This thesis explores the existence and outlook of a European officer class in the mid- to later 18th century by studying the army officers of Britain and the Habsburg Monarchy from the War of the Austrian Succession to the eve of the French Revolutionary Wars. It illuminates the character of such an officer class of ‘Military Europe’ with its own cultural customs and practices. Furthermore, it details similarities, differences and peculiarities of both officer corps. This is achieved by analysing the social and national composition of both armies, with a focus here on the Habsburg Army due to the fact that it took in great numbers of foreigners and that the muster lists give an indication of how great the proportion of nobility was. A comparison with the British case shows striking similarities but also obvious differences. In a further step the ability of individuals for social advancement and national mobility is scrutinised on both sides. In this context, the state’s care for its officers and their social security is also taken into account. One possibility to acknowledge the officers’ service was to raise their status, either by ennoblement or through increasing the prestige of the uniform in court and society, its transformation into an ‘Ehrenkleid’ (garment of honour). As officers increasingly became servants to the state, rather than noble retainers and military enterprisers, they were also subject to professionalization efforts by the sovereigns. What becomes apparent, however, is that the officers did not only react to such measures but that at least a significant part of them actively worked on improving the service, thereby exhibiting a growing professionalism. In order to explore the coherence of the officer corps in those armies, with officers all following the same codes and accepting each other as equals, the thesis looks into core values (including honour, duty, courage and loyalty) binding them together and separating them from the enlisted men. The thesis will also offer a glimpse of their engagement with civilian society and culture as well as their role as ‘foot soldiers of Enlightenment’. On a European level, interaction between these officers proves their general acceptance of and respect for each other, while at the same time acting as state representatives in wartimes. Their interaction with non-European and non-state military forces and their leadership marks out the fluid boundaries of military Europe, but also exhibits the pervasiveness of European military culture.

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Cette thèse étudie les crises et les reconfigurations de la relation d'autorité au sein de l'année française entre 1954 et 1966. La guerre d'Algérie apparaît comme le point d'aboutissement de nombreux écrits théorico-pratiques visant à donner l'initiative aux chefs et à instituer l'obéissance active des soldats. Sur le terrain du commandement, la guerre d'Algérie consacre l'initiative des petits chefs, où chacun peut faire sa règle. Pourtant, la relation d'autorité est minée par des phénomènes de concurrences entre chefs, qui se disputent pour obtenir des honneurs et des résultats. Dans le cadre d'une armée de masse, de nombreuses contre-autorités émergent pour contrer, annuler ou parfois collaborer avec l'autorité hiérarchique. Les soldats, se font critiques et commettent des actes de résistance dans le dos de l'autorité. En prenant appui sur le TPF A de Constantine, nous avons pris soin de compter et d 'historiciser les formes de désobéissance enregistrées, mais aussi de décrire les profils de ceux qui commettent des atteintes à la relation d'autorité. Ces désobéissances sont d'abord fortes, caractérisant l'entrée en guerre entre 1954 et 1957. Pendant le temps fort de la guerre (1957-1961), les désobéissances restent nombreuses, mais les sanctions se concentrent sur les faits les plus graves, si bien qu'elles semblent se tasser. La fin de la guerre (1961-1966), entre le putsch et le départ des forces françaises, est marquée par une véritable crise de la discipline, suivie de nombreuses réformes découlant de la guerre d'Algérie, visant à refonder le lien entre l'armée et les citoyens-soldats. / This thesis studies the crises and reconfigurations of authority within the French am1y from 1954 to 1966. The Algerian war appears as the end point of many theoretical and practical writings aiming at endowing chiefs with initiatives and at establishing active submission on the part of soldiers. At the level of leadership, the Algerian war sanctions small chiefs' initiative that allows them to make their own rules. And yet, power relations are undermined by phenomena of competition between chiefs who fight between themselves to obtain honours and results. ln the context of a mass am1y many counter-power emerge to counter, cancel or sometimes collaborate with hierarchical authority. The soldiers become the cri tics of such practices and commit acts of resistance in the back of the hierarchy. By building on the TPF A of Constantine, we meticulously index and historicise the forms of disobedience recorded but we also describe the profiles of those who breached these power relations. These acts of disobedience are strong during the period of the beginning of the war between 1954 and 1957. During the high of the war (1957-1961), the acts of disobedience stay plenty but the sanctions only focus on the most serious cases thus giving the impression that they diminished. The end of the war ( 1961-1966), between the putsch and the departure of the French am1y, is marked by a crisis of discipline that leads to a series of reforms aiming at rebuilding the relations between the army and the citizen­-soldiers.