I will argue that Plato’s dialogue Theaetetus demonstrates that knowledge is never caused by sense perception. While various kinds of qualities appear to the soul or mind as a result of sense perception—as a result of external bodies impacting with the sense organs—the being (einai or ousia) of these qualities is something different from the mere appearance of the qualities that occurs through the senses. While white colors appear to the soul through vision, perception itself does not reveal that these many appearances are all instances of one white quality. However, I will demonstrate that it is impossible to know anything, even something as basic as “the chalk is white,” if the knower does not recognize that “white” is some one thing and not merely a plurality of instances. Since sense perception does not disclose the one being of what appears within it, knowledge always requires the soul or mind to go beyond what is receptively disclosed to it through sense perception. In order to demonstrate this conclusion, Plato uses a reductio ad absurdum argument. He develops a theory that argues for the opposite conclusion. According to this theory, perceiving and knowing are the same. In order to justify this result, the theory posits that qualities have no one being that is distinct from their many appearances. I will show that the theory entails a series of unacceptable consequences. The worst of these consequences is that it makes reality itself is unintelligible—according to the theory, the world cannot be linguistically described because the world does not possess any concrete determinacy to describe as a result of the theory denying the difference between being and appearances. Plato’s Socrates demonstrates that these conclusions are unacceptable on the theory’s own terms. As a result, the theory fails and the postulate that being and appearances are identical must be rejected. It is impossible for the mere appearance of a quality through sense perception to ever be knowledge. It will only be possible for knowledge to come about through an activity of the soul that discovers the being of what appears to it.

This thesis has its starting-point in a recognition that, so far, Maurice Blanchot's work has been considered as posing its critic an impossible problem. In recognising this, however, it does not seek merely to provide advance justification for its own shortcomings. On the contrary, it sets out to demonstrate that the impossibility of accounting for Blanchot's work arises not simply because he is a 'difficult' author, but because his sole ambition has been to call into question the entire categoric framework of possibility in terms of which we seek to approach him. The task it seeks to fulfil is thus to locate the gradually occurring break with traditional categories which is at the heart of Blanchot's work. On the basis of close attention to the variants between his finished works and the original texts which constitute them, it seeks to transform his work from the forbidding, self-sufficient universe it is generally taken to be, and, by replacing Blanchot in his neriod, to show how he brings about a gradually evolving transmutation of the forms and structures within which literature is traditionally contained. The period it examines lies between the appearance of Thomas l'obscure in 1941 and that of L'Espace littéraire in 1955. More precisely, by detailed study of L'Arrêt de mort and of the development of his criticism from La Part du feu to L'Espace littéraire, it seeks to reveal how, in the domain of fiction and in that of criticism, Blanchot sets about subverting the very structure of language, preparing the way for the new literary idiom which is his today, and in which fiction and theory coexist in a single philosophical discourse of great originality.

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Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, Dept. of Germanic Studies, 2006. / Title from PDF t.p. (viewed Nov. 11, 2008). Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 67-11, Section: A, page: 4197. Adviser: Fritz Breithaupt.

In this thesis I try to answer the question of what attitude the ancient sceptics had towards the notion of belief. I concern myself exclusively with Pyrrhonic scepticism, as it was described by Sextus Empiricus in his book Pyrrhoniai hypotyposeis. Pyrrhonic scepticism was an epistemological system with ethical ramifications, that questioned most of the conventional wisdom of the time, I begin by evaluating two infleuntial readings, by Michael Frede and Casey Perin. I then go on to make my own assessment. Ultimately, I show why Frede's view is the more plausible; the sceptics allowed themselves to hold beliefs about reality, not just appearance.

Being and Structure in Plato’s Sophist is a study of the metaphysical notion of being as it is at play in Plato’s dialogue the Sophist, and the senses in which Plato’s conception of being entails further accounts of ontological structure and goodness. While modern metaphysics primarily concerns existence, ancient metaphysics primarily concerns what grounds what, and in this dissertation I consider the nature and value of Plato’s understanding of being as a notion of ground rather than a principle of existence. I argue that Plato conceives of being in the fundamentally unified sense of participation, which entails a self-and-other and hence complex relation. For Plato, being must be understood in its context as one among many Platonic forms, or the network of mutually co-constitutive structures of determinacy that are the grounding stability necessary for the very possibilities of becoming, knowing, and discourse. I argue that Plato inherits his view in large part from Parmenides, and that the account in the Sophist makes explicit a previously implicit aspect of the Parmenidean tradition insofar as it involves a novel sense of nonbeing not as absolute nothingness, but instead as difference in the sense of constitutive and determinate otherness. I furthermore discuss the ways in which this account helps to show the connections between seemingly disparate elements of the dialogue like its dramatic setting, the method of division, and the discussion of the great ontological kinds. In this way, the dissertation entails a study of the entire dialogue and the interrelation of its parts, as well as its context among several other key Platonic and Parmenidean texts.

<p>My dissertation analyzes the overlooked character types of <i>akrasia </i>(un-self-control) and <i>enkrateia </i>(self-control) in Aristotle’s ethics. In Chapter 1, I argue for the thesis that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types, or settled psychological dispositions, definable in terms of unique un-self-controlled and self-controlled relations to choice-making. In Chapters 2 and 3, I argue for the thesis that agents do not express these character types only in temperance’s practical domain; rather, agents can express <i>akrasia</i> and <i>enkrateia</i> in any practical domain where one’s reason can conflict with one’s desire, so the character types have wide ranges of expression. More specifically, in Chapter 2, I develop a distinction between strict forms of the character types, which agents express in temperance’s practical domain, and loose forms of the character types, which agents express in other practical domains (e.g., in courage’s practical domain). I also argue that the strict and loose forms of each of the character types are united according to the ontological and terminological relation of metaphor, or inclusive resemblance. In Chapter 3, I draw two lines of psychological justification for the view that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are wide-ranging character types and respond to some scholarly objections. In Chapter 4, I build an account of ethical practical syllogisms and differentiate them from non-ethical practical syllogisms; I argue that an agent expresses her character type through each feature of an ethical practical syllogism (i.e., not only through the enacted choice that concludes an ethical practical syllogism, but also through the propositions she exercises in it). Finally, in Chapter 5, I construct and analyze loose akratic and enkratic practical syllogisms in a variety of practical domains to show that <i>akrasia </i>and <i>enkrateia </i>are character types with wide ranges of expression.<b></b></p>

This study has addressed the need for greater understanding of the part education for social change plays in the process of creating a more just, equitable, and humane society. The purpose of this study has been to develop a better understanding of education for social change through examining the case of Highlander Center, a leader and pioneer in American education in the Appalachian region, and its efforts to create greater economic democracy and a more just and democratic society. Initially the author presents the case of Highlander Center and a review of the literature of education for social change to establish a conceptual foundation for this phenomenon and to provide examples of this alternative educational approach. The study then focuses on the qualitative case study methodology that was used in collecting data through open-ended, in-depth interviews with Highlander Center staff and program participants, participant observation at Highlander Center education for social change workshops and trainings, site observations of program participants' efforts in four communities in three Appalachian states, and document analysis. Five themes are used to present the findings of the study: (1) The Economic Problem in Appalachia, (2) Forces That Aid Social Change Toward Greater Economic Democracy, (3) Forces That Constrain Change Toward Greater Economic Democracy, (4) Highlander Center Education for Social Change, and (5) The Part Education for Social Change Plays in the Process of Creating a Society That Is More Democratic and Just. Finally, a summary and interpretation of the research findings are presented, implications for education for social change including a Social and Human Reality Framework of Education for Social Change are discussed, and suggestions are made for further research.

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