History gives Harry S. Truman rightful merit for his help in establishing Jewish homeland in 1948. Although more than 63 years have passed since the declaration of Israeli independence, the true motives that lead President Truman to recognize Israel are still being discussed and disputed. Shortly after his inauguration in April 1945, the thirty-third president found himself in a difficult position when a majority of the Jews who had survived Nazi concentration camps could not or did not want to return to their countries of origin. Instead, they declared their wish to emigrate to Palestine, where Zionists had already been trying to establish a Jewish commonwealth. However, at that time there was a widespread uncertainty whether Franklin Delano Roosevelt's successor would have the same opinion about the post-World War II settlement in Palestine or not. It is the objective of this thesis to analyze the complex set of reasons that made President Truman support political Zionism. As we know, this process ultimately culminated with a prompt recognition of a newly established Jewish state. To answer the question what was the main reason behind this decision, domestic and external factors the president had to consider will be examined. The emphasis will be placed on American military and economic interests...

The idea that the United States is bequeathed the special mission of leading mankind toward liberty has dominated U.S. foreign relations since the American Revolution. It remains the most pervasive theme in Americans' thought about the world to the extent that over time, it has become firmly embedded in the nation's historical and cultural consciousness. A study of diplomatic, intellectual, and cultural history, America in the World: Ideology and U.S. Foreign Policy, 1944-1950 examines the impact of this exceptionalist vision on the policies and public debates that influenced Americans' thinking about their role in the world from the beginning of their efforts to design the global post-World War II order to the outbreak of the Korean War in 1950. Believers in Lockean progress and advocates of modernization, the administrations of Franklin Roosevelt and Harry Truman sought to establish a one-world order based on American liberal political and economic ideals. At the heart of this American-designed postwar world stood the United Nations, created to ensure collective security and foster a spirit of international collaboration, and transnational institutions like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, envisioned to protect the global economy and promote free trade. These institutions served as concrete articulations of U.S. national interests yet at the same time they were intended to inaugurate a "New Deal" and a "Fair Deal" for the world. Interpreting American post-war and Cold War policymaking through the lens of exceptionalism provides a complementary methodological framework to the national security or economic theses more commonly employed to describe this period. When the Soviet Union refused to accept the American-designed one-world order, the American response - inside and outside of government - was overwhelmingly shaped by ideology. While economic considerations and national security influenced U.S. Cold War policy, this dissertation demonstrates that it was the challenge posed by Moscow's universalist aspirations and Communism's inherent teleological ideology that caused Americans to turn the Cold War into a battle for a way of life.

The purpose of this paper is to examine the background of the rift between the Soviet and Western allies by selecting several of the more critical points of controvercy involved with the formulation of the Truman Doctrine.

La "Faith-based" diplomatie américaine et les ambiguïtés du plan Marshall : le cas de la France dans l’après-guerre. Le Président Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) affirme dès 1946 que les E.U. doivent s’armer d'une « diplomatie fondée sur la foi » pour encourager la reconstruction spirituelle d'une Europe « déchristianisée » face au communisme. Pour faire barrage au marxisme de l’Union Soviétique, il fallait commencer par la France, vue comme la pierre de voûte spirituelle. Plus que toute autre nation, elle bénéficie avec le plan Marshall d'un puissant soutien financier militaire, économique et d'une conquête des cœurs et des esprits. De multiples agences interviennent dans cette période alors que les Églises américaines redécouvrent cette terre de mission. Généralement articulées autour de la conviction religieuse des Présidents, les initiatives sont relayées sur le terrain par l’engagement d’acteurs privés. Officialisée en 1998 par le président Clinton dans la promulgation de l’Acte international sur la liberté religieuse, cette approche a justifié la ténacité des missionnaires de 1945 à nos jours dans une France catholique religieusement peu diverse. Encouragées par le quatrième Réveil la plupart des missions américaines, églises protestantes historiques, nouvelles religions ou NMR (mormons, adventistes, témoins de Jéhovah etc...) et Évangéliques ont bien accueilli cette opportunité, phase d’introduction pour certaines ou de redémarrage pour d’autres déjà présentes dès le 19ème siècle. Bien que l'entreprise de « nation building » économique et culturelle de la France ait été perçue par l’opinion américaine de l’époque comme l'une des plus décevantes de l’après-guerre, les résultats de la transformation de la société française sont apparus avec un décalage dans le temps. Pouvons-nous alors retracer les sources des mutations transatlantiques des religions d'origine américaine et l’évolution du paysage religieux français aux activités gouvernementales et missionnaires en ce début de la Guerre froide ? / President Harry S. Truman (1945-1953) claims in 1946 that the U.S. should advance a "faith-based" diplomacy to encourage the spiritual reconstruction of a “dechristianized” Europe .To stand in the way of a Marxist and Godless Soviet Union, it has to begin with France, seen as the spiritual stone arch. More than in any other nation, the Marshall Plan brings a financial, economic and military support, willing to conquer hearts and minds. Many key governmental agencies are involved in this time period, while American churches engaged in aid relief are rediscovering France as a new mission territory. Usually strongly influenced by the religious conviction of the Presidents, "Faith-based policies” supporting Foreign policies are reinforced on the ground by the engagement of private voluntary organizations (PVOs). Formalized in 1998 by President Clinton as a tool in Foreign policy in the enactment of the Act on International Religious Freedom, this approach justifies the tenacity of missionaries from 1945 to the present day in a secular and catholic France. Encouraged by the Fourth Awakening, most American missions, mainstream Protestant churches, new religions like NRM (Mormonism, Adventists, Jehovah's Witnesses, etc...) and Evangelicals, welcome this mixed opportunity: a comeback for a few denominations already presents in the 19th century and for others a chance for a fresh beginning. Although the business of "nation building”, the reshaping of the economic and cultural life of France, is perceived by the American public opinion as one of the most disappointing of the post-war, a deeply transformed French society will later emerge. The overlapping of American public and private organizations, of American churches and missionaries lay the groundwork for the radical transformation of a French monolithic religious landscape. Without doubt this can be traced to this short and critical experimental period of the Early Cold War.

Famine and destitution stemming from the Second World War had spread across the European continent and parts of Asia by mid-1945. Recognizing the need for recovery and survival in those regions, President Harry S. Truman at the recommendation of several Cabinet members, summoned ex-President Herbert Hoover for advice on how the United States should proceed in offering aid beyond the earlier efforts of the United Nations Rehabilitation and Relief Administration and other relief sources. After an absence from the White House and official government participation for many years, Hoover readily provided crucial advice on addressing famine relief in Europe and Asia based on his previous humanitarian leadership during and after the First World War. Recognizing that further action needed to be taken, Truman asked Hoover, as Honorary Chairman of the Famine Emergency Committee (FEC), to go to Europe and Asia to personally assess the famine relief needs. Hoover and several colleagues travelled 50,000 miles to thirty-eight different nations from March and into June 1946 to witness and evaluate famine needs in the afflicted nations, or arrange for food supply resources from various other countries; making a second trip to a struggling Germany and Austria in 1947. This thesis initially examines the narrative of the period between Hoover's reentry into public service, as requested by Truman, and the chronicle of the FEC missions. At the same time, it considers the purposes of the FEC missions, from both Hoover's and Truman's perspectives, and despite differing political viewpoints, the efforts of the two leaders to merge their activities into a common goal. The aim, amid early Cold War challenges, was to encourage both freedom and democracy in Europe and elsewhere, while sustaining free market economies and guarding against the spread of communism. As Hoover focused his efforts on American based humanitarian aid through the mechanism of food relief to promote economic prosperity, stability, and political freedoms, Truman endeavored to protect democracy as expressed in the Truman Doctrine. Both standpoints coalesced in a synthesis of anti-communism, global stability, and U.S. geopolitical interests. This thesis also will analyze the friendship that developed between Hoover and Truman during the FEC missions. This helped lead to further collaboration between the two leaders, as the President asked the ex-President to assist in the creation of the First Hoover Commission, leading to a Second Hoover Commission under President Dwight D. Eisenhower. Despite ongoing political dissimilarities and occasional disagreements, the friendship of Hoover and Truman strengthened and endured for the remainder of the lives.

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Strategic upheavals, such as the emergence or disappearance of geopolitical threats or radical technological changes, generate profound uncertainty and intense debate about a state’s future strategy. How do decisionmakers reexamine and revise strategy amidst these upheavals? Existing theories of strategic change recognize the significance of upheavals, but raise questions about the mechanisms by which decisionmakers embrace or discard new ideas about strategy. contend that understanding strategic change requires attention to narratives––stories about the past and present of international politics that suggest legitimate pathways for future action. I develop a theory of narrative emergence, positing that after upheavals, national security elites compete to mobilize support for their vision of future policy. They use public and private debates to legitimate their positions and build domestic coalitions. I identify four rhetorical strategies––persuasion, rhetorical coercion, co-optation, and transgression––that have different effects in mobilizing or demobilizing coalitions. If one coalition builds cross-cutting support, this can entrench their rhetoric in public discourse over time as part of a dominant narrative that shapes subsequent strategy debates through constraining and enabling effects. I evaluate this theory in the context of two cases of strategic upheaval in the United States, focusing on the puzzles of U.S. nuclear strategy: the arrival of the atomic age and the achievement of strategic parity between the U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. In the first case, I use qualitative and text analysis to track the rise of a dominant narrative about nuclear weapons during the early Cold War. In this contradictory narrative which I label “Waging Deterrence,” the bomb was both an unusable, revolutionary deterrent and an essential tool for fighting and winning the next war. I draw on archival sources to trace the emergence of this narrative during the Truman and Eisenhower administrations, showing this narrative was not predetermined, but contingent on domestic debates as speakers––Presidents, civilian advisors, military elites, and others––used rhetorical strategies in public and private to co-opt and silence opponents. This narrative constrained the possibilities for strategic revision during the later Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations. In the second case, parity’s mutual vulnerability upended this narrative; narratives remained unsettled until the Carter administration, where domestic legitimation contests facilitated the return of Waging Deterrence to justify competitive nuclear postures that had a lasting impact on U.S. nuclear strategy. The project offers a novel mechanism to understand strategic change and highlights the discursive and domestic politics of nuclear strategy, showing that foundational U.S. deterrence concepts emerged in part from domestic legitimation contests that rendered other options illegitimate. It also offers insights into policy debates about the future of nuclear and grand strategy amidst contemporary upheavals, suggesting contested processes of narrative construction will be central to shaping future strategy.

Thesis (M.A.)--Miami University, Dept. of History, 2009. / Title from first page of PDF document. Includes bibliographical references (p. 38-39).

This work examines the actions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the first year of the Korean War. Officially created in 1947, the Joint Chiefs saw their first true test as an institution during the conflict. At various times, the members of the JCS failed to issue direct orders to their subordinate, resulting in a divide between the wishes of President Truman and General MacArthur over the conduct of the war. By analyzing the interaction between the Joint Chiefs and General Douglas MacArthur, the flaws of both the individual Chiefs as well as the organization as a whole become apparent. The tactical and strategic decisions faced by the JCS are framed within the three main stages of the Korean War.