The Royal Commission on Japanese Claims (1947-1951), known as the “Bird Commission,” investigated and offered compensation to Japanese Canadians for their losses of property during the 1940s. It is largely remembered for what it was not: that is, it was not a just resolution to the devastating material losses of the 1940s. Community histories bitterly describe the Commission as destined to failure, with narrow terms of reference that only addressed a fraction of what was taken. Similarly, other historians have portrayed the Commission as a defensive mechanism, intended by the government to limit financial compensation and to avoid the admission of greater injustice. Yet scholars have never fully investigated the internal workings of the Commission. Despite its failings, Japanese Canadians used the Bird Commission in their struggle to hold the state accountable. Hundreds of Japanese Canadians presented claims. Their testimonies are preserved in thousands of pages of archival documents. The Bird Commission was a troubling, flawed, but nonetheless important historical process. This thesis examines government documents, claimants’ case files, and oral histories to nuance previous accounts of the Bird Commission. I draw from ‘productive’ understandings of Royal Commissions to argue that the Liberal government, cognizant of how such mechanisms could influence public opinion, designed the Bird Commission to provide closure to the internment-era and to mark the start of the postwar period. Their particular definition of loss was integral to this project. As Japanese Canadians sought to expand this definition to address their losses, the proceedings became a record of contest over the meaning of property loss and the legacy of the dispossession. Navigating a web of constraints, Japanese Canadians participated in a broader debate over the meaning justice in a society that sought to distance itself from a legacy of racialized discrimination. This contest, captured in the Commission proceedings, provides a pathway into the complex history of the postwar years as Canadians grappled with the racism of Second World War, including Canada’s own race-based policies, and looked towards new approaches to pluralism. / Graduate / 2018-12-22

Scholars speculate that government apologies and compensation for historical injustices promote forgiveness and reconciliation, as well as psychologically benefit members of the victimized group. However, they have not offered theory or compelling evidence in support of these assumptions, nor do they discuss how redress affects the majority group. Across four studies, I examined how Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians psychologically responded to offers of apologies and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax. Overall, it was better to give than receive the redress. When participants thought redress had not been offered, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it less favorably than Chinese Canadians. But, when participants thought redress had been offered, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it more favorably than Chinese Canadians did, confirming the predictions of balance and system justification theory. An offer of apology and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax did not influence Chinese Canadian participants’ forgiveness or reconciliation feelings. The redress offer also did not lead Chinese Canadians to feel more identified with Canadians or Chinese Canadians, nor did it lead Chinese Canadians to evaluate Chinese Canadians more positively. On the other hand, the majority group, non-Chinese Canadians, evaluated their group more positively and considered the system of government less responsible for the harm when both an apology and compensation were offered, as justice motivation and social identity theories predict. The current results inform interdisciplinary discussions of the potential effects of apologies and compensation by suggesting additional psychological effects of redress. They also demonstrate that, despite concerns that the majority will backlash against their government giving apologies and compensation, majority group members increased their favor of redress measures once they were offered.

Scholars speculate that government apologies and compensation for historical injustices promote forgiveness and reconciliation, as well as psychologically benefit members of the victimized group. However, they have not offered theory or compelling evidence in support of these assumptions, nor do they discuss how redress affects the majority group. Across four studies, I examined how Chinese and non-Chinese Canadians psychologically responded to offers of apologies and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax. Overall, it was better to give than receive the redress. When participants thought redress had not been offered, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it less favorably than Chinese Canadians. But, when participants thought redress had been offered, non-Chinese Canadians evaluated it more favorably than Chinese Canadians did, confirming the predictions of balance and system justification theory. An offer of apology and compensation for the Chinese Head Tax did not influence Chinese Canadian participants’ forgiveness or reconciliation feelings. The redress offer also did not lead Chinese Canadians to feel more identified with Canadians or Chinese Canadians, nor did it lead Chinese Canadians to evaluate Chinese Canadians more positively. On the other hand, the majority group, non-Chinese Canadians, evaluated their group more positively and considered the system of government less responsible for the harm when both an apology and compensation were offered, as justice motivation and social identity theories predict. The current results inform interdisciplinary discussions of the potential effects of apologies and compensation by suggesting additional psychological effects of redress. They also demonstrate that, despite concerns that the majority will backlash against their government giving apologies and compensation, majority group members increased their favor of redress measures once they were offered.

Masters of Art / Many empirically supported versions of stage and componential models of the cognitive processing underlying the completion of various tasks spanning a wide range of domains have been developed by cognitive scientists of various kinds. These include models of scientific (e.g. Dunbar 1999), mathematical (e.g. Schoenfeld 1985), artistic (e.g. Getzels and Csikszentmihalyi 1976), engineering (e.g. Purzer et al 2018), legal (e.g. Ronkainen 2011), medical (e.g. Vimla et al 2012) and even culinary cognition (e.g. Stierand and Dörfler 2015) (and this list is nowhere near exhaustive). Yet, despite the existence of fields such as experimental and metaphilosophy which take philosophy as their object, often by using methods from the cognitive sciences, a stage or componential model of philosophizing is conspicuously missing from even an exhaustive list of the kind just produced.

How, if at all, should we remember the histories of injustice and atrocity that haunt most modern states? Since World War II, it has become commonplace to suggest that properly responding to injustices requires societies to remember them, and to remember the experiences of those they touched. But what specific value might memory in this sense constitute in or contribute to the lives and societies of those coping with troubled history? This question raises two issues. The first is ontological: what does it mean to say that a society should remember in the first place? Is it to say that the individuals who make up society should each privately remember, or is to say that the society as a whole should somehow create or maintain a collective memory that is not reducible to the sum of individual cognitive processes? The second issue is normative: what exactly can memory so conceived do to ameliorate the undesirable legacies that historical injustices leaves on the world? How might remembering help us to move forward, or help us to lessen the pains we can’t leave behind? This study takes on both of these issues. On the first, I suggest that when we speak of societies remembering, we’re speaking of irreducibly social processes, by which individual memories are translated into publicly available traces of the past, which can then inform recollection by others, perhaps at some distance from the original event. On the second, I suggest that this sort of remembering can be valuable in the wake of injustice as a way of combating the legacies of persistent harm and exclusion that sometimes follow victims long after an injustice is over, and challenge their abilities to stand, participate, and identify as full members of the political community. Memory in this sense is crucial for re-negotiating the boundaries of membership, and for rebuilding a more inclusive public world.

<p>The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions.</p><p>The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.</p>

The current state of the global distribution of income, wealth, and well-being is in many respects the product of historical acts and processes. Of these, some have been just, others not. In philosophical discourse, processes of the latter kind are referred to as historical injustices. Of these historical injustices, the most protracted, extensive, and (presumably) the most devastating, is colonialism. For centuries, innocent people – in fact whole continents – were subjected to plunder, despoilment, land-displacement, exploitation, slavery, oppressive rule, cultural rape, and genocide. The extent and persistence of the consequences of this particular historical injustice are, however, contested territory. With regards to the exact causes of global poverty and destitution, measuring the effects of colonialism vis-à-vis other determining factors is an empirical impossibility. Nonetheless, it is beyond dispute that during colonial times vast amounts of riches were illicitly transferred from the colonies to their (mainly European) masters. It therefore seems reasonable to assume that this massive and prolonged one-directional transfer (from South to North) of wealth and resources necessary for nation-building, i.e. self-sustained and successful eco¬nomic development, has contributed, to a morally significant degree, to the unequal economic status of societies – resulting, ultimately, in the present unjust division of countries into developed, industrialized ones on the one hand, and under-developed (in many cases, extremely poor) ones, on the other. If this assumption is correct, then this is a problem of fantastic moral proportions. The aim of this essay is to consider the moral implications of the consequences of colonialism in light of the problem of global poverty and against emergent, compelling theories of global justice. It is argued that the former colonies are justified in making reparative demands on their former colonial powers as a matter of rectificatory justice. The demands discussed here are aimed at property restoration and economic compensation. The salience of these demands is established by way of arguments for collective moral responsibility and historical (trans-generational) obligations. It is further argued that such reparations would constitute a great leap towards eradicating global poverty on the grounds that many presently poor countries were the victims of colonial atrocities. Such a leap would also take us closer to a just world.