No description available.

The present study investigated the effect of a commons simulation and fines on a generalization test that incorporated several features important in the real world. Two hundred and seventy-five volunteer college students in groups of seven participated in this study. Approximately one-half received exposure to the commons simulation and one-half did not. One-half of the groups in each treatment level received two posttests with a fine option available and the other one-half received two posttests without this option. The two posttests differed in that one was played with a large unknown referent group and the other was played with the immediate group of seven. The results showed that some generalization from the commons simulation to the large posttest does occur. However, subjects in the large group do not cooperate (act in the common group interest) more or defect (act in the individual interest) less, but become more cautious as a result of the simulation exposure and withdraw from the commons when playing with a large and unknown referent group.

This study focuses on public opinion of the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB). The act is a federal reform act, therefore politicians will pay attention to voters’ opinions of the law when considering if they should pass future legislation like it. Data were collected from a sample population of United States citizens by the Princeton Survey Research Associates International. People’s educational views, political views, group interests, and authoritarian views were all used to measure which groups have a positive attitude toward NCLB. Logistic regression was used to test several models to predict which groups have the strongest opinion of the law. The results indicate people’s views toward standardized testing, Republicans, and parents are the groups most likely to have a positive view of the law, followed closely by people with authoritarian attitudes.

Cette thèse vient proposer une notion d’action de groupe processuelle. Cette notion est dégagée suivant la méthode comparative. L’action de groupe est censée résoudre différents types de litiges qui mettent en cause un nombre élevé de personnes. L’étude de droit comparé montre en ce sens une notion qui semble plurielle puisqu’il existe différents modèles d’action de groupe. La manière de la concevoir diffère d’un modèle à autre. La terminologie relative à ce sujet est surabondante, souvent considérée en tant que synonyme de l’action collective, du recours collectif, des actions de classe, des procédures modèles, des jugements pilotes... En dépit de cela, il est possible de trouver une notion spécifique, ayant des caractères propres et typiques. Mais cette notion spécifique ne peut être que processuelle. Le procès est un outil de protection des droits et des intérêts juridiques et légitimes, sans importer leur nature. Il est logique que la résolution de ce type de litiges soit envisagée depuis cette perspective. De plus, c’est au niveau procédural que la protection de ce type de situations pose autant de problèmes. L’action de groupe vient alors s’inscrire naturellement dans cette discipline juridique, dévoilant une notion spécifique qui place le juge au cœur de la résolution de ce type de litiges. / The aim of this thesis is to offer a specific notion of the idea of group litigation, in a procedural and comparative perspective. The mass consumer society in which we live has generated a style of litigation that involves a vast number of people. Grouping claimants together in a class action is meant to resolve this sort of litigation. But comparative law illustrates the complexity of the topic. A large number of different models of class action exist. Terminology is vast and often spans interchangeably terms such as group litigation, collective actions, class action, procedural models and pilot decisions. Each model shows different ways to solve the same problem. In spite of this, we can still find a specific framework with distinct and typical characteristics. However, this specific notion can only be procedurally based. Clearly, resolving this type of litigation must be viewed from this perspective. Judicial process is the way by which to protect rights and legal and legitimate interests without considering their nature. But it is at procedural level that protecting this type of situation raises the most problems. Class actions therefore naturally fall within this legal discipline, and bring to light a specific idea that makes the judge the linchpin when deciding the outcome of litigation.

No description available.

Obwohl der Konzern eine hohe praktische Relevanz im europäischen Binnenmarkt aufweist, besteht kein einheitliches europäisches Konzernrecht. Die Arbeit entwickelt einen Regelungsvorschlag für ein europäisches Konzernleitungsrecht und schließt damit diese Lücke. Zunächst werden die rechtlichen Grundlagen des Konzerns dargestellt. Anschließend werden die Akteure des Konzerns und deren Eigeninteressen beschrieben. Die wirtschaftlichen Anreize und Risiken der Konzernierung werden diskutiert. Die ökonomische Analyse des grenzüberschreitenden Konzerns gibt die optimale Konzernstruktur vor, die rechtlich abgesichert werden muss. Das sekundärrechtlich zu gewährleistende Weisungsrecht muss sich nahtlos in die Rechtsordnungen der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten einfügen. Es werden die bestehenden Möglichkeiten einer einheitlichen Konzernleitung und deren Grenzen aufgezeigt. Letztere sind die Haftungsrisiken für die Geschäftsführer der Mutter- und der Tochtergesellschaft und die Rechte der Minderheitsgesellschafter. Als Beispiele dienen die deutsche sowie die französische Rechtsordnung. Anschließend wird untersucht, ob und inwieweit die Grenzen der einheitlichen Leitung durch die Anerkennung des Gruppeninteresses überwunden werden können. Das französische und das deutsche Recht halten unterschiedliche Antworten bereit, so dass die Begriffskonturierung nicht den nationalen Rechtsordnungen überlassen werden sollte, sondern auf der Grundlage von binnenmarktorientierten Effizienzerwägungen autonom bestimmt werden sollte. Diese Überwindung durch die Anerkennung des Gruppeninteresses wird ihrerseits durch das Insolvenzrecht begrenzt. / Although the corporate group is of great practical importance in the European internal market, there is no uniform European corporate group law. The thesis develops a regulatory proposal for a European group management law and thus remedies this absence. First, the legal basis of the corporate group is presented. Then, the actors of the group and their own interests are demonstrated. The economic incentives and risks of integration into a group are discussed. The economic analysis of the cross-border group prescribes the optimal group structure, which must be legally secured. The right to issue instructions, which is to be guaranteed by secondary legislation, must fit smoothly into the legal systems of the individual Member States. The existing possibilities of uniform group management and the limits are highlighted. The latter are the liability risks for the managers of the parent and the subsidiary and the rights of minority shareholders. The German and French systems serve as examples. It is then examined whether and to what extent the limitations of uniform management can be overcome by the recognition of the group interest. French and German law provide different answers, so that the contours of the concept should not be left to the national legal systems but should be determined autonomously based on efficiency considerations oriented towards the internal market. This overcoming by the recognition of the group interest does not apply without limitations in insolvency law.