Social dilemmas constitute a broad class of quandaries, including, for example, common pool resource (CPR) dilemmas and public good (PG) dilemmas. CPR's are characterized by non-excludability and rivalry and are often associated with overexploitation. Through similar arguments, the features non-excludability and non-rivalry give rise to under-provision of PG's. The prevalence and inefficiencies often associated with CPR's have given rise to an extensive literature and the role of resource uncertainty has not been ignored. Uncertainty combined with rivalry is often said to augment users' incentive to overexploit. However, underlying most of the theoretical research is an explicit or implicit assumption of symmetric information, or a symmetric lack of information. In reality, people generally have access to different sources of information and they may differ in their abilities to process information. In the first two papers of this thesis, the assumption of symmetry is relaxed and both papers demonstrate that from a welfare perspective, the distribution of uncertainty is also of importance. Many CPR's and PG's are natural, which can complicate the situation. In the traditional resource management literature, the exploited resource is often assumed to be properly characterized by some concave growth function. Today, there is extensive empirical evidence suggesting that many ecosystems have more complex, often non-linear dynamics. Management of such resources can be quite challenging as the non-linear dynamics can make the ecosystem flip between alternate stable states, and even marginal changes can cause radical transformations of such ecosystems. Most of the CPR models assume the shared resource to be of fixed size or to be able to generate a constant flow of services. In the third paper we aim at providing a more complete picture of the overexploitation of a common resource, by combining the institutional structure with complex ecological dynamics. We manage to raise questions and doubts about the standard assumptions. Another feature of convex-concave resources is that a state can become highly robust and sometimes an ecosystem change may even be irreversible. This is problematic if, for example, we wish to restore a degraded ecosystem. The aim of the fourth paper is to empirically analyze this question, by eliciting peoples' preferences through a hypothetical referendum on the issue. / Diss. Stockholm : Handelshögskolan, 2005