This thesis examines the default application of the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties reservation rules to reservations to human rights treaties. The contemporary practice of formulating reservations allows states to unilaterally modify their treaty obligations following the conclusion of negotiations. Though multilateral treaties address a broad spectrum of subjects and are negotiated using a variety of methods, all treaties are governed by the same residual reservation rules of the Vienna Convention when there is not a treaty-specific reservation regime in place. The Vienna Convention system is only engaged if a state seizes the opportunity to determine whether a reservation is valid pursuant to default rules or if a challenge regarding the validity of a reservation is brought before another competent mechanism of review, such as a dispute resolution mechanism. Even when applied, the Vienna Convention rules are ambiguous at best and have been criticised since their inception due to the high degree of flexibility in their application, especially in relation to human rights treaties. In light of the inherent flaws of the Vienna Convention reservation regime and the structural characteristics of human rights treaties, rarely will a reserving state be deprived of the benefit of the reservation even if it is determined to be invalid by another State Party. Though the consequences of an invalidity determination are more concrete when the decision is taken by a dispute resolution mechanism, such as a court, seldom are disputes over the validity of a reservation to a human rights treaty submitted to a competent mechanism. Using the core UN human rights treaties as a case study this research highlights that the past thirty years have revealed a practical impasse in treaty law when the default reservation rules are relied upon to regulate reservations to human rights treaties. Reservations of questionable validity gain the same status as valid reservations because the Vienna Convention rules do not address the consequence for a reservation determined to be invalid outwith the traditional inter se application of the reservation between the reserving and objecting states, which is not logical in the context of a human rights treaty. Against this background, this thesis examines whether the default reservation rules adequately govern reservations to human rights treaties. The conclusion affirms that the Vienna Convention reservation regime can regulate reservations to human rights treaties but only if there is a clearly defined final view on the validity of a reservation taken by an organ other than the state. Therefore, it is argued that treaty-specific supervisory mechanisms attached to each of the core UN human rights treaties should be invested with the competency to serve a determinative function with respect to evaluating reservations to human rights treaties in order to facilitate a stronger basis for the international human rights system.

Few topics of discussion within international human rights law are as riddled with confusion as that concerning the legal status or normative significance of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and their work. The treaty bodies, in its work, generate a form of jurisprudence – a body of norms and directives about how state parties ought to act in order to comply fully with the treaties. The prevailing issue within the legal practice and academic debate is often presented as a dilemma: are the norms generated by the treaty bodies binding or not? This paper takes a somewhat different approach, arguing that the treaty bodies’ normative output, all the while legal in nature, is best understood as non-binding, yet maintain the function of giving the states parties to the respective treaties reasons for action. Thus, discarding with the binary ‘grammar’ defended by some of the leading international law scholars, where law equals binding and obligatory, and non-binding and non-obligatory equals non-law. Instead, this paper suggest a third option which better fits the actual function that treaty body output serves within the practice of international human rights law. Also, since the resulting norms do not have binding force, the requirement of state consent should be proportionally weakened, giving rise to the possibility that the state may be subject to legal norms without its consent.

La sanction internationale de la violation des droits de l'homme peine à atteindre les objectifs qui lui sont assignés. Les sanctions non juridictionnelles mises en place au sein du système de la Charte des Nations unies sont le régime de droit commun, mais leur efficacité reste limitée pour la victime. Les Comités créés pour veiller à l'application des conventions relatives aux droits de l'homme prennent de simples recommandations à l'issue de l'examen des communications individuelles et sont incompétents pour connaître des violations graves. À défaut de mécanisme de sanction des violations graves, le Conseil de sécurité a étendu l'application des mesures collectives aux droits de l'homme. Le recours ainsi fait au Chapitre VII est confronté aux difficultés opérationnelles qui en limitent la portée. Face à ces difficultés, le Conseil de sécurité a diversifié ses sanctions. Toutefois, qu'elles soient des sanctions ciblées ou des mesures juridictionnelles comme la création de juridictions pénales ou la saisine de la Cour pénale internationale, les mesures collectives sont axées sur l'individu et non l'État. Bien que ce dernier soit le titulaire des obligations internationales en la matière, il est à l'abri de toute sanction contraignante, qu'elle soit collective ou pénale. L'absence de sanction efficace à l'encontre de l'État et la garantie insuffisante des droits de la victime impose une réforme du contentieux international des droits de l'homme. Au-delà du renforcement des mécanismes des organes de traités, la création d'une juridiction universelle chargée de sanctionner la violation des droits de l'homme au sein du système des Nations unies doit être envisagée. / The goal of effectively addressing human rights violations by imposing international sanctions has been hardly achieved. Under the UN Charter, even though non-judicial sanctions are applied as the common system, they are not effective enough in addressing the victim's needs. Committees established to monitor the application of human rights Conventions, while considering individual communications, can only make recommendations, as they are not even competent to handle serious human rights violations. In the absence of an effective mechanism to deal with serious human rights violations, the Security Council has extended the application of collective measures under Chapter VII of the Charter to human rights, resulting into operational difficulties limiting its scope. Therefore, the Security Council has diversified its sanctions in order to address these challenges. However, the collective measures, either targeted sanctions or judicial measures e.g. the establishment of criminal courts or referral to the International Criminal Court, only focus on the individual rather than the State. Although the State is the duty bearer under the international human rights obligations, it is not subject to binding sanctions, whether collective or criminal. The lack of effective sanctions against State and the insufficient guarantee for protection of the victim's rights call for a reform of the international human rights litigation. In addition to strengthening the treaty body system, it is worth considering the establishment of a World Court within the UN system to impose enforceable sanctions on States in case of human rights violation.

La construction empirique du système conventionnel des Nations Unies relatif aux droits de l’homme s’est fondée sur un consensus minimum entre les Etats concernant le développement du dispositif conventionnel. Font partie de ce consensus les procédures de surveillance de l’application des traités onusiens relatifs aux droits de l’homme et les organes auxquels la mise en oeuvre de ces procédures fut confiée. A côté de la procédure de présentation des rapports sur les mesures prises pour la mise en oeuvre de leurs obligations conventionnelles, les Etats parties se sont mis d’accord sur une procédure de présentation de plaintes individuelles, sous l’appellation de procédure de communications individuelles. Le modèle initial de cette procédure, produit de résistances, des polarisations, des hésitations et des espérances démenties concernant la création d’une Cour internationale des droits de l’homme, la nature et l’étendue du contrôle sur plainte et le statut de l’individu, fut reproduit par la suite sans modifications majeures. La procédure d’examen des communications individuelles ainsi que les éléments de l’affaire introduite par les communications individuelles sont établis par les instruments conventionnels dans des termes comparables. Leur mise en oeuvre par les organes de traités ne témoigne pas d’une rupture capable d’empêcher l’unité du système conventionnel des Nations Unies. Les comités conventionnels ont pris conscience de leur fonctionnement au sein d’un seul système et s’efforcent d’harmoniser leurs méthodes de travail tout en assurant la spécificité de leur traité. C’est ainsi que l’on peut parler du régime des procédures de communications individuelles dans le système conventionnel des Nations Unies sur les droits de l’homme. A côté des éléments institutionnels et procéduraux permettant la systématisation des procédures de communications individuelles, les instruments conventionnels les plus récents établissant les procédures de communications individuelles codifient l’évolution de la procédure par les comités conventionnels les plus anciens, notamment le Comité des droits de l’homme. La codification de la pratique du contentieux des comités conventionnels s’inscrit dans un processus continu d’évolution de la protection des droits de l’homme au niveau universel. En s’affirmant garants à la fois de l’objet et du but de traités onusiens relatifs aux droits de l’homme et de l’effectivité du recours individuel, les organes de traités renforcent leur rôle en tant qu’organes de contrôle et poussent pour une judiciarisation implicite de la procédure de communications individuelles. Cependant, à défaut d’outils institutionnels permettant d’imposer aux Etats parties les obligations découlant de la procédure de communications individuelles, les organes de traités sont obligés de chercher le bon dosage entre fermeté et diplomatie sans pour autant être en mesure d’assurer la coopération des Etats parties. La standardisation de la procédure de communications individuelles au sein du système conventionnel des Nations Unies de protection des droits de l’homme renforce la position de l’individu en droit international et met au premier plan des victimes restées longtemps dans l’ombre. Par l’affirmation de leur autorité d’interpréter les traités et d’assurer l’efficacité de la procédure de communications individuelles, les comités conventionnels contribuent à la mise en oeuvre effective et cohérente des principes normatifs au niveau universel. / The empirical construction of the United Nations human rights treaty system was based on a minimum consensus among states. Treaty bodies and monitoring procedures of treaty obligations are part of this consensus. Besides the reporting procedure, States parties have reached consensus on an individual complaints procedure. The procedure emerged after polarization and hesitation among States over the establishment of an international human rights court and the status of the individual in international law and was reproduced in without major modifications. So individual complaints procedures under United Nations human rights treaties have common procedural and institutional features. Furthermore, treaty bodies have engaged in a process of harmonization of their working methods giving us reason to be optimistic about the unity of United Nations human rights treaty system. Besides common institutional and procedural aspects, the latest treaties establishing individual complaints procedures codify the evolutionary practice of older treaty bodies, especially the Human Rights Committee. By affirming their determination to protect the object and purpose of human rights treaties and to guarantee the effectiveness of individual complaints procedures, treaty bodies strengthen implicitly the judicial aspects of the procedure. However, in the absence of judicial authority and other institutional tools for imposing on States parties’ treaty obligations, the treaty bodies are forced to seek the right balance between firmness and diplomacy without being able to ensure States parties’ cooperation. Nonetheless, observance of treaty obligations under the individual complaints procedure is a part of a long and continuous process in which treaty bodies due to their expertise and competences have a predominant role. The standardization of the individual communications procedure in the United Nations human rights treaty system strengthens the position of the individual in international law and foregrounds victims that have long remained in the shadows. By asserting their authority to interpret treaties and to ensure the effectiveness of the individual communications procedures, the treaty bodies contribute to the universalization of normative principles and their effective and coherent implementation.