The main aim of this thesis is to present an account of Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy and to demonstrate its relevance to contemporary issues in the methodology of the history of philosophy both insofar as Hegel still has interesting things to say to contemporary historians, and insofar as an understanding of Hegel's views helps us understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. In the first chapter, I present the conceptual scaffolding which enables us to compare Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy with contemporary approaches to the history of philosophy. I also criticize some of the myths that have developed around Hegel's conception of the history of philosophy. In the second chapter, I present the principles that constitute Hegel's evaluative framework: coherence or non-contradiction (in relation to the concept of Aufhebung), concreteness, systematicity, autonomy, and the use of clear conceptual language in philosophical discourse. Aside from these formal principles, I also identify a substantive philosophical thesis which Hegel seems to use in order to evaluate development in the history of philosophy, namely, the identity of thought and being. In the third chapter I attempt to attenuate the tension that exists between Hegel's methodological prescriptions, especially the claim that we should be on guard against anachronistic readings and that critique should be internal, with the manner in which he seems to consistently read past philosophers through his own system. I suggest two perspectives which can help attenuate this tension. First, I emphasize that Hegel is trying to write an anti-individualistic history of philosophy, where philosophical systems are presented as public culture achievements and the individual idiosyncrasies of philosophers are suppressed. Second, I show how Hegel's semantic and epistemic holism helps us make sense of the way that he approaches the history of philosophy. In the fourth and final chapter I discuss Hegel's conception of the relationship between philosophy and its socio-cultural milieu, and based on this discussion, I show that Hegel did not think that there is continuity in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in, and that he thought that the main purpose of the history of philosophy is to provide metaphilosophical reconstructions and justifications of shifts in the kinds of problems that philosophers have been interested in. / Thesis / Master of Arts (MA) / In this thesis I attempt to fill in a gap in Anglophone scholarship on Hegel by presenting an account of a much neglected aspect of Hegel's system, namely, Hegel's account and conception of the history of philosophy. I begin by attempting to dispel some misunderstandings that have distorted the Anglophone reception of this aspect of Hegel's thought, and by emphasizing the importance of understanding Hegel's views on the history of philosophy if one wishes to understand later developments in the historiography of philosophy. I then present the principles by which Hegel evaluates development in the history of philosophy, and I attempt to attenuate some of the tension which seems to exist between Hegel's methodological prescriptions and his actual practice as a historian of philosophy. I conclude with an account of Hegel's views on continuity in the history of philosophy, and their relation to contemporary views on continuity in the history of philosophy.

Is language a tool of empire or is empire a tool of language? This thesis examines the cultivation of Carolingian hegemony on a pan-European scale; one defined by a renewed interest in the study of language and its relationship to Carolingian eagerness for moral and spiritual authority. Intended to complement previous work on Carolingian cultural politics, this thesis reiterates the emergence of active philosophical speculation during the late eighth and early ninth centuries. Prior research has ignored the centrality of linguistic hermeneutics in the Carolingian literate programme. This thesis addresses this lacuna, demonstrating the symbiotic relationship between spirituality, language, and politics within the Carolingian world. The work appropriates prior investigations into the connection of semiotics and Christian philosophy and proposes the development of a renewed interest into ontology and epistemology by Carolingian scholars, notably Alcuin of York and Theodulf of Orléans. The correlation between linguistic philosophy and spiritual authority is confirmed by the 794 Synod of Frankfurt, at which accusations towards both the Adoptionist movement of northern Spain and the repeal of Byzantine Iconoclasm were based on the dangers of linguistic misinterpretation. The thesis also explores the manifestation of this emergent philosophy of language within the manuscript evidence, witnessed by the biblical pandects produced by Alcuin and Theodulf. Desire for the emendation of texts, not to mention the formation of a uniform script (Caroline Minuscule), abetted the larger goal of both infusing a text with authority (both secular and divine) and allowing for broader spiritual and intellectual understanding of a text. Increasing engagement with classical philosophy and rhetoric, the nature of Carolingian biblical revision, and the cultural politics as seen at the Synod of Frankfurt depict the primacy of language to the Carolingians, not only as a tool of imperialism, but the axis of their intellectual and spiritual world.

<p>This dissertation is a rhetorical-historiographic analysis of the emergence and dissolution of a model of therapy, one that showed promise in the 1950s as a treatment for a deadly disease (alcoholism) using a recently developed pharmaceutical drug (LSD-25). By the time this treatment model, called “psychedelic therapy,” was fully developed and ready to be tested, the rhetoric surrounding LSD in the 1960s public sphere had already turned mainstream psychiatry against the drug. Psychedelic therapy became rhetorically inextricable from the counterculture that grew out of its fringes, although its basic principles were actually borrowed from the widely-accepted Alcoholics Anonymous recovery movement. Moreover, the therapy only worked if the patient took the drug in a context designed to facilitate a particular type of experience, akin to a spiritual conversion. This method flew in the face of psychiatry’s insistence on double-blind placebo-controlled trials, which could only account for the drug’s strictly biochemical effects, regardless of therapeutic context. Through my analysis of archival sources, letters, conference proceedings, and research publications, I argue that psychedelic therapy’s failure to gain legitimacy despite its early success indicates how attributions of  rhetorical action (or lack thereof) serve to mark out the boundaries of discursive arenas. These demarcations of <em>rhetorical </em>legitimacy thus allow for disciplinary legitimacy, even while the techniques, strategies, and materials of particular rhetorical appeals circulate among disciplines and other arenas without regard for these limits of legitimate persuasion. A drug may undeniably affect a person’s behavior, but to assert that the drug is persuasive will necessarily raise questions of legitimacy that must be resolved before it can be incorporated into a set of disciplinary practices.</p>

<div>This dissertation redefines the placebo effect in light of new empirical observations and certain strands of philosophical ethics. </div>Chapter 1 critically reviews available definitions of placebo responsiveness against their abilities to hang together the diversity of empirical observations and emerging research interests. Projecting Wittgenstein's example of a child learning pain language, Chapter 2 redefines the phenomenon as a particular kind of experience of meaning and reconsiders clinical empathy in terms of the loss and recovery of language that belongs to illness experience and diagnosis. Chapter 3 broadens the account of psychosomatic responsiveness from the experience of meaning to the experience of values, utilising Canguilhem's definition of health and Nietzsche's genealogical account of the health of values. Chapter 4 explores the foregoing by recounting how Wittgenstein's moral philosophy might hold together the traditional ethical and bioethical question of what makes life worth living with psychosomatic responsiveness.

<p>This dissertation traces both professional and public concerns about the Earth’s environmental limits from the late 1960s to 1990s, at the intersection of reproductive rights and aerospace technology. It considers two rather ‘radical’ and opposing grassroots activist approaches for how to best address the environmental and population crises that gained public traction at the turn of the 1970s: zero population growth and space settlement. The current scholarship has examined the ‘era of limits,’ and modern environmentalism and population control activism from both U.S. and global perspectives, considering how policy, science, gender, politics, and the media shape public understandings and both local and state responses. Zero growth proponents, through both coercive and voluntary campaigns, sought to demonstrate and halt the damage that unchecked economic and population growth was causing the planet. Yet these histories rarely consider the rise of new spaceflight technologies and thought during the same period, which promised a pro-growth, technology-infused solution to the limits to growth, one that would not impose restrictions on consumptive, environmental, or reproductive behavior. Responding to recent scholarly efforts to better contextualize aerospace technology into social and cultural histories of the post-Apollo era, this dissertation focuses on the grassroots activism of two organizations: Zero Population Growth (ZPG), which advocated for zero growth, and the L-5 Society (including a student-run affiliate chapter called the Maryland Alliance for Space Colonization), which promoted space settlement and the manufacturing of clean, pollution-free energy and mining resources for Earth. In this dissertation, I argue that in order to fully understand the implications of ‘Earthly limits’ on American society, we need to look at the role of grassroots activists. How did their concerns form, persist, and change over the course of the late twentieth century? Using primary and archival material and oral histories of the members, it analyzes their dynamics, goals, and stakes in ideas about limits to growth and a finite Earth. Centering on the diverse personal stories and experiences of former activists reveals their unique motivations for joining their respective groups, why they advocated for such different approaches to the limits to growth, and how their drive for a better future continued long after popular enthusiasm for zero growth and space settlement waned by the late 1970s.</p>

This thesis presents Hegel’s account of abstract ‘understanding’ (Verstand) and asserts that his thought is to be read as primarily presenting a critique of abstract understanding. Verstand involves the methodological supposition of a self-subsistent fundament of what it speaks of, and hence the critique of understanding is the critique of the supposition of self-subsistent fundaments. Grasping his account and reading him in its critical light yields a very different image of Hegel than the caricature of ‘totalizing systems’. The dimension of the Verstandeskritik has been relatively neglected in Hegel-reception and misunderstandings result from trying to ‘understand’ Hegel, by overlooking the topic of ‘understanding’ in his work as critique. Many caricatures result from understanding Hegel as a proponent of what he actually critiques (‘absolute knowing’ is often understood as a mega-understanding). The thesis then addresses the historically influential criticisms raised by his contemporary, F.J.W. Schelling, to give a voice to a Hegel that has been hitherto drowned out by caricatures that began with Schelling.

<p>This sentence is whatever truth is <em>not</em>. The subject of this master’s thesis is the power, influence, and solvability of the liar paradox. This paradox can be constructed through the application of a standard conception of truth and rules of inference are applied to sentences such as the first sentence of this abstract. The liar has been a powerful problem of philosophy for thousands of years, from its ancient origin (examined in Chapter One) to a particularly intensive period in the twentieth century featuring many ingenious but ultimately unsuccessful solutions from brilliant logicians, mathematicians and philosophers (examined in Chapter Two, Chapter Three, and Chapter Four). Most of these solutions were unsuccessful because of a recurring problem known as the liar’s revenge; whatever truth is <em>not</em> includes, as it turns out, not <em>just</em> falsity, but also meaninglessness, ungroundedness, gappyness, and so on. The aim of this master’s thesis is to prove that we should not consign ourselves to the admission that the liar is and always will just be a paradox, and thus unsolvable. Rather, I argue that the liar <em>is</em> solvable; I propose and defend a novel solution which is examined in detail in the latter half of Chapter Two, and throughout Chapter Three. The alternative solution I examine and endorse (in Chapter Four) is not my own, owing its origin and energetic support to Graham Priest. I argue, however, for a more qualified version of Priest’s solution. I show that, even if we accept a very select few true contradictions, it should <em>not</em> be assumed that inconsistency inevitably spreads throughout other sets of sentences used to describe everyday phenomena such as motion, change, and vague predicates in the empirical world.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

I interpret and defend Kant's criticism of traditional metaphysics and his indirect proof of transcendental idealism in the first Critique's Antinomy of Pure Reason. Throughout my thesis, I focus on the role of the principle "P2" in the Antinomy ("If the conditioned is given, then the whole sum of conditions, and hence the absolutely unconditioned, is given"). I first defend Kant's use of the principle to motivate the proofs of the Thesis and Antithesis arguments in the second antinomy, which concerns composition, and the third antinomy, which concerns causality. I then explain how the role of P2 in the proofs exposes Kant's indirect proof of transcendental idealism to a significant challenge, to which I develop a response. Finally, I pose the question of whether Kant ultimately argues that the unconditioned exists, or whether he argues that it is merely possible that the unconditioned exists. I explore both options and outline avenues for further consideration of this question, which I argue is crucial to understanding Kant's critical project.

In this thesis I present a strong and universally compelling case for the importance of Heidegger’s question, namely, the question of the meaning of being. I show how the being-question has been obscured and forgotten over the past two millennia of western philosophy. I attempt to raise this question again, and elucidate why it is an important one to examine, not only for philosophy as a discipline, but for any human endeavor. My aim is to reach those of you who would normally not come across, or might even dismiss, Heidegger’s work. I hope the arguments I make will convince you, hard though it may be, that reawakening ourselves to the question of being is a task that we must undertake.

To many people love is special, sacred even. Love plays a countless number of roles for a countless number of people. Contemporary ideas about love, however, are more in alignment with the philosophies of Aristotle, and not of Plato. Aristotle held that love could exist as many people see it today – wishing well for others purely for their own sake. But Plato disagreed. Plato claimed that love was a way by which one could better themselves and become wiser. In this thesis, I explain Plato’s theory of love put forth in the Symposium. I also explore the textual evidence for the selfish nature of Plato’s love.