This thesis focuses on the establishment and operation of the latest regional Human Rights Court: The African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. For the development of human rights protection mechanisms within regional organizations the governments of the member states are of special relevance. They pull the strings to either foster and develop a system or to disrupt it. Therefore, following a brief historical introduction, the first chapter gives an overview of the regional African organization, the former Organization of African Unity (OAU) and today's African Union (AU) which was instrumental in the establishment of the African Human Rights System and has now enhanced it by adding a judicial authority. However, it will become clear that is has taken a long time for the OAU to put human rights violations within the borders of its own member states on its agenda: Not until there was increasing international pressure due to never-ending excrescences of violence in the dictatorial regimes in Africa did the OAU carefully attend to this matter in the late 1970s. Its efforts culminated in the adoption of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (the eponymous Banjul Charter) which entered into force in 1981. The body for the protection created by the Charter was the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights which took up its function in 1987. Since the newly established African Court is not supposed to replace the Commission but rather to strengthen it, the Court operates in concert with the Commission. Therefore the old protection system will still be applicable which deems a portrayal of the system in the following chapter necessary. Here, it will be outlined, that the competences of the Commission remain very limited and that its judicial impact on the State parties involved in its protection procedures has been nearly nil up to this very day. Against this background the next chapter focuses on the Protocol to the Banjul-Charter establishing the African Court on Human and Peoples' Rights. First, the historical-political background and the protocol's juridical formulation process are examined. Here it will be shown that the end of global bipolarity has had a remarkable impact on the political protagonists in Africa with the effect that the increasing demands for a human rights Court within the OAU no longer remained completely unheard. It will also be outlined that the path towards the adoption of the protocol has been long and difficult. After a short survey of the organisational structure of the Court it will become clear that the protocol follows to a large extend its Inter-American counterpart concerning the institutional embodiment. However, a remarkable and, in international comparison, a unique achievement has also been achieved by the institutional regulations by making gender equality has one of the key issues to encompass when it comes to the nomination and election of judges. The following chapters outline the jurisdiction of the Court and the judicial process before the Court. In this connection the admissibility criteria will be highlighted in which two remarkable regulations stand out: First, it will become clear that in contrast to other regional human rights courts individuals and NGOs alike are entitled to file a complaint with the African Court (even though initially with the help of the Commission, since the protocol makes the complaint authority of individuals and NGOs dependent of a special declaration of acceptance of the State Parties concerned). Moreover, also unique compared to international two-tier human rights procedures, the protocol does not include a provision according to which a complainant would be obliged to go through a prior Commission procedure before filing a complaint with the Court. Individual complainants rather have direct access to the Court once a declaration of acceptance has been submitted by a State Party to the protocol. Following short remarks on the competence of the Court to issue provisional measures which, among other things, reveal that these measures have, in contrast to those of the ECtHR, binding effect the procedural termination of a complaint comes into focus. Here, the possible contents of the rulings and the control mechanisms for their implementation are being contemplated in a detailed fashion. This last aspect most probably will have great influence on the fate of the Court since the Commission for its part had to a large extent no success due to the fact that it had no conventional implementation procedures to rely on. Therefore, in the vast majority of cases the findings of the Commission trailed off without any State Party concerned paying any attention to it. The drafters of the protocol establishing the Court obviously have learned this lesson since the protocol provides for a quite remarkable implementation mechanism that may be able to impose political and legal pressure alike on State Parties if the Court deems that they have not properly complied with a Court's ruling. Even sanctions within the African Union against a recusant State come into question from a legal point of view - a quantum leap regarding the legal situation under the Banjul Charter. The last chapter rehearses the main findings of the thesis and concludes with a positive outlook on the future development of the African human rights system.

La sanction internationale de la violation des droits de l'homme peine à atteindre les objectifs qui lui sont assignés. Les sanctions non juridictionnelles mises en place au sein du système de la Charte des Nations unies sont le régime de droit commun, mais leur efficacité reste limitée pour la victime. Les Comités créés pour veiller à l'application des conventions relatives aux droits de l'homme prennent de simples recommandations à l'issue de l'examen des communications individuelles et sont incompétents pour connaître des violations graves. À défaut de mécanisme de sanction des violations graves, le Conseil de sécurité a étendu l'application des mesures collectives aux droits de l'homme. Le recours ainsi fait au Chapitre VII est confronté aux difficultés opérationnelles qui en limitent la portée. Face à ces difficultés, le Conseil de sécurité a diversifié ses sanctions. Toutefois, qu'elles soient des sanctions ciblées ou des mesures juridictionnelles comme la création de juridictions pénales ou la saisine de la Cour pénale internationale, les mesures collectives sont axées sur l'individu et non l'État. Bien que ce dernier soit le titulaire des obligations internationales en la matière, il est à l'abri de toute sanction contraignante, qu'elle soit collective ou pénale. L'absence de sanction efficace à l'encontre de l'État et la garantie insuffisante des droits de la victime impose une réforme du contentieux international des droits de l'homme. Au-delà du renforcement des mécanismes des organes de traités, la création d'une juridiction universelle chargée de sanctionner la violation des droits de l'homme au sein du système des Nations unies doit être envisagée. / The goal of effectively addressing human rights violations by imposing international sanctions has been hardly achieved. Under the UN Charter, even though non-judicial sanctions are applied as the common system, they are not effective enough in addressing the victim's needs. Committees established to monitor the application of human rights Conventions, while considering individual communications, can only make recommendations, as they are not even competent to handle serious human rights violations. In the absence of an effective mechanism to deal with serious human rights violations, the Security Council has extended the application of collective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to human rights, resulting into operational difficulties limiting its scope. Therefore, the Security Council has diversified its sanctions in order to address these challenges. However, the collective measures, either targeted sanctions or judicial measures e.g. the establishment of criminal courts or referral to the International Criminal Court, only focus on the individual rather than the State. Although the State is the duty bearer under the international human rights obligations, it is not subject to binding sanctions, whether collective or criminal. The lack of effective sanctions against State and the insufficient guarantee for protection of the victim's rights call for a reform of the international human rights litigation. In addition to strengthening the treaty body system, it is worth considering the establishment of a World Court within the UN system to impose enforceable sanctions on States in case of human rights violation.

In the last few years, an ever growing number of States have recognized same-sex marriage. For that reason, it is important to ask what would happen if two same-sex individuals that have legally contracted marriage in another countrywould sue for its recognition in Peru. The authors of this article study the courses ofaction available to legal operators facing this situation, in the context of the public policy exception and International Human Rights Law.For that purpose, they analize European and Inter-American case-law on the matter and offer a way forward on how to solve conflicts between foreign law, domestic law, and human rights. / Durante los últimos años, cada vez más ordenamientos jurídicos han regulado el matrimonio entre personas del mismo sexo. Es importante por ello preguntarse qué sucedería si dos personas del mismo sexo que hayan contraído matrimonio legalmente en otro país exigieran que el mismo fuera reconocido en Perú.Los autores de este artículo indagan sobre las posibilidades de acción de los operadores jurídicos ante esta situación, en el marco del orden público internacional y el Derecho Internacional de los Derechos Humanos. Para ello, analizan jurisprudencia tanto europea como interamericana sobre el tema, además de ensayar una solución sobre cómo resolver conflictos entre los ordenamientos extranjeros, la normativa nacional y los derechos humanos.