Despite Hannah Arendt's prediction in the wake of World War II that "the problem of evil will be the fundamental question of post-war intellectual life," the majority of postwar philosophers have preferred to stay away from the idea of evil. But at the same time that philosophical reflection on the notion of evil has dissipated, there is no denying the fact that referring to "evil" has remained very common among the public at large, among political leaders, and in popular culture. To better understand what meaning the concept of evil might have for us today, in this paper I will address two main questions. First, recognizing the problems recent philosophers have raised against the idea of "evil," we should ask if we should simply take our leave of the concept of evil, admitting that it has been exhausted by overuse, shifting intellectual paradigms, and a triumphant secular age. In other words, does it make any sense for us today to go beyond calling something wrong or unjust or harmful or unspeakable and to speak in terms of "evil?" Is talk about evil simply a relic of a way of speaking and thinking about the world that we have long left behind? Is "evil" in fact one of those terms that have always drawn people into error and sometimes even into committing horrific acts? Second, if we believe we can begin to address this first set of questions about the notion of evil, it remains to be seen what exactly we might mean by evil. What are we pointing to when we call something "evil?" What makes something evil rather than merely wrong or unjust? What kinds of things do we reserve the judgment of evil for? This set of questions leads us to come up with a substantive account of evil, an account of what evil is and what distinguishes evil from other wrongdoing. To address these questions, our argument will proceed as follows. We will begin with an overview of the recent return to discussing evil after a turn away from evil by the majority working in philosophy. After giving a brief historical overview of these shifts we will then begin to argue for the need for philosophers to think about evil and the concept of evil. In short, as I will argue, because we continue to turn to the notion of evil in response to extreme forms of wrongdoing, philosophical reflection is warranted in trying to clarify what we might reasonably mean when we call an agent or action evil. Moving to a discussion of the idea of radical evil, we will begin with a close reading and interpretation of Kant's account of radical evil, pausing to discuss what he gets right and where he may err. We will then move to recent discussions of evil in contemporary philosophy, much of which can be understood as revolving around Kant's account of radical evil. In these contemporary accounts, evil is no longer used in an inclusive, wide sense, but almost exclusively to refer to the kinds of extreme, unforgivable wrongdoing we might classify under the notion of radical evil. In these recent accounts, there is an attempt to distinguish degrees of evil, between the "normal" or "ordinary" evils of serious wrongdoing that we nevertheless can understand, punish, and cope with, versus the "radical" or extreme evils that we cannot really understand, punish, or fit into our intellectual and moral frameworks. After discussing these recent accounts and appreciating the progress they make, we will nevertheless ask whether they can really help us grasp the kinds of horrendous evil they were developed in response to. In particular, we will argue that these recent accounts still fail to appreciate the notion of radical evil to its full extent, preferring to focus on the harm caused and on notions like the banality of evil and ordinary evildoers, projects which may end up distorting the nature of evil. Looking to some recent reflections on radical evil, we will argue that the Kantian notion of a perversion of the will and an evil heart help us to understand that radical evil is something that is usually anything but banal, but is a fundamental breach of our normal standards of wrongness and that this quality of excess and the inversion of the moral is what lies at the core of the acts and agents we deem evil. We will conclude by looking at the necessary limits of any abstract discussion of evil in general and how particular evils such as those experienced at Auschwitz cannot even begin to be explained by such accounts, arguing that our discomfort and horror in the face of evil nevertheless remains but that such attempts at reflection and understanding evil remain necessary and urgent.

Mit Immanuel Kant beginnt das Problem der Geschichte der Philosophie als philosophisches Problem; zu Kant kehren daher die aktuellen Problematisierungsversuche gerne zurück, so auch Axel Beelmann. Eingangs schildert Beelmann in dramatischer Weise den Skandal, den eine systematische Vernunft im Faktum einer Philosophiegeschichte anerkennen muss, welche verschiedene Kulturen kennt, unterschiedliche Probleme benennt und divergierende Begrifflichkeiten einräumen muss. Es wird ein 'Graben' zwischen systematischem und geschichtlichem Philosophieren aufgeworfen, welcher seit Kant - der sein eigenes Projekt einer 'philosophischen Archäologie' nicht ausbaute - hauptsächlich auf zwei Wegen überwunden wird: im Entwicklungsdenken und als Narration. Beelmann unterscheidet eine 'spekulative Philosophiegeschichte' von einer 'philosophischen Philosophiehistorie' und einer 'historischen Philosophiehistorie', womit eine Typologie für seine Untersuchung gegeben ist, alle prinzipiellen Möglichkeiten aufzuzeigen, 'die Philosophie in ein Verhältnis zu ihrer Geschichte zu bringen'.

Was kann man unter Kulturphilosophie verstehen? Umfaßt sie den Bereich alter Artikulationsbedingungen des philosophischen Denkens? Oder fällt darunter der Bereich eines sozusagen randständigen historischen Wissens, welches das Philosophieren nur nebenbei berührt? Was wollen wir wissen, wenn wir nach der Kulturgeschichte der Philosophie fragen? Wollen wir überhaupt etwas wissen? Oder interessiert uns an dieser Frage ihr irrationales Potential, ihre Abseitigkeit, die sie jedenfalls für Philosophen hat? Wollen wir vielleicht unsere Vorstellung von Philosophie ändern, erweitern, indem wir nach ihr auch kulturhistorisch fragen? Oder wollen wir uns willentlich in Abseits der varia et curiosa begeben und unsere Vorstellung von Philosophie lediglich ergänzen, sozusagen garnieren, indem wir die Rubrik \'interessante Einzelheiten\' eröffnen und darunter sammeln, was wir für bemerkenswert halten. weil es \'auch\' zur Philosophie gehört?

As the twentieth century dawned in the western world, there were voices both inside and out of the Christian Church that began to question religion's central place in man's daily life. Had humanity finally progressed to the point where religion was no longer necessary? Had we at long last developed the characteristics and perspectives that religion had attempted to engrain within us? Or were the rules and regulations of religion still needed to ensure the continued advancement of civilization? This is a study of two opposing voices in that debate: theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer and ethicist Paul Ramsey. What follows is my attempt to examine, explain, and expound upon the philosophies of both men in an endeavor to more fully understand their perspectives and the implications each has for civilization and religion as we move now firmly into the twenty-first century and beyond.

In the recent literature, there is some debate over Reid’s theory of perception. Commentators are divided on whether or not Reid’s theory is consistent with an acquaintance model of perception. I will show that Reid’s views are not consistent with an acquaintance model, but that he nevertheless had good reasons to subscribe to this model. There is, therefore, an interesting tension in Reid’s theory of perception. I then develop a modified Reidian acquaintance model of perception as a way of resolving these tensions in light of an argument contained in Reid’s Philosophical Orations, and defuse recent objections to the acquaintance interpretation in the process. / Thesis / Doctor of Philosophy (PhD) / In this dissertation I examine an ongoing debate in the contemporary literature on Thomas Reid over the nature of his account of perception. I argue that one interpretation of Reid’s theory of perception that has been entertained fails, and that this does not, for various reasons, bode well for the viability of his account. I argue that Reid had available a straightforward way to revise his theory in order to avoid this difficulty, and I explicate this simple revision.

This thesis explores Friedrich Nietzsche's use of history for philosophical purposes, focusing on two central themes in Nietzsche's writings: the genealogical methodology, and perspectival epistemology. My aim is to demonstrate how Nietzsche's concept of "historical philosophizing" is intricately connected to his moral philosophy. Using a genealogical methodology, Nietzsche traces the historical development of moral concepts back to their foundations, unveiling the underlying power structures and complex mechanisms that underpin moral discourse. Additionally, perspectival epistemology challenges conventional notions of truth and objectivity, serving as a critique of moral semantics. I argue that these elements are interconnected and should be studied as parts of a unified whole. By providing insights into an overlooked theme in Nietzschean methodology, this essay may enrich our understanding of his philosophy as well as contribute to broader debates within contemporary philosophy.

This work examines the relationship between Alfred North Whitehead’s process philosophy and the nonlinear dynamical systems framework for studying cognition. I argue that the nonlinear dynamical systems approach to cognitive science presupposes many key elements of his process philosophy. The process philosophical interpretation of nature posits events and the dynamic relations between events as the fundamental substrate of reality, as opposed to static physical substances. I present a brief history of the development of substance thought before describing Whitehead’s characterization of nature as a process. In following, I will examine the both the computational and nonlinear dynamical systems frameworks for investigating cognition. I will show that the computational paradigm is subject to many of the same criticisms as substance. Conversely, I will show that nonlinear dynamical cognitive science avoids these criticisms and is congenial to Whitehead’s philosophy insofar as it is suitable for describing emergent processes. To conclude, I suggest that the nonlinear dynamical cognitive science confirms and validates Whitehead’s philosophy. Furthermore, I argue that process philosophy is an appropriate characterization of nature for guiding inquiry in cognitive science.

No description available.

<p>This thesis aims to develop a principled rationale for coercible environmental protectionist duties, based on Kant’s <em>Metaphysics of Morals</em>, specifically, the <em>Doctrine of Right</em>. The claim of the thesis is not that such a rationale can be directly extracted from Kant’s arguments in that work, but rather that it can be reasonably extrapolated based on Kant’s framework. For Kant, politico-juridical authority, and its exercise via coercion, can be justified only in terms of the requirements of a system of freedom. Accordingly, the only legitimate rationale for coercively inhibiting environmentally destructive activities would be that such activities are, in one way or another, contrary to freedom, or incompatible with a system of Right based on freedom. The Kantian perspective on law and politics, as applied to environmental issues, demands that we ask: in what way do acts of environmental destruction constitute a hindrance, obstruction, or diminishment, of freedom; or, in what way are such acts a defective and transgressive exercise of freedom? The basic aim of this thesis is to answer these questions, and, more specifically, to establish that owners of finite natural resources (especially land) owe duties of forbearance with respect to their holdings, i.e., duties not to destroy or dissipate (or use non-sustainably) such resources. A primary challenge is that, from a Kantian perspective, any such analysis has to be based exclusively on the idea of freedom – as opposed to notions of “harm”, “welfare”, the “public good” or the “intrinsic value of nature”. Kant’s “Juridical Postulate of Practical Reason” furnishes the key to our response: environmentally destructive activity is a hindrance to freedom, and thus transgressive, because it renders usable natural resources unavailable for further use, whereas the postulate actually demands that ostensibly usable objects remain available for use in perpetuity. Further, the permissibility of environmental destruction ultimately entails the permissibility of the annihilation of the material preconditions of any possible exercise of freedom. As such, environmentally destructive acts must be intolerable within a system of Right, and environmental preservation is an imperative of Right.</p> / Master of Arts (MA)

<p><strong>Abstract</strong></p> <p>I argue that the relationship between Levinas and Plato is best described as one of inspiration, because both thinkers understand themselves as inspired by a transcendent Good. Levinas’ obscure and frequent citations of Plato have led many scholars to conclude that their relationship is impossible to understand, but I argue that an implicit Platonic inspiration is at the root of each of Levinas’ polemic and descriptive arguments.</p> <p>My method is to map the overlap between Levinas and Plato in <em>Totality and Infinity</em> and <em>Otherwise than Being</em>. Inspiration, as a unifying concept, emerges from this mapping. I also consider Derrida’s demonstration of how difficult it is for Levinas to align himself with Plato. I argue that Derrida has missed the Platonic inspiration at the core of Levinasian philosophy and therefore cannot understand how the two are aligned. For both Levinas and Plato, inspiration puts the thinker’s ability to act in question, and makes the thinker realize his passivity to the transcendent Good.</p> / Master of Philosophy (MA)