This dissertation studies the immediate reception of von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s Theory of Games and Economic Behavior. It focuses on how economists (and other scientists, such as mathematicians) reacted to von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s axiomatization of expected utility theory. Such study employs book reviews the Theory of Games received, articles authored by mathematically-proficient readers who followed von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s lead of axiomatizing choice under uncertainty, and articles that cited the later. The main conclusions are threefold. First, to understand the history of the Theory of Games\' reception it is unavoidable to consider how secondary sources acted as disseminators of its premises, results, and method. Second, many skilled authors reflected on von Neumann and Morgenstern\'s book. Most economists who used that literature in an axiomatic framework cited such contributions to borrow and adapt assumptions. Those who applied results directly generally used less-sophisticated mathematical tools and were not proof-driven. Third, while the independence axiom is a necessary condition for expected utility theory, economists struggled to understand how von Neumann and Morgenstern used it. It was not clear where the Theory of Games hid that assumption. After economists discovered the independence axiom, they did not find an immediate use for it / Esta dissertação estuda a recepção imediata do Theory of Games and Economic Behavior, de von Neumann e Morgenstern. Seu foco reside em como economistas (e outros cientistas, tais como matemáticos) reagiram à axiomatização da teoria de utilidade esperada composta por von Neumann e Morgenstern. Tal estudo se vale de resenhas do Theory of Games, artigos autorados por leitores proficientes em matemática que seguiram a deixa dos autores de axiomatizar teoria de escolha sob incerteza e, por fim, artigos cujas citações incluem trabalhos destes leitores habilidosos. Há três conclusões principais. Primeiro, para entender a história de recepção do Theory of Games, é importante considerar que fontes secundárias agiram como disseminadores de premissas, resultados e o próprio método do Theory of Games. Segundo, muitos leitores capazes refletiram sobre o livro de von Neumann e Morgenstern. A maioria dos que usaram tal literatura a fizeram de acordo com o método axiomático, citanto aqueles artigos para reproduzir ou adaptar hipóteses. Dentre os que os citaram para aplicar seus resultados diretamente usaram ferramentas matemáticas menos sofisticadas e não tinham como objetivo a produção de demonstrações formais, em geral. Terceiro, enquanto o axioma de independência é uma condição necessária para a teoria de utilidade esperada, economistas tiveram dificuldades em compreender como von Neumann e Morgenstern usaram-no. Não estava claro para eles onde o Theory of Games o havia escondido. Uma vez que os economistas descobriram o axioma, não encontraram uso imediato para ele

Cette thèse a pour objectif d’étudier les relations interalliées entre l’Italie et l’Entente avec rigueur et dans toutes ses dimensions : militaire, diplomatique, économique et sociale de 1914 à 1919. Nous avons établi des rapports de forces et des lignes stratégiques structurants les anciens et nouveaux équilibres stratégiques de la guerre à la paix de Versailles. L’Italie de l’indépendance stratégique en 1914-1916 à la subordination envers lesAlliés en 1917, pour finir par être vassalisée en 1918-1919 par l’Entente et les Etats-Unis. La Victoire Mutilée de1919 devient un résultat logique provenant du nouvel ordre mondial crée par la Première Guerre Mondiale.Ce résultat est obtenu par une nouvelle analyse stratégique globale fondée sur les déterminants de la puissance :l’économie, la cohésion nationale, l’effort de guerre et les victoires ou défaites qui en découlent, la diplomatie, les forces morales des nations. Cette analyse balaie tout le spectre du conflit armé : de la déclaration de guerre à la paix. Elle est fondée sur 3 piliers théoriques : la pensée stratégique de Sun Tzu, l’héritage de Clausewitz, et lathéorie des jeux. Les lignes stratégiques obtenues définissent des rapports de force internationaux et de nouveauxéquilibres. Cette thèse débouche au niveau de la recherche historique sur une nouvelle vision des relations interalliées durant la Grande Guerre. Elle revient au fondement de l’histoire : la politique et la guerre en sont le coeur. Il s’agit de rendre à l’histoire politico-militaire ses lettres de noblesse. Cependant 3 pistes de recherches restent à explorer : les rivalités culturelles entre nations, les différences entre modèles sociaux, et une analyse des mentalités. Le Fascisme est la conséquence ultime en Italie de la guerre en raison de la Victoire Mutilée et l’affaiblissement général du pays. En effet, la guerre a déstabilisé le pays en créant une crise politique, socio économique grave. La naissance de l’esprit Arditi, l’absence de réformes sociales en 1919 et l’expérience de la guerre sont-ils responsables de la Marche sur Rome par les fascistes ? / This thesis aims to study interallied relationships between Italy and the Entente with rigor and in all dimensions: military, diplomatic, economic and social from 1914 to 1919. We can establish force reports and strategic lines in order to structuring old and new balances from war to Versailles’ peace. The world war one beganby an independent Italy in 1914-1916. Then in 1917, Italy became an subordinate state toward Allies. Finaly, in1918-1919 Italy was a vassal state of Allies and Associates. The injured victory of 1919 became a logic result inreason of new global order created by the World War one.This result is obtained by a new strategic global analysis,founded on power determinants: economy, national cohesion, war effort, diplomacy and moral forces of nations.This analysis scans all the spectre of war: from breaking out to peace. It’s founded on three theoric schemes: thestategic think of Sun Tzu, the war meaning of Clauzewitz and the game theory. The obtained strategic lines giveinternational force reports and new balances.This thesis emerges on historic level on a new vision of interalliedrelationships during the World War one. It was back at historic foundation: policy and war are the history heart. It concerns to restore at politic and military history her nobility letters. Moreover it stays three research sectors todevelop: cultural rivalries between nations, differences between social models, and a psychologic analysis.Fascism is the last consequence in Italy from war and the injured victory. Italy was lower than before the WorldWar one. The World War one has destabilized Italy by creating a politic and economic crisis. The beginning of Arditi spirit, missing of social reforms in 1919 and the experience of war are they in charge of the March onRome by Fascists ?