Investment Policy of the European Union - protection of foreign direct investment Abstract One of the changes brought about by the Lisbon Treaty is the explicit inclusion of foreign direct investment and its protection in the common commercial policy of the European Union. This is one of the areas of exclusive competence of the EU. The European Union has subsequently stated negotiating bilateral agreements governing, inter alia, investment issues. However, it has not been spared from controversy and negative publicity that has been accompanying especially the TTIP and the CETA. This work aims to analyse the investment policy of the EU and mutual interaction of its institutions with the Member States and third parties. After general introduction to the topic of international investment law and EU law (chapters II. and III.), it is devoted to the issue of protection of foreign investment in the internal market. Its regime is then compared with the BIT regime (chapter IV.). Attention is then focussed towards the EU's external relations in the field of investment protection. Its competence is subjected to further analysis (chapter V.) and current results of efforts of the Commission and the EU as such are also discussed (chapter VI.). It is so in the light of possible impacts of foreign investment in terms of...

Foreign investments in SADC are regulated by Annex 1 of the SADC Protocol on Finance and Investments (SADC FIP), as well as the laws of SADC Member States. At present, SADC faces the challenge that this regime for the regulation of foreign investments is unstable, unsatisfactory and unpredictable. Furthermore, the state of the rule of law in some SADC Member States is unsatisfactory. This negatively affects the security of foreign investments regulated by this regime. The main reasons for this state of affairs are briefly explained below. The regulatory regime for foreign investments in SADC is unstable, due to recent policy reviews and amendments of key regulatory instruments that have taken place. Major developments in this regard have been the suspension of the SADC Tribunal during 2010, the amendment of the SADC Tribunal Protocol during 2014 to bar natural and legal persons from access to the Tribunal, and the amendment of Annex 1 during 2016 to remove investor access to international investor-state arbitration, better known as investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). The regulation of foreign investments in SADC has been unsatisfactory, among others because some SADC Member States have failed or neglected to harmonise their investment laws with both the 2006 and the 2016 Annex 1. Furthermore, SADC Member States such as Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), Malawi, Mauritius, Seychelles, Eswatini, Tanzania, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have multiple Regional Economic Community (REC) memberships. This places these Member States in a position whereby they have conflicting interests and treaty obligations. Finally, the future of the regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC is unpredictable, due to regional integration efforts such as the recent formation of the COMESA-EAC-SADC Tripartite Free Zone (T-FTA) and the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA). The T-FTA is entitled to have its investment protocol, while the AfCFTA investment protocol will be negotiated from 2018 until 2020. These developments entail that the 2016 Annex 1 will soon be replaced by an investment protocol at either the T-FTA or AfCFTA levels, thereby ushering a new regime for the regulation of foreign investments in SADC. The unknown nature of the future regulations create uncertainty and instability among foreign investors and host states alike. This study analyses the regulation of foreign investments in terms of Annex 1 and selected laws of SADC Member States. In the end, it makes the three findings mentioned above. In order to address these findings, the study makes four recommendations. The first is that foreign investments in SADC must be regulated at African Union (AU) level, by means of an AfCFTA investment protocol (which incidentally is now the case). Secondly, investor-state disputes must be referred to the courts of a host state, optional ISDS, the African Court of Justice and Human Rights (ACJ&HR) or other agreed forum. Thirdly, an African Justice Scoreboard (AJS) must be established. The AJS will act as a gateway to determine whether an investor-state dispute shall be referred to the courts of a host state, ISDS, the ACJ&HR or other forums. Fourthly, the office of an African Investment Ombud (AIO) must be created. The AIO shall facilitate the early resolution of investor-state disputes, so as to reduce the number of disputes that may end-up in litigation or arbitration. / Mercantile Law / LL. D.

L’analyse du droit applicable aux relations sur l’approvisionnement du gaz russe dans l’UE a démontré l’impuissance du droit international de l’énergie, ainsi que les insuffisances du droit local russe et de celui des pays de l’UE et de l’UE. La solution globale à tous les problèmes pourrait être la fourniture de garanties favorisant les opérations d’achat-vente de gaz entre Gazprom et les entreprises des pays de l’UE et le développement des relations de la participation directe des entreprises russes et de l’UE sur les marchés. Les bases de la réglementation de ces relations pourront être fixées dans le nouvel Accord international entre la Russie et l’UE et dans la législation locale. / The current legal rules restrain the development of both frameworks now existing – that is, long-term contracts and opened-up markets. The solution to this problem could be the maintain of the first group of relations and the development of the second group. Therefore, it is important to suggest an alternative framework. The basis of such alternative framework could be fixed in an international treaty between Russia, EU and the member-states. This new regulation will also require the adjustment of the local legislation.