No description available.

This dissertation tracks a series of literary interventions into scientific debates of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, showing how the realist novel generated new techniques of description in response to pressing philosophical problems about agency, materiality, and embodiment. In close conversation with developments in the sciences, writers such as George Eliot, Thomas Hardy, and Olive Schreiner portrayed human agency as contiguous with rather than opposed to the pulsations of the physical world. The human, for these authors, was not a privileged or even an autonomous entity but a node in a web of interactive and co-constitutive materialities. Focused on works of English fiction published between 1870-1920, I argue that the historical convergence of a British materialist science and a vitalistic Continental natural philosophy led to the rise of a dynamic realism attentive to material forces productive of “character.” Through the literary figure of character and the novelistic practice of description, I show, turn-of-the-century realists explored what it meant to be an embodied subject, how qualities in organisms emerge and develop, and the relationship between nature and culture more broadly.

Gegen die Unumgänglichkeit des philosophiehistorischen Wissens sich zu stellen, haben verschiedene Denker unternommen, andere wollen die Umgangsformen der Philosophiegeschichte reformieren und neue Modelle des (historischen) Umgangs einführen. Gilles Deleuze nun scheint beides zu versuchen, indem er dem philosophiehistorischen Wissen als Philosoph jede Evidenz bestreitet und es zugleich als Philosophiehistoriker in einer neuen Umgangsweise aufhebt. Seine Philosophie ist offenbar verträglich mit einer Rede über andere Philosophien, ja scheint sie sogar zu fördern, wenn man so die Tatsache interpretieren will, daß Ddeuze eine ganze Reihe von Büchern zu einzelnen Denkern veröffentlicht hat. Wie diese Beziehung von Philosophie und Philosophiegeschichte bei ihm aussieht, ist bisher nicht untersucht. Zum paradoxen Unterfangen von Gilles Deleuze, Philosophiegeschichte zu treiben und sie zugleich zu unterlaufen, die folgenden Überlegungen, deren vorläufiger Charakter daran zu erkennen ist, daß sie sich an verstreuten expliziten Äußerungen orientieren.

Daß Cousin heute weitgehend vergessen ist, liegt eben daran, daß sein Tun und Wirken als Philosoph eng mit der Bildungspolitik seiner Zeit verwoben ist. Daß unsere Lehrbücher der Philosophiegeschichte ihn lediglich anführen als einen, der das Studium der Philosophiegeschichte gefördert habe, ist ein dialektischer Rückschlag der von Cousin selbst ins Werk gesetzten Historisierung, denn Cousin hat schnell das Prestige des „großen\" Philosophen verloren, das - nach seinen eigenen Vorstellungen - Unvergeßlichkeit garantiert. Vermeren zeigt überzeugend, daß es einen Weg gibt, diesem Vergessen mit Erkenntnisgewinn entgegenzusteuern, eben auf dem Weg einer Intellektuellengeschichte.

What does it mean to do philosophy historically, and when does the legend of philosophy begin? When Hegel tried to give a logical explanation of philosophy's history, was he doing the same thing as Eduard Zeller in his account of Creek thought, or Kuno Fischer in his narrative of modern philosophy? l do not believe so, and I shall sugges t in the following that we should carefully differentiate between the different activities commonly referred to as the history of philosophy. I will point out the enormous productivity of the 19th century in terms of printed books devoted to the history of philosophy. I will also point to the context in which these were produced and used rather than examining individual works or authors. There is an entirely new context in the 19th century, which is the study of philosophy. A proper culture developed around the historical interest in philosophy, and it is this culture I want to sketch here.

This essay is called In the head of Garibaldi – a study about the portrayal of Garibaldi in biographies and focuses on the literary portrayal of Garibaldi in biographies published in the early 20th century and the early 21st century. The purpose of the essay is to describe the possible changes in the way of portraying Garibaldi in biographies and compare the portraying to the portrayal of Garibaldi that Garibaldi himself gives in the American translation of his memoirs, which were published in New York 1859.I have in this study used a constructivist approach with focus on the attributes, ideals and roles of Garibaldi. Research and thoughts from a wide field of science has been used, for example the works on nationalism by Elie Kedourie and Ernest Gellner. The thoughts on biographies as a scientific genre as described in the anthologies Att skriva människan (Ambjörnsson, Ringby & Åkerman red.) and Med livet som insats (Rosengren & Östling red.) has also been of the utmost importance of the study.The results of the study shows that there has been changes in the way of portraying Garibaldi in biographies, as showed in the more unbiased portrayals in the newer biographies. A larger focus on criticism of the sources is also apparent in the newer biographies. In a comparison between the biographies and Garibaldi‟s memoirs it stands clear that the memoirs and the biographies portrays and depicts the myth of Garibaldi, with more or less focus on fiction.

No description available.

This dissertation is a study of the ontological foundations of true and false speech in Plato’s Sophist. Unlike most contemporary scholarship on the Sophist, my dissertation offers a wholistic account of the dialogue, demonstrating that the ontological theory of the “communing” of forms and the theory of true and false speech later in the dialogue entail one another. As I interpret it, the account of true and false speech in the Sophist is primarily concerned with true and false speech about the forms. As Plato sees it, we can only make true statements about spatio-temporal beings if it is possible to make true statements about the forms. Statements about the forms, however, make claims about how forms “commune” with other forms, that is, how forms are intelligibly related to and participate in one another. If forms stand in determinate relations of participation to other forms, however, then forms, as the relata of these relations, must compose structured wholes. Yet if they compose structured wholes, there must be a higher order normative principle that explains their structure. This creates a regress problem. In order to ground the structure of spatio-temporal beings, forms must be the highest explanatory principles. The theory of the “communing” of forms, however, makes it seem as if the forms require further explanation. This dissertation argues (1) that in the Sophist Plato solves the regress problem and (2) that, by doing so, he is able to ground true and false speech about the forms. I demonstrate that he solves the regress problem by differentiating a form’s nature from a form qua countable object. Then I show that this distinction between a form’s nature and a form qua countable object explains how true and false statements about the forms are possible.

No description available.

No description available.