the government and decrease the public's intention to challenge the incumbents' authority while at the same time increasing the public's faith in the institutions, thereby encouraging the public to adopt official channels to air their grievances. The analysis of the village-level as well as individual-level survey data and cases lends empirical supports to the argument. First, I find that the governing costs—measured by the size of labor force—are significantly and positively associated with the likelihood that local officials allow the villagers to freely nominate candidates. Second, I find that party members are more likely to vote in rural elections than urban elections while urban elections attract citizens with higher levels of democratic consciousness. The rural-urban divide in voter type indicates that the possession of economic resources by rural grassroots governments helps mobilize rural loyalist voters to participate in village committee elections, whereas the lack of such resources by urban governments discourages regime loyalist but encourage democratic voters to turn out to vote in urban elections. Third, I find significant evidence that citizens who are aware of grassroots elections are less likely to engage in contentious activities such as protest, strikes or demonstrations. Yet, the awareness of elections also encourages citizens to more frequently adopt, shangfang (petition), a government-sponsored conflict resolution mechanism, than those who are not aware of such elections. The implications of these findings suggest that the capability of state in controlling resources is vital to the success or failure of elections in stabilizing authoritarian regimes. The findings also provide an assessment on the substantial influence of the rural and urban grassroots elections in China's subnational democratization.

對於比較政治領域，威權政體的「選舉」開放，是否真的會使公民出現自主性參與，一直是學界極為關注的命題。檢視當前中國城市基層選舉，可以發現，參與帶動的「有限政治改革」，其效果仍難以預料。因此，本研究主要探討，轉型中政權選舉的制度效應，會對選民個體的「政治功效意識」與政治行動帶來何種影響。我們並嘗試從政治功效意識的研究範疇，提出「防禦性」與「認同性」兩種概念分類，「防禦性」功效意識是由於選民的維權心態激發的投票參與意願，「認同性」效能感是由選舉動員浮現的群體認同投票意識。我們假設，個體同時經歷過「認同性」與「防禦性」兩種功效意識的形塑過程，但又受到個人的「政權支持」程度影響，不可能出現兩種功效意識同時上升的情形。而個別心態傾向會影響後續的政治行動，會有「退出」、「呼籲」、「忠誠」三種行動抉擇。「退出」是不再進場參與投票，「呼籲」走向過激的政治反抗，「忠誠」則是向黨國輸誠。 針對上述假定，本研究以上海2006、2009年兩次居委會換屆選舉為研究個案。根據作者田野調查發現，經過選後，防禦性功效意意識較高的選民，最終採取「抗議」的政治行動；認同性功效意識較高的選民，雖部分仍表態黨國「忠誠」，但多數參與者卻由於選舉過程無法滿足，浮現「失望」，呈現參與「退出」的情況。因此，「『高認同性』功效意識選民退出－『高防禦性』功效意識選民呼籲」，構成了社區基層選舉存在著普遍的「集體行動困境」，但值得注意的是，這種選舉失望走向從「退出」的行動選擇，卻也可能最終又走回「呼籲」的過激行動。就此觀之，中國的基層民主發展，或許會是面臨集體行動困境之後，走向突發轉折的非預期性後果。