This thesis examines Allen's development using Annie Hall (1977), Manhattan (1979), and Hannah and Her Sisters (1986) as landmarks. Three criteria (chapters) structure the analysis: comedy, narrative, and romance.

At the beginning of my Master's thesis we define basic terms such as payoff, strategy, best reply and Nash equilibrium. Furthermore, we introduce the population perspective, in which during a random meeting of a pair of players, these players interact according to their strategies and they receive payoffs. We define the criterion of evolutionary stability, which shows a link between payoffs in the game and strategy spreading among population. The most common description of this evolution is based on the replicator equations. We analyze their basic properties and examine the relationship between the stationary points of this system and the concepts of Nash equilibrium and evolutionary stability. In the following practical part, we apply the introduced theory to model the Cournot duopoly. Its aim is to analyze the model characteristics in terms of evolutionary stability and to determine the duopolist's behavior in the long run.

We consider nonlinear elliptic Bellman systems which arise in the theory of stochastic differential games. The right hand sides of the equations (which are called Hamiltonians) may have quadratic growth with respect to the gradient of the unknowns. Under certain assumptions on Lagrangians (from which the Hamiltonians are derived), that are satisfied for many types of stochastic games, we establish the existence and uniqueness of a Nash point and develop structural conditions on the Hamiltonians. From these conditions we establish a certain version of maximum and minimum principle. This result is then used to establish the existence of a bound solution. 1

This diploma thesis analyses the historical development of gambling legislation in the Czech Republic, from the first mention of the regulation in the Middle Ages to present days, while the primary (but not exclusive) subject of my research are the basic sources of gambling regulation in the field of administrative law. In my thesis, I identify and examine the main reasons for implementation of new institutes and other changes into the gaming law. In this context, I assess the degree of restrictiveness or liberality of each regulation while focusing on whether there were any long-term tendencies to make the legislation more or less strict. All of this is done through the interpretation of legal norms with the help of legal methodology - methods of subjectively historical, teleological and logical interpretation are used in the thesis. These forms of legal methodology were chosen with regard to the resources used in the thesis, which include mainly legislation and its explanatory statements. The whole thesis is divided into three chronologically subsequent chapters representing the main periods of the gambling legislation development. The first chapter deals with the evolution of gaming law from its beginnings in the 13th century until 1989; its subchapters then divide this long period into several...

View of rational choice in coherence with ultimatum game. Rational choice theory adjusted by joining behavioral economics to better comprehend decision-making processes. In this thesis I focus on researching strong influences using multiple simple games. Namely: ultimatum game, dictator game and modifications of previous. They will be carried out by online questionnaire. Next step will be analysis of components to determine significant ones and impact of game's modifications. I assume that decision-maker's rationality will be disproven. This thesis will continue with assessing influence of risk and fear of loss. Goal is to gather enough of detailed data about motivations and participants in order to perform analysis and establish statistically significant influences.

Signaling games are part of games with imperfect information. The games with imperfect information mean that the player doesn't know all moves of players, which played before him. The signaling game as such are interesting because some players have more information than the others. The better informed group of players can indicate to uninformed players what they know and wait how the opponents react. Generally the move which uninformed party takes influence all players. In my papers I want to describe main rules for signaling games, show possible ways how to solve this kinds of problems and use this new knowledge in aplication on problem which can be usable in practices.

A random walk is a mathematical formalization of a trajectory that consists of taking succesive random steps. The results od random walk analysis have been applied to computer science, economics, biology tec. This thesis is concentrated on connection between random walk and games theory especially with thinglering simulation. The application part of this thesis is focused on game strategies, that determine the amount of bet in next game.

The aim of this work is to show that even people who outwardly demonstrate irrational behaviour are actually rational. The only reason why their actions deviate from theoretical rational behaviour is given by different utility functions. Ultimatum game with its easy rules represents a great way to show deviations between human and rational behaviours. The model described in the thesis focuses on Responder's decision making, which is influenced not only by maximization of pure economical profit but also by many other factors, which are summed in the model in one variable -- attitude to fairness. It is shown how this variable can be predicted using decisions obtained from a multi-round Ultimatum game. To prove that humans behave in accordance with their own preferences, the modelled game does not only estimate players' attitudes to fairness but also predicts players' following actions using knowledge of estimated values.

In this thesis, I suggest a new anti-corruption measure. The measure makes corruption unfeasible by making the interests of the culprits incompatible. This is achieved by giving immunity to the culprit who reports the corruption. Said culprit is allowed to retain any benefits he has already obtained and is given a reward for making the report. The purpose of the measure is to discourage the parties from corruption ex ante. The paper presents an argument that no immunization and reward take place, because the culprits are rendered unable to find mutually profitable corruption deals. The effect of various assumptions about the corruption is then discussed.

The thesis presents a game theoretic model of two directors on a single market. It introduces a variable film type which attains a value from the interval [0,1], where the boundaries expresses the art and the mainstream film, respectively. Each director has opposite preferences over a film type and chooses which type of film to shoot. The director's decision influences the profit function of the other director. The objective of each director is to maximize his profit function. The profit function is the difference of the quadratic audience function and of the cost function. The cost function is the sum of quadratic production cost function and linear disutility cost function which expresses the director's unmeasurable cost issued from the deviation from his most preferred film type. The model therefore includes both the economic and the artistic incentives which influence the directors' decision. We prove that for each pair of profit functions, there exists at least one pure strategy Nash equilibrium. The discussion of possible outcomes is illustrated by an empirical application.