Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence during World War II, was responsible for the transportation to New Zealand of the foreign-born wives and fiancées of New Zealand servicemen. Between 1942 and 1948 servicemen returning from theatres of war in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific brought over 3000 wives and 700 fiancées to New Zealand. Portrayed as homogeneous, young, working-class British housewives who made hasty ill-considered marriages, war brides, in fact, proved to be varied in origin, age, occupation and education. Whirlwind romances and short courtships were not the norm. This thesis examines the consequences of the decision to marry a New Zealander and migrate and the impact of the journey and settlement. The full glare of publicity that greeted war brides on arrival focused attention on their compatibility with, and adaptability to, the receiving society. Adjustment was however fraught with difficulties. Memory and loss are implicit in the experience of migration. War brides expressed this in terms of the rift with their pasts and a lack of shared memories. On arrival in New Zealand war brides dispersed around the country in an extreme 'pepper-potting' pattern. When their only connection with New Zealand was their locally-born husband they suffered social isolation and sometimes a devastating sense of loneliness. The resulting marginalisation they experienced was evident in their oral history narratives. Ambivalence and recourse to serendipity as an explanation for past actions were elements of the dis-composure discernable in narratives. In spite of their varied religious, social and class backgrounds, this diverse cohort formed a war bride identity based on shared experience rather than national or ethnic origin. Far from dissipating, their war-bride identity has been consolidated into an enduring image most tangibly expressed in the extant war brides' clubs, although club attendance is not a prerequisite of war bride identity.

Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence during World War II, was responsible for the transportation to New Zealand of the foreign-born wives and fiancées of New Zealand servicemen. Between 1942 and 1948 servicemen returning from theatres of war in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific brought over 3000 wives and 700 fiancées to New Zealand. Portrayed as homogeneous, young, working-class British housewives who made hasty ill-considered marriages, war brides, in fact, proved to be varied in origin, age, occupation and education. Whirlwind romances and short courtships were not the norm. This thesis examines the consequences of the decision to marry a New Zealander and migrate and the impact of the journey and settlement. The full glare of publicity that greeted war brides on arrival focused attention on their compatibility with, and adaptability to, the receiving society. Adjustment was however fraught with difficulties. Memory and loss are implicit in the experience of migration. War brides expressed this in terms of the rift with their pasts and a lack of shared memories. On arrival in New Zealand war brides dispersed around the country in an extreme 'pepper-potting' pattern. When their only connection with New Zealand was their locally-born husband they suffered social isolation and sometimes a devastating sense of loneliness. The resulting marginalisation they experienced was evident in their oral history narratives. Ambivalence and recourse to serendipity as an explanation for past actions were elements of the dis-composure discernable in narratives. In spite of their varied religious, social and class backgrounds, this diverse cohort formed a war bride identity based on shared experience rather than national or ethnic origin. Far from dissipating, their war-bride identity has been consolidated into an enduring image most tangibly expressed in the extant war brides' clubs, although club attendance is not a prerequisite of war bride identity.

Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence during World War II, was responsible for the transportation to New Zealand of the foreign-born wives and fiancées of New Zealand servicemen. Between 1942 and 1948 servicemen returning from theatres of war in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific brought over 3000 wives and 700 fiancées to New Zealand. Portrayed as homogeneous, young, working-class British housewives who made hasty ill-considered marriages, war brides, in fact, proved to be varied in origin, age, occupation and education. Whirlwind romances and short courtships were not the norm. This thesis examines the consequences of the decision to marry a New Zealander and migrate and the impact of the journey and settlement. The full glare of publicity that greeted war brides on arrival focused attention on their compatibility with, and adaptability to, the receiving society. Adjustment was however fraught with difficulties. Memory and loss are implicit in the experience of migration. War brides expressed this in terms of the rift with their pasts and a lack of shared memories. On arrival in New Zealand war brides dispersed around the country in an extreme 'pepper-potting' pattern. When their only connection with New Zealand was their locally-born husband they suffered social isolation and sometimes a devastating sense of loneliness. The resulting marginalisation they experienced was evident in their oral history narratives. Ambivalence and recourse to serendipity as an explanation for past actions were elements of the dis-composure discernable in narratives. In spite of their varied religious, social and class backgrounds, this diverse cohort formed a war bride identity based on shared experience rather than national or ethnic origin. Far from dissipating, their war-bride identity has been consolidated into an enduring image most tangibly expressed in the extant war brides' clubs, although club attendance is not a prerequisite of war bride identity.

Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence during World War II, was responsible for the transportation to New Zealand of the foreign-born wives and fiancées of New Zealand servicemen. Between 1942 and 1948 servicemen returning from theatres of war in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific brought over 3000 wives and 700 fiancées to New Zealand. Portrayed as homogeneous, young, working-class British housewives who made hasty ill-considered marriages, war brides, in fact, proved to be varied in origin, age, occupation and education. Whirlwind romances and short courtships were not the norm. This thesis examines the consequences of the decision to marry a New Zealander and migrate and the impact of the journey and settlement. The full glare of publicity that greeted war brides on arrival focused attention on their compatibility with, and adaptability to, the receiving society. Adjustment was however fraught with difficulties. Memory and loss are implicit in the experience of migration. War brides expressed this in terms of the rift with their pasts and a lack of shared memories. On arrival in New Zealand war brides dispersed around the country in an extreme 'pepper-potting' pattern. When their only connection with New Zealand was their locally-born husband they suffered social isolation and sometimes a devastating sense of loneliness. The resulting marginalisation they experienced was evident in their oral history narratives. Ambivalence and recourse to serendipity as an explanation for past actions were elements of the dis-composure discernable in narratives. In spite of their varied religious, social and class backgrounds, this diverse cohort formed a war bride identity based on shared experience rather than national or ethnic origin. Far from dissipating, their war-bride identity has been consolidated into an enduring image most tangibly expressed in the extant war brides' clubs, although club attendance is not a prerequisite of war bride identity.

Frederick Jones, Minister of Defence during World War II, was responsible for the transportation to New Zealand of the foreign-born wives and fiancées of New Zealand servicemen. Between 1942 and 1948 servicemen returning from theatres of war in Europe, the Middle East and the Pacific brought over 3000 wives and 700 fiancées to New Zealand. Portrayed as homogeneous, young, working-class British housewives who made hasty ill-considered marriages, war brides, in fact, proved to be varied in origin, age, occupation and education. Whirlwind romances and short courtships were not the norm. This thesis examines the consequences of the decision to marry a New Zealander and migrate and the impact of the journey and settlement. The full glare of publicity that greeted war brides on arrival focused attention on their compatibility with, and adaptability to, the receiving society. Adjustment was however fraught with difficulties. Memory and loss are implicit in the experience of migration. War brides expressed this in terms of the rift with their pasts and a lack of shared memories. On arrival in New Zealand war brides dispersed around the country in an extreme 'pepper-potting' pattern. When their only connection with New Zealand was their locally-born husband they suffered social isolation and sometimes a devastating sense of loneliness. The resulting marginalisation they experienced was evident in their oral history narratives. Ambivalence and recourse to serendipity as an explanation for past actions were elements of the dis-composure discernable in narratives. In spite of their varied religious, social and class backgrounds, this diverse cohort formed a war bride identity based on shared experience rather than national or ethnic origin. Far from dissipating, their war-bride identity has been consolidated into an enduring image most tangibly expressed in the extant war brides' clubs, although club attendance is not a prerequisite of war bride identity.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Jack M. Holl / Donald J. Mrozek / General Walter Bedell Smith is the subject of this dissertation. It examines his career as Eisenhower's chief of staff from a functionalist perspective. Functionalism as a school of thought emphasizes the organic nature of social institutions, the importance of improvisation while framing solutions to problems, and the necessity of producing predictable results. In practice, the US Army and Smith applied functionalism in a restricted way, but conceived of the General Staff as the "brain of the army." While working for General Marshall in the War Department General Staff and later as General Eisenhower's chief of staff, General Smith met his responsibilities with respect to order, cohesion and objectives. Two general conditions complicated Smith's role at Eisenhower's headquarters: first, the burgeoning size of the staff made it difficult for Smith to manage by means of direct supervision and still preserve a measure of initiative among staff members; second, Smith's poor health and choler sometimes hindered his ability to adopt means that were consistent with the organic aspect of functionalism. In Washington, Algiers and London, Bedell Smith gained notoriety as a "hatchetman" who did his superior's dirty work. His ugly reputation was fitting in some ways, but undeserved in others. His achievements have been underestimated. Smith was the firm defender of the Eisenhower's prerogatives. Among British colleagues, he was a disciple of cooperation and diplomacy. He was intelligent, orderly and functionalist in the sense that his decisiveness and willingness to accept responsibility achieved quick and predictable results. Smith's understanding of principal issues and his grasp of details earned the trust and respect of colleagues. He acted out of duty, not "natural" meanness. The traits of a "hatchetman" - feared and detested by some - were the distinguishing features that won favor from his superiors, Marshall and Eisenhower.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Michael A. Ramsay / This dissertation examines combat leadership in the American Expeditionary Forces (AEF) in infantry and machine gun units at the company level and below to highlight the linkages between the training and professional development of junior officers and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and the army's overall military effectiveness in World War I. Between 1865 and 1918, the growing lethality of the battlefield had forced changes to tactics and formations that placed novel demands on small unit leaders. The proliferation of new weapons in infantry companies and the thinning and extension of formations required junior officers and NCOs able to exercise an unparalleled degree of initiative and independence while also mastering new tactical and technical skills. When the United States entered World War I, the Regular Army was still grappling with how to reconcile its traditional expectations of small unit leadership with the new "skill sets" required of junior leaders in modern warfare. Faced with the need to produce officers and NCOs to lead its rapidly expanding mass army, the regulars improvised a system for identifying, training, and assigning company-level leaders. Unfortunately, the Regular Army's unpreparedness to wage a modern war, and the host of systemic problems associated with raising a mass army, meant that much of the training of these key leaders was so ill-focused and incomplete that the new officers and NCOs were woefully unprepared to face the tactical challenges that awaited them in France. These problems were only compounded when unexpected casualties among officers and NCOs in the summer and fall of 1918 led to a further curtailment in leader training the U. S. Army. The end result of the U. S. Army's failure to adequately train and develop its junior leaders was that its combat units often lacked the flexibility and "know how" to fight without suffering prohibitively high casualties. When the junior leaders failed, faltered and bungled, the AEF's battles became confused and uncoordinated slugging matches that confounded the plans and expectations of the army's senior leaders. The heavy casualties that resulted from these slugging matches further undermined the AEF's effectiveness by reducing the morale and cohesion of the army's combat units and hindering the army's overall ability to learn from its mistakes due to the high turn-over of junior officers and NCOs.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Charles W. Sanders / On September 13, 1950, in a culmination of three years of efforts by organizations and individuals inside and outside the Harry S. Truman administration, 69 captured battle flags from the Mexican-American War were formally returned to the Mexican government at a ceremony in Mexico City. The events surrounding the return of flags to Mexico occurred in two distinct phases. The first was a small, secretive, and largely symbolic return of three flags conceived and carried out by high-ranking U.S. government officials in June 1947. The second large-scale, public return of the remaining flags in the custody of the War Department was initiated by the American Legion and enacted by the United States Congress. Despite their differences, both returns were heavily influenced by contemporary events, primarily the presidential election of 1948 and the escalation of the Cold War. Also, although the second return was much more extensive than the President originally intended, it was only through his full support that either return was accomplished. In the decades since 1950, historians have either ignored the return of Mexican battle flags or focused instead on Truman’s wreath laying at the monument to the niños héroes in Mexico City in March 1947. This study, for the first time, provides an in-depth description of the efforts to return captured Mexican battle flags and explains why these war trophies were returned while others have remained in the United States. The goal of this investigation is to present the efforts of the Truman administration for what they truly were: an unprecedented act of international friendship. Although the actions of the U.S. government and private organizations were partially influenced by self-interest and Cold War fears, their primary motivation was a sincere desire to erase the painful memories surrounding the Mexican-American War of 1846-1848 in an effort to improve future relations between the two countries. Many historians point to the Truman administration as the end of the Good Neighbor Policy toward Latin America. This study, however, argues that the return of captured Mexican battle flags represents the true pinnacle of the United States’ Good Neighbor Policy toward its southern neighbor.

Doctor of Philosophy / Department of History / Sue Zschoche / Despite an impressive history of woman-friendly legislation, Kansans tend to be socially conservative. The Equal Rights Amendment, first proposed in 1923, was the culmination of over a century's worth of women's activism attempting to remove the strictures of coverture and to recognize women as citizens in their own right, not as wives or as mothers of male citizens. After largely ignoring the amendment for fifty years, Congress finally passed the ERA in 1972 and submitted it to the states for ratification. Almost immediately, the real and imagined consequences of the legislation provoked a passionate debate among mostly middle-class white women about the meaning of American womanhood. Liberals hoped that the ERA would remove existing barriers to women's educational and professional life; conservatives feared that the ERA would cause women to focus on selfish interests outside of their households, rotting the foundations of family life and American strength. In Kansas, women from both camps converged to discuss the future of the ERA at the feminist-organized Kansas Women's Weekend of July 15-17, 1977, resulting in Kansas sending a conservative faction to the federally funded National Women's Conference later that year. Conservatives failed to derail the convention's feminist agenda, nor were they able to enact a rescission of Kansas' ratification, but in the long run they succeeded in creating widespread uneasiness about the social consequences of the ERA. The vitriolic anti-ERA campaign demonstrated the extent to which female dependency still defined both male and female conservatives' views on the interrelatedness of family, religion, manliness, and national strength. This dissertation explores a volume of letters to Kansas legislators expressing anti-ERA sentiment. The letters provide a unique lens through which to examine the passions aroused by the ERA among grassroots conservatives. Contextualizing this issue are other conservative reactions to feminist activity from the Revolution onward that consistently demonstrate how conservatives valorize female dependency. Although the liberal position regarding women's rights has changed significantly over two hundred years, conservative reaction has invariably embraced and elevated the patriarchal family as proper and necessary to the smooth functioning of a Christian republic.

Master of Arts / Department of History / Donald J. Mrozek / On March 30, 1972 the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) launched a conventional offensive, dubbed the Easter Offensive, against South Vietnam. In response to this act President Richard Nixon ordered the United States Air Force (USAF) and Navy (USN) to resume bombing North Vietnam. For the next nine months, USAF conducted offensive operations against the whole of the DRV in an attempt to accomplish four major objectives. First, USAF units sought to interdict sufficiently the North Vietnamese Army's (NVA's) supply lines to preclude continued conventional operations in South Vietnam. Second, President Nixon had directed the Air Force to inflict sufficient punishment on North Vietnam in order to deter further aggression against its southern neighbor. Third, as implied by the Nixon Doctrine, USAF was to establish convincingly its ability to conduct conventional operations in support of an allied nation during a major conflict. Finally, with the introduction of B-52 bombers in December 1972, the Air Force was to maintain the credibility of manned strategic aircraft as part of American nuclear deterrence policy. Historically, the United States Air Force and many civilian observers have maintained that the United States Air Force succeeded in all four tasks. However, the evidence strongly indicates that the United States Air Force not only failed to achieve all but the interdiction objective during the course of operations against North Vietnam, but that this defeat stemmed from the decision not to develop a comprehensive Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (SEAD) doctrine from 1968 through 1972. In choosing this course of action, USAF's military and civilian leaders guaranteed that American forces would be unable to bring sufficient force to bear to achieve President Nixon's goals. Furthermore, by choosing this course of action and, in addition, refocusing the Air Force on nuclear delivery rather than enhancing USAF's capability to penetrate an integrated air defense (IADS), these same leaders ignored the results of Operation Rolling Thunder. The consequence of this choice, as will be shown in the following pages, was an outcome that had serious implications for the United States' Cold War conventional and nuclear military policy.