Made available in DSpace on 2014-07-29T16:17:46Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 dissertacao leonardo historia.pdf: 616881 bytes, checksum: 631648834d6528ae2257c1fe889bf3d2 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2009-12-09 / This dissertation aims to establish a relation between the thought of Gilles Deleuze and historical science. We started from the concept of realism, as it was worked by the historian Jacques Rancière. According to this concept, the thought of the current story is marked by Nihilism, and especially by the thought of the Possibility. The thought of the possibility is a determination of the Historical event from its possibility s, a subsumption of the event to the possibility system of a certain time. It is through the possibility thought that we try to elaborate a relation between the thought of Deleuze and historical science. The thought of this author gives us "lines of flight or fight", which shifts the history of thought as possible. However, before that, one another issue still requires our attention: the critique Deleuzian criticism to the history. Is there a radical and exclusive critique of the history in the thinking of this author? After examining this issue, giving a negative answer, we present some points from the philosophy of Difference and Repetition, in order to outline the design of singular conception of history in this system. The hypothesis here is that this notion of history is not constructed on the thought of possibilities but in the thought possible, but in the thought of the virtual. In this sense, rather than being subsumed in a negative ontology of the event and a time of anti-event, elements that correspond to the thinking of the possible, the notion of history produced by the philosophy of Difference and Repetition is a history that has an affirmative ontology of the event and a time that is the time of the event / Esta dissertação tem por objetivo elaborar uma relação entre o pensamento de Gilles Deleuze e a ciência histórica. Para isso, partimos do conceito de realismo, tal como este foi trabalhado pelo historiador Jacques Rancière. De acordo com este conceito, o plano de pensamento da história atual é marcado por um niilismo, e, principalmente, por um pensamento do possível. O pensamento do possível é uma determinação do acontecimento histórico a partir de sua condição de possibilidade; uma subsunção do acontecimento ao sistema de possibilidade de uma determinada época. É através deste pensamento do possível que tentamos elaborar uma relação entre o pensamento de Deleuze e a ciência histórica. Já que o pensamento deste autor nos fornece linhas de fuga , que desloca a história do pensamento do possível. Todavia, antes dessa, um outra questão ainda requer a nossa atenção: a crítica deleuzeana à história. Será que há uma crítica radical e exclusiva à história no pensamento deste autor? Após examinarmos esta questão, dando-lhe uma resposta negativa, apresentamos alguns pontos da filosofia da diferença e da repetição, com o intuito de esboçar a singular concepção de história contida nesse sistema. A hipótese que lançamos aqui é a de que esta noção de história não está calcada num pensamento do possível, e sim num pensamento do virtual. Nesse sentido, ao invés de estar subsumida a uma ontologia negativa do acontecimento e a um tempo do anti-acontecimento, elementos que correspondem ao pensamento do possível, a noção de história produzida pela filosofia da diferença e da repetição é uma história que possui uma ontologia afirmativa do acontecimento e um tempo que é o tempo do acontecimento

This study sets out to reclaim the ontological epistemology of Saint Thomas Aquinas which serves as a unifier of knowledge in being, within the philosophical milieu of being’s forgottenness. Post-Humean and Kantian thought made appearance rather than being solely accessible to the thinking subject. The consequence has been the marginalisation of being as reflected in truth – influenced by scientistic and postmodern paradigms – which has contributed to both the paucity of meaningless metaphysics, and the conceptualisation of science and faith as necessarily opposing categories. To the end of establishing that science and faith have points of intersection, it is argued that the reclamation of Thomist natural philosophy leads to the defence of a clarified form of realism. Establishing the “real” implies that the metaphysical dimensions of the problem of existence can be explored. Within this realist model, the “pre-Modern” Thomistic theory of “scientia” is employed to bring physical and natural science and metaphysics into relationship as components of true knowledge of being. Consequently, the author puts forth that “scientia” is exemplified in, amongst others, the particular science of cosmology since the rudimentary point of engagement between physical and metaphysical science occurs in the act of creation, that is, when being comes into existence. Whilst metaphysics is often disregarded, it is consistently proposed that the causal nature of being demands – by its presence – a more robust account than physical and natural science can offer. The contribution made by this work rests in its ontologically-formed epistemic typology whereby “hard” science and faith are related in boundary areas of knowledge, that is, when metaphysical problems emerge from within physical and natural science. By reimaging “hard” science and reasonable faith within “scientia”, both approaches are conceived as adequating to truth when their content is reflective of being. / Thesis (DPhil)--University of Pretoria, 2014. / lk2014 / Philosophy / DPhil / Unrestricted

The dissertation is entitled "Patronage and social mobility in the aristocracies of the Principate". Patronage is defined as a reciprocal exchange relationship between men of unequal social status (municipal patronage is excluded). The work falls into three parts. In the first the language of patronage (patronus, cliens, amicus, beneficium, etc.) is defined; the reciprocity ethic implicit in the language is described; and the spheres of social life in which the patronal ideology was applied by Romans are located. The core of the dissertation is devoted to a description of the patronage networks extending from the emperor through the imperial aristocracy to the provincial aristocracy (in particular, that of North Africa). At each level a description is offered of the economic, social and political goods and services exchanged and the types of people who entered into the patron-client relationships. Further, there is an attempt to show that the fact that Rome remained a patronal society in the Principate has broad implications: the distribution of a variety of offices and honors depended solely on patronage; senators continued to be important patrons distributing their own as well as imperial beneficia to their clients; senators and equites were bound together in a single patronal network; and patronage is perhaps the best explanation for the increasing entry of provincials into the imperial aristocracy. Traditionally it has been argued that the importance of patronage in the Principate was diminished by increasingly rigid bureaucratic machinery in which appointments and promotions were based on merit and especially seniority. Chapter three provides a demonstration that the influence of these bureaucratic criteria on senatorial and equestrian careers have been greatly overestimated and that there is no reason to minimize the effects of patronage.

Renaissance creativity and obsession with classical traditions spawned a new form of horsemanship called the manege in sixteenth-century Europe. This study deals with England's rejection of the courtly horsemanship despite the dismal state of the nation's equestrian affairs. Tudor and Stuart monarchs utilized royal influence to attempt change - from legislative refmms to the horses - but no specific monarchical effort proved immediately effective. The significance of royal influence is seen in the continued importation of quality stock and in royal support for equestrian-related sports. Both enriched equine bloodlines and promoted the development of sporting tradition in England. While, with royal encouragement, the manege and its 'dancing' horses enjoyed a brief acceptance in England, both were spurned in favor of sports and the developing Thoroughbred horse. English horsemen of the 1600s found their own voice regarding horsemanship in the written works of Blundeville, Markham, Astley, and Clifford. These English authors criticized the manege as 'violent.' Furthermore, such riding was considered futile in warfare and impractical for riding in the open English countryside. The majority of aristocratic riders became obsessed with the new riding styles made popular by racing and other histories have given attention to the emerging group of horsemanship writers in England, this thesis deals with the aristocratic rebuff of the manege and its proponents. English nobles even disregarded their own reputable horseman, William Cavendish, whose teachings reveal a diligent manege master with a competent understanding of the equine mentality. By 1620, the associated 'violence' in manege training waned as a second generation of riding masters - largely French - advocated greater humanity and patience in methodology. However, the English had already charted their own course in horsemanship and had no use for the 'frivolous' riding. English renunciation of the manege is but one expression of the country's isolationism during the period, and its focus internally is congruent with a growing nationalism that favored things 'uniquely British.'

This thesis examines Karl Jaspers' theory of the origin of man in a historical period 2500 years ago.Jaspers believes that it was then that man's current mental and spiritual consciousness was formed and developed. Jaspers was convinced that man should use the abilities of his origin as a counterforce in the struggle in modern reality, a development which in many respects was based on myths, dogmas and irrationality, and which characterized man's living conditions. After suffering the trauma of World War II until 1945, Jaspers decided to identify the good qualities that he believed all people should have in common, thereby creating new existential conditions. Jaspers started from the archaic and classical times in history and then found a period where man had obviously been endowed with specific soul gifts and cognitive qualities. He called the period "the axial age" in the book published in 1949, Vom Ursprung und Ziel der Geschichte, which was then translated into English in 1953 with the title The Origin and Goal of History. The English edition is the primary source in this study. In his book, Jaspers uses a philosophical-historical perspective on the origins and events that he associates with human development during the axial age, in order to draw attention to the normative image we have of our selves and others as human beings in the world. Jaspers pedagogically describes the life man lives in modernity in the same way as when Plato explains the world of ideas. As it is demonstrated in the thesis, Jasper's idea is based on a speculative reflection on the origin and properties of man and regards it as a "tabula rasa" with new existential conditions intended for man in the modern world, facing a charge and a prelude to the future. Furthermore, the thesis explores comments on and critique of this theory expressed by other scholars.

<p>I analyze Deleuze’s concept of temporality in terms of its ontology and axiological (political and aesthetic) aspects. For Deleuze, the concept of temporality is non-monolithic, in the senses that it is modified throughout his works — the monographs, lectures, and those works that were co-authored with Félix Guattari — and that it is developed through reference to a dizzying array of concepts, thinkers, artistic works, and social phenomena. </p><p>I observe that Deleuze’s concept of temporality involves a complex ontology of difference, which I elaborate through reference to Deleuze’s analyses of Ancient Greek and Stoic conceptualizations of time. From Plato through to Chrysippus, temporality gradually comes to be identified as a form that comprehends the variation of particulars. Deleuze modifies the ancients’ concept of time to suggest that time obtains as a form of ceaseless ontological variation. Through reference to Deleuze’s reading of Gilbert Simondon, I further suggest that Deleuze tends to conceive of temporality as an ontogenetic force which participates in the complex process of individuation. </p><p> A standout feature of this dissertation involves an analysis of how Deleuze’s concept of temporality is modified in his works on cinema. In <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image </i>and <i>Cinema 2: The Time-Image, </i>temporality comes to be characterized as something other than the measure of the movement of existents. In his detailed analyses of Bergson — in <i>Cinema 1: The Movement-Image, Cinema 2: The Time-Image</i>, and <i>Bergsonism </i>— Deleuze suggests that time involves an actualization of aspects of a virtual past as contemporaneous with the lived present. While not an outright denial of the relation of temporal succession, Deleuze’s claim implies a diminishment of this relation’s significance in an adequate elaboration of the nature of temporality. </p><p>Further, I observe —through reference to Deleuze’s readings of Marx, Kierkegaard, and Spinoza — that (the explicitly temporal) change of societal forms of economic organization is non-reducible to that suggested by linear evolution. The claim is that putatively discrete modes of economic organization do not enjoy temporal displacement with respect to one another. This suggests that linear evolutionary models of societal development are inadequate. This further implies that temporality is non-reducible to the relation of temporal succession. In concrete terms, societal change is characterized as immanent temporal variation.</p><p>Taken together, these analyses yield the conclusion that Deleuze tends to conceive of the nature of temporality as involving the ongoing realization of multiple — non-identical, sometimes contrary — aspects of a stochastic process of creation that is expressed in ontogenetic circumstances, social evolution, literary works, and filmic works. </p>

My thesis is concerned with the analysis of philosopher Marie Štechová. Based to the previous thesis (defended in 2015 at the University of Ostrava, lead by Prof. Zdeňka Kalnická), which summarizes the published works and manuscripts by Štechová, I can spread the previous research and so in this I can concentrate on the inclusion of the thinker into the context and especially the exploration of the specific gender aspects of her philosophy. These will then be compared with the views of other thinkers and thinkers of the period. The main aim of this diploma thesis is to extend not only the philosophical but also the literary canon about female thinkers, and also to bring closer the idea of the femininity of thinkers and thinkers at the end of the 19th century on the Czech territory.

The reception of deconstruction in recent art historiography The aim of the presented master thesis is to outline the reception of deconstruction in the contemporary art historiography and the introduction of its effects on the discipline of art history. The work deals with the term deconstruction in the sense of (1) the original philisophical and critical writing of Jacques Derrida, and (2) the method, which was implemented to literary studies at the end of the 70s and later on to other humanities, including the art history. First, theoretical part of the thesis introduces Derrida's thoughts, epistemology and the strategy of deconstruction. Second part reflects the epistemological changes a implementation of the deconstructive criticism into the art history. After imbedding the "deconstructive" current into the broader development of art history and reading of some methodological handbooks, we turn to concrete works of some art historians and their individual uses of the deconstructive implulses, namely Donald Preziosi, Norman Bryson, Michael Ann Holly, Keith Moxey, and to a lesser extend also W. J. T. Mitchell, Craig Owens, Rosalind Krauss, Stephen Melville, Donald Crimp, David Carrier and Victor Burgin. As opposed to the original derridian deconstruction, in its aplied form (art history,...

<p>  </p> <p>Medicine is often referred to as both a science and an art. The scientific rigor of medicine has allowed for the advanced and effective treatment of disease whereas the humanistic art of medicine has allowed for clinicians to uncover how best to care for their patients in a compassionate manner. This dissertation hopes to discover how medicine can coordinate scientific expertise with compassionately focused care. The goal of this dissertation, then, is to uncover how medicine can begin to develop a more personalized medicine in which patient’s values and life-plans are coordinated with a scientific understanding of the treatment of disease. First, this dissertation establishes how medicine can be split into two perspectival understandings of disease (a first-personal and second-personal understanding), then it argues how these two understands can be coordinated with one another to develop a more holistic understanding of patient care. Next, this dissertation illustrates how concepts from phenomenology hold relevance within clinical practice in order to show how clinicians can develop a more robust understand of their patients as persons. This understanding is then used to recapture an account of the clinical relevance of empathy so that clinicians are better able to imagine what it might be like to be a patient living through illness.</p>

Despite Hannah Arendt's prediction in the wake of World War II that "the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life," the majority of postwar philosophers have preferred to stay away from the idea of evil. But at the same time that philosophical reflection on the notion of evil has dissipated, there is no denying the fact that referring to "evil" has remained very common among the public at large, among political leaders, and in popular culture. To better understand what meaning the concept of evil might have for us today, in this paper I will address two main questions. First, recognizing the problems recent philosophers have raised against the idea of "evil," we should ask if we should simply take our leave of the concept of evil, admitting that it has been exhausted by overuse, shifting intellectual paradigms, and a triumphant secular age. In other words, does it make any sense for us today to go beyond calling something wrong or unjust or harmful or unspeakable and to speak in terms of "evil?" Is talk about evil simply a relic of a way of speaking and thinking about the world that we have long left behind? Is "evil" in fact one of those terms that have always drawn people into error and sometimes even into committing horrific acts? Second, if we believe we can begin to address this first set of questions about the notion of evil, it remains to be seen what exactly we might mean by evil. What are we pointing to when we call something "evil?" What makes something evil rather than merely wrong or unjust? What kinds of things do we reserve the judgment of evil for? This set of questions leads us to come up with a substantive account of evil, an account of what evil is and what distinguishes evil from other wrongdoing. To address these questions, our argument will proceed as follows. We will begin with an overview of the recent return to discussing evil after a turn away from evil by the majority working in philosophy. After giving a brief historical overview of these shifts we will then begin to argue for the need for philosophers to think about evil and the concept of evil. In short, as I will argue, because we continue to turn to the notion of evil in response to extreme forms of wrongdoing, philosophical reflection is warranted in trying to clarify what we might reasonably mean when we call an agent or action evil. Moving to a discussion of the idea of radical evil, we will begin with a close reading and interpretation of Kant's account of radical evil, pausing to discuss what he gets right and where he may err. We will then move to recent discussions of evil in contemporary philosophy, much of which can be understood as revolving around Kant's account of radical evil. In these contemporary accounts, evil is no longer used in an inclusive, wide sense, but almost exclusively to refer to the kinds of extreme, unforgivable wrongdoing we might classify under the notion of radical evil. In these recent accounts, there is an attempt to distinguish degrees of evil, between the "normal" or "ordinary" evils of serious wrongdoing that we nevertheless can understand, punish, and cope with, versus the "radical" or extreme evils that we cannot really understand, punish, or fit into our intellectual and moral frameworks. After discussing these recent accounts and appreciating the progress they make, we will nevertheless ask whether they can really help us grasp the kinds of horrendous evil they were developed in response to. In particular, we will argue that these recent accounts still fail to appreciate the notion of radical evil to its full extent, preferring to focus on the harm caused and on notions like the banality of evil and ordinary evildoers, projects which may end up distorting the nature of evil. Looking to some recent reflections on radical evil, we will argue that the Kantian notion of a perversion of the will and an evil heart help us to understand that radical evil is something that is usually anything but banal, but is a fundamental breach of our normal standards of wrongness and that this quality of excess and the inversion of the moral is what lies at the core of the acts and agents we deem evil. We will conclude by looking at the necessary limits of any abstract discussion of evil in general and how particular evils such as those experienced at Auschwitz cannot even begin to be explained by such accounts, arguing that our discomfort and horror in the face of evil nevertheless remains but that such attempts at reflection and understanding evil remain necessary and urgent.